Politico reports that in a telephone conversation yesterday with Putin, President Donald Trump projected confidence that a resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war would come “relatively quickly.” Putin told Trump about plans to call a temporary ceasefire to mark the Victory Day celebration in May. According to Politico, Putin also expressed a desire to play an active role in Iran, which Trump said he quickly rebuffed.
“He told me he’d like to be involved with the enrichment if he can help us get it,” Trump told reporters. “I said, I’d much rather have you be involved with ending the war with Ukraine. To me, that would be more important.”
Naturally, for Trump, this was a deeply deceptive claim. In a previous phone call in March, Putin had made it clear that Russia opposed the US-Israeli aggressive and unprovoked attack on Iran. Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov’s summary of the call said that the call was “business-like, frank, and constructive,” and also “friendly,” lasting over an hour. Putin supported Trump’s ceasefire extension on Iran, but warned of severely adverse consequences for Iran, its neighbors and the entire international community if U.S./Israel take further military action against Iran tand discussed mediation. Putin stressed that a ground operation would be particularly unacceptable and dangerous. On Ukraine, Putin proposed a May 9 Victory Day ceasefire, which Trump reportedly supported, while citing Russian advances on the front line. Ushakov stated Trump expressed interest in ending the Ukraine conflict quickly, with Putin confirming Russia’s readiness for a negotiated settlement. Putin’s spokesman Dmiry Peskov, asked about this, was skeptical that a single telephone call was going to do much to bring an end to such a complex conflict. Other things discussed included the global oil market, and maintaining regular communication.
Hypersonic Missiles Against Iran
In referring to the “concluded” phase of armed confrontation with Iran, Trump may have told Putin that he was not contemplating further missile attacks or ground operations. If so, this would leave open the possibility that the US intends to maintain the current blockade in the expectation that this alone may cripple Iran to the point that it would have to surrender. Judging by reports that Iran is losing half a billion dollars a day in oil trade, its currency badly depreciating, the rate of inflation having risen to 50%, and that Kharg Island is nearing storage capacity, forcing Iran to reduce oil production and forgo a further $170 million per day, and causing permanent damage to Iran’s oil infrastructure this does not seem implausible. But on this question, Larry Johnson cites a report that Iran’s Majlis speaker Ghalibaf is “ridiculing Scott Bessent’s wild claims that the blockade is going to destroy Iran’s ability to export oil. He clearly is not concerned and is mocking Bessent’s insistence that Iranian oil wells are on the verge of collapsing.”
News that the one of the three US aircraft carriers in the region, the Gerald Ford – the one most affected by recent difficulties involving a fire, plumbing problems and substandard food – is moving away, it is even possible that the US is pursuing the entirely different option of de-escalation and backing away, with a view to normalizing the Gulf and bring down oil prices (which as I write on April 30th have peaked at $114 a barrel, an improvement on yesterday’s $120 peak), and reducing the cost of the war (currently estimated at $25 billion, but probably much higher) to the US, as well as the ways in which the war has exposed deep deficiencies in US military and weapons preparedness.
However, based on reports as of April 30, 2026, the British Daily Telegraph, a pro-war outlet with respect both to Ukraine and Iran – and in the context of rumors that the US is planning another sneak attack on Iran, despite the ceasefire – the US Central Command (CENTCOM) has requested to deploy the Army’s Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system to the Middle East for potential use against Iran. The deployment is intended to target Iranian missile launchers that have been moved beyond the range of existing US systems, specifically to counter, or “strike,” launchers deep inside Iranian territory. The Dark Eagle system, also known as the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), is technically still under development and has not yet been declared fully operational, though it is nearing that stage. These missiles are designed to glide at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound and can maneuver to avoid interception. This move comes amid ongoing tensions. While a tentative ceasefire has been in place since early April 2026, the request suggests the US is preparing for further military action. As of the latest reports, a decision on this request has not been finalized.
The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported that, contrary to reports of hypersonic missiles, Trump has opted for economic warfare against Iran as it carried less risk, instead of resuming bombing or trying to exit the conflict. US President Donald Trump has instructed his aides to prepare for an “extended blockade” against the Islamic Republic of Iran (Cradle). But one problem with the political-economy of the US blockade, as argued yesterday by Larry Johnson on Sonar21 (Sonar 21) is that if the US stops an Iranian vessel and takes control of it, then the US Navy must assign one ship to accompany it to a location the US controls.
“The US does not have enough US Navy ships to carry out such a mission on a broad scale. All Iran needs to do is load up 20 tankers and send them to sea simultaneously. The US may be able to stop two or three, but the rest will penetrate the blockade and arrive at their respective destinations.”
Iran can allow ships heading toward friendly nations to pass through the Strait in numbers that will make it impossible for the US Navy to stop them. (Although insurers and ship owners may not be comfortable with the risks). Furthermore, Pakistan has opened six corridors with Iran to bypass the US blockade. More than 3,000 containers bound for Iran are being transited over land.
There are rumors to the effect that the US blockading effort could switch or extend to the Strait of Malacca. A Malacca Strait blockade refers to the strategic, hypothetical, or active disruption of the narrow waterway between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which handles 25% of global trade and 80% of China’s oil imports. Often considered a critical vulnerability for China—the “Malacca Dilemma.”
The strait is the primary chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Disruptions, such as a blockade, could cause oil prices to surge and cripple supply chains, specifically targeting China. China’s would have to find alternative routes through Pakistan, Myanmar, and Thailand. The U.S. and India hold stronger naval positioning near the strait compared to China, giving them the capability to enforce a blockade, but it is doubtful that India would be party to such an attempt. Further, it is doubtful that Indonesia, Malaysia or Singapore, all of which do substantial business with China, would be unfazed by such a development. Yet recent US efforts to intercept Iranian oil tankers have seen enforcement extend towards the Malacca Strait, creating friction over the right of “innocent passage” under international law.
The Ramstein War
Brian Berletic engaged in some useful reality checking in reminding Glenn Diesen yesterday that the US is still essentially in charge of the war against Russia over Ukraine, from the war’s command center under US control in Ramstein, Germany. The implication is, and I agree with him, that the significant drone attacks we are witnessing against important oil refineries and other assets in Tualse (for the third time, last week) and Perm (for the past two nights) are ultimately directed by the US, at the very least using US intelligence and satellite guidance.
It is, therefore, hardly accurate to say that the US has actually “abandoned” Ukraine, as apart from intelligence, mainly, it has merely instructed Europe to take over the day-to-day NATO management of the war so that the US can concentrate on Iran and the US broader war against China, of which the assault on Iran is part. Until such time as the US can refocus all its efforts on dismantling Russian, the single largest national territory on the planet.
Ramstein Air Base operates as a major hub for both the U.S. Air Force and NATO, serving as headquarters for U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Allied Air Command. The host unit is the 86th Airlift which handles air mobility, while the 435th Air Ground Operations Wing provides specialized support.
The Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), commonly known as the Ramstein format, is the primary international platform coordinating military support for Ukraine against the Russian invasion. The group acts as a central hub where Ukraine communicates its immediate and long-term battlefield needs, and partners, led by the United States, announce new military packages. Established in April 2022 and named after the U.S. Air Base in Germany where the first meeting took place, it has evolved into a coalition of over 50 countries that meet monthly to synchronize, expedite, and deliver weapons to Ukraine.
The U.S. has pressured both sides to reach an agreement, with a 20-point peace framework proposed by the Trump administration in late 2025/early 2026. While direct, large-scale financial aid from the U.S. has decreased, the U.S. continues to support Ukraine through targeted military assistance, such as the $400 million in funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) approved for 2026–2027. The U.S. has actively participated in trilateral meetings, such as the February 2026 meetings in Geneva, to discuss security guarantees, prisoner exchanges, and a possible, ceasefire.
We return back to the Ukraine war with a continuation of the ongoing series spanning the last few premium articles which covered broader battlefield evolutions rather than tactical developments. The reason for the continued broader look is that the front has continued to be stagnant, tactically-speaking, and there are not enough newsworthy developments to justify the usual indepth coverage, as it would simply bore most readers to read about a few meters of nameless territory being captured, and the like.
But first, let us review what ‘stagnant’ may possibly mean and give a brief frontline update. Here is a recent Russian control graph showing most of March being fairly low, but with April again beginning to show spikes and implying a return to higher Russian advancement and overall activity on the front:
Much of Russia’s recent activity has come in unexpected quarters, particularly in the Sumy and Kharkov regions:
This month of april 2026, Russia seized 117km2, of which 55% are located on the UKR-RUS 🇺🇦🇷🇺 border Since the start of the year, Russian northern corps expanded its infiltrations in Sumy and Kharkiv regions This strategy is forcing Ukraine to defend the border 🧵THREAD🧵1/15⬇️
As the analyst states above: “The strategy is forcing Ukraine to defend the border”, and there have been recent reports of Ukraine sending reserves from other fronts to Sumy where Russia has been showing increased activity and territorial gains.
They provide a pro-Ukrainian version of Russia’s recent territorial gains:
As stated previously, one of the things these advancements on the border buffer zones does tell us is that Russia appears to not view the situation as critical, but continues to invest in the long-term development of the war by stretching Ukrainian forces in non-critical areas.
If Russia was focused merely on wrapping up the conflict as soon as possible, it would bolster its forces in the key regions that Putin has outlined as the main objectives, i.e. around Donbass. The fact that forces continue to be deployed and committed to these ‘hinterland’ zones means Russia is signaling it is in no rush, and intends to prosecute the conflict step by step by continuing the boa constrictor ‘squeezing’ strategy against Ukraine.
There has been a lot of buzz recently about Ukraine doing “better than ever”, and Russia facing various imminent collapses of both the economic and military sort. But Zelensky’s very vocal proclamations appear made to conceal more dire internal developments. For instance, Zelensky continues to press for an in-person meeting with Putin for some reason, while the Russian side no longer seems to care what Ukraine or the West wants, with Peskov stating multiple times recently that Russian-US talks are “on hold” and not currently happening.
Kyiv asks Turkey to arrange a meeting between Zelensky and Putin Ukraine is pushing for talks as soon as possible to give new momentum to diplomacy. “We have directly approached the Turks. But if such a meeting is organized in another capital — not Moscow or Minsk — we will take part,” said Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha.
Why is Ukraine so urgently pushing for direct talks with Putin to end the conflict, if Ukraine is doing so well as its backers suggest? And why is Russia so unbothered by it all, if Russia is the one supposedly seeing reversals on the battlefield and a collapsing economy?
At the same time, we can’t stick our heads in the sand and simply ignore the elephant in the room that Russia has in fact stopped advancing at “expected” rates, and the battlefield appears to have undergone an epochal shift to some new phase that analysts are only just scrambling to understand and explain to their readers.
As such, that is what I personally believe is happening. To summarize in a nutshell: it’s clear—as stated earlier—that Russia is not seeking a quick “out” or off-ramp, otherwise it would not have continued investing so many resources to backwater non-strategic regions like Sumy and even Chernigov. But then, why has Russia slowed down?
Let us examine a few of the key facts:
Firstly, the slowdown is not from some vast amount of attrition that has exhausted Russian forces. How do we know this? Because Russia is not even conducting assaults at scale, so there is little to even attrit. And this is part of the new epoch-shifting strategy which we will get to soon.
Secondly, Russia continues to destroy Ukrainian armor and materiel at greater disparities. If you follow this thread down, you’ll see over the past few weeks, even pro-Ukrainian bean-counters like Oryx have continued reporting that Ukraine is losing more hardware each day than Russia:
The trend of Ukraine suffering more equipment losses continues. I have noticed that almost always, a quarter of the Russian losses are only trucks, while Ukraine losses very few…
Russian and Ukrainian losses over the past 2 weeks, according to Jakub Janovsky, an account that updates Oryx. (Take it with a grain of salt) This has been a trend since the start of 2025. Even though Russia is on the offensive, Ukraine has been consistently losing more
The latest equipment loss sheet above shows 31 Russian losses versus 54 Ukrainian ones. The previous one showed 55 Russian equipment losses versus 166 Ukrainian ones—and this is from Oryx team member Jakub Janovsky.
Thirdly, even Ukrainian analytical sources have reported that Russian casualties are actually declining over the past year:
The situation could be considered “difficult but controlled” if a faster advance resulted in greater enemy losses, that is, if the two lines were moving synchronously. So it was in 2024. Since January 2025, the situation has begun to worsen, with Russians moving faster and dying less.
They are in effect admitting that Russian territorial captures are speeding up while Russian soldier deaths are slowing down. They do claim that recently Russian losses have spiked a bit again but it’s too small an interval for them to get “excited about” yet.
Thus we can infer Russia is not taking inordinate losses which have “exhausted” its forces. Further confirmation of this comes from a new interview with pro-Ukrainian ‘expert’ Michael Kofman. He states the following, via Grok summary:
‘Light motorized tactics are not a sign of armor shortages—Russia actually has more armored vehicles now than at the start of the war, and its ground forces have grown over 50% larger. The real constraints are elsewhere (e.g., air defense degradation and manpower allocation).”
So what is truly happening?
Here is my take:
Strategic Shift
I believe that Ukraine’s strategy has worked to an extent: that being, the total focus on attritional drone defense, layered networks of entrenchments and traps, etc. It has created enough costs for Russian assaults that Russian command has simply heavily backed off on doing larger-scale vehicular assaults. I’m not referring to truly gigantic assaults like were seen in the opening days of the Battle of Avdeevka in October 2023—those have long gone. But even smaller scale ones, where columns of light vehicles mixed with motorcycles attempted to forcibly storm positions.
At first, these lighter assaults worked decently well, though with a certain casualty percentage built in. But they grew costlier and costlier, with several high profile disastrous results where most of the assault columns were destroyed over the past year or so. Russian commanders who continued such assaults developed a stigma and their reputations quickly tarnished. This led to the eventual decrease, and presumably a decree from general staff that such assaults have to be greatly minimized for the time being.
Granted, this also happened to coincide during winter where it was already assumed Russian forces would become more dormant, so many people still continue to believe Russia is simply “waiting out the weather”. But at this point, nearly in May it’s clear that something shifted beyond simple inclement weather related delays as in previous years. This is why, I believe it can only be a strategic decision to shift things into a different type of attritional approach. It’s no surprise that this coincided with the sudden increase in activity on the border regions, where Russia again began to double-down on the ‘boa constrictor’ strategy.
Kofman, from the earlier interview, mentions this:
“Russia prioritizes Donetsk but spreads pressure broadly (including flatter terrain in Zaporizhzhia) to tie down Ukrainian forces. It avoids major urban assaults on large cities but uses proximity to attrit them via fire, potentially rendering them non-functional without occupation (e.g., threats to Kramatorsk/Slaviansk via fiber-optic drone advances).”
In fact, he touches on a specific important detail of the new strategy which we are now witnessing: the lack of full-on assaults on major cities.
As most know, Russia now has several key strategic Ukrainian cities almost fully surrounded: Konstantinovka, Novopavlovka, Krasny Lyman, Kupyansk, etc. In the past, this would have entailed immediate Wagner-like assaults through both the outskirts and into the city centers. But for some reason, Russia has now completely abandoned these previous “frontal assault” tactics. This, I believe, is part and parcel to the new strategic shift.
As Kofman notes above, Russia has shifted toward bombing and droning them with only the barest infiltration of troops. Part of the reason could also have to do with Ukraine’s total shift toward Russian manpower destruction via drones as an attritional strategy. This may have created costs for advancing that are too large for now, and Russia is being increasingly cautious, leveraging more its broader war strategy of disabling Ukraine economically and politically, rather than simply territorial conquest.
I believe this to be a relatively temporary shift for the time being until further opportunities open up. This could be either 1. a new advancement or technological leap that would mitigate the drone threat just enough to enable previously acceptable casualty rates—i.e. let’s say 10-20% instead of 30%, or something along those lines. Or 2. further economic, political, and attritional weakening of Ukraine and its statehood to wear its armed forces down further before re-activating more “large-scale” style offensives.
The escalations with the situation vis-a-vis Europe and the Baltics could have played into the calculus here: i.e. Russia may have deemed the threat of true kinetic confrontation to be getting so close that more resources had to be redirected from the Ukrainian effort toward the effort of bolstering the strategic “rear” in case a true conflict with NATO breaks out, or the Baltics have to be taught a lesson via “boots on ground”.
Moscow is obviously privy to telegraphed plans far ahead of time, so much of the provocations we ourselves are seeing are just the tip of the iceberg of the fuller long-term plans that European elites are hatching in terms of provocations. This is most often seen via the official dispatches from the Russian SVR, which this year alone has announced various provocative plans which include transferring nuclear weapons to Ukraine from UK-France.
To summarize this section: I believe that for now, Russia has chosen to “bide its time” and essentially switch to a lowered-intensity style strategy favoring more the “constrictor” approach, as well as economic destabilization, over predominantly territorial capture. Keep in mind, it’s never been one or the other: we were first here in identifying the constrictor strategy from the onset, over three years ago now. But there are fluctuations in how strongly Russia leverages one approach over the other, and I believe for now we have seen a swing the other way, wherein for the time being Russian command is “playing it safe” so as to husband its forces and not lose manpower unnecessarily.
There is of course always the possibility they see something we don’t in the criticality of the Ukrainian situation, and know that pushing super hard and losing troops is not necessary as Ukraine may be facing enough dire prospects as to make the current approach satisfactory in achieving military objectives—i.e. defeating Ukraine—over the long term….
The European Union, having gotten Orban out of the way, has finally formally approved its 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine.
Combined with Zelensky’s recent statements that his country ‘does not need’ Trump’s negotiation team, Ukrainian political analyst Kost Bondarenko has drawn the obvious conclusion — Zelensky is confident that he can blow off Trump. He will continue fighting with European help until 2028, when the hope is for a Democratic administration to return to the White House.
So, how goes the war?
Zelensky and allied western media have been pushing three main narratives this year. First, that Russian casualties are higher than ever. Second, that Ukraine is taking back increasing amounts of territory. Third, that Ukraine has retaken the lead in the drone war that it lost in 2025. The reality doesn’t seem to bear out these claims.
Losses
There have been a remarkable number of contradicting numbers about Russian losses coming from the Ukrainians and their western partners.
To begin with, there is dissonance between Zelensky and the General Staff. Throughout April, Zelensky and his minister of defense Fedorov have been saying that March saw an all-time record of Russian losses, 35 thousand KIA+WIA. But the website of the General Staff, which is the official Ukrainian source for Russian losses, claimed under 32 thousand. More importantly, according to this same website, the Russians lost 28% more troops in the first quarter of 2025, compared to the first quarter of 2026.
Then we turn to Zelensky’s western partners. On April 14, Finnish prime minister Alexander Stubb was overjoyed to declare that the Russians lost 35 thousand KIA in March:
“I actually think that Ukraine is in a much better place than it has been at any stage in this horrific war,..
Since December, they [Ukraine] have killed somewhere around 35,000 Russian soldiers per month,” he said. “Russia is not able to recruit enough soldiers to compensate for those 35,000. Ninety-five percent of the losses are through drones…
The ratio of losses right now is one to five… So one Ukrainian soldier to five Russian soldiers.”
But even Zelensky doesn’t say that 35,000 Russians were killed — he says 35 thousand KIA + MIA.
There are serious issues with gathering statistics on losses. Ukraine’s Russian loss calculations are based on video evidence from drones. But often, a hit by a drone doesn’t actually lead to death. The soldier might be evacuated in the meantime. Or, he might be hit again by another drone, which is counted as two Russian casualties.
A rather interesting article came out on April 17 on the topic of Russian losses. It was published by texty.ua, a liberal nationalist publication opposed to commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky. It was reposted by MP Mariana Bezuhla, who is also opposed to Mr Syrsky.
Anyway, it found that Russian losses have been continually decreasing, while Russian territorial gains increase. This is a continuation of a trend they first identified in mid-2025, which I covered here.
This is the graph they produced in April.
Note that the losses are shown on a weekly basis, based on the data of Ukraine’s General Staff. Advances are based on the DeepState semi-independent OSINT project, which is less optimistic for the Ukrainian side than the claims of the General Staff or president, but also often more optimistic than the real situation on the ground.
Texty writes that the situation could be considered “difficult but controllable” (a beloved phrase of the general staff) if faster advances led to greater Russian losses. This would mean that both lines increase simultaneously. However, this this was only the case in 2024.
Since January 2025, texty believes that ‘the situation has begun to deteriorate’ as ‘the Russians are advancing faster and dying less’.
Following September 2025, Russian losses started to increase slightly, which texty describes as ‘meaning the situation has returned from catastrophic to “complex but manageable.”’
However, starting from January 2026, Russian losses again declined alongside increased territorial advances. For Texty, this ‘signals an extremely bad situation’.
Finally, while the ‘surge in Russian losses’ in the first two weeks of March ‘gives hope for a change in the trend, too little time has passed to understand whether this is a coincidence or a sign of changes in our favor.’
This is certainly quite a different tone from that struck by Zelensky and Fedorov. I think that to begin with, of course, Russian losses are seriously exaggerated. The Ukrainians are also constantly losing troops due to Russian dominance of the skies and because of doomed, ill-planned counterattacks against Russian positions.
And finally, the past few months saw comparatively fewer Russian assault operations due to winter weather. Now that spring has led to a regrowth of greenery, Russian infantry assault teams are finding it easier to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions without being detected by drones.
Starved out
Meanwhile, the Ukrainians certainly seem to have fewer and fewer troops.
Due to the lack of manpower, troops are being forced to stay in the same trenches without rotations for months on end. On April 23, the liberal nationalist publication Ukrainska Pravda wrote about an outcry on social media from relatives of soldiers in the 14th brigade. Stationed in the Kharkiv oblast, they have apparently been largely starved of food and drinking water for the past 8 months. As a result, they are in a highly emaciated condition that is hardly conducive to active resistance.
Ivanna Poberezhnyuk, the relative of one soldier who maintains contact with soldiers in the unit, wrote this to threads:
The guys are in positions without food and water! The command is not responding. Fighters are losing consciousness from hunger, drinking rainwater. There are also problems with communication
It is also notable that Poberezhnuk wrote that these soldiers serving in the 14th brigade were ‘attached’ to the 30th brigade. This practice has been much criticized over the past two years, since it means that the ‘attached’ unit is often ‘used up’ at the frontlines by the unit it is attached to. Units that have the privilege to ‘attach’ other units to themselves care little about preserving the lives of troops in these attached units, because they can always just attach another unit. All the while, they can claim to suffer reasonable losses in their own unit.
Anastasia Silchuk, the wife of one of the soldiers, wrote this to Facebook:
“We voluntarily stood up for the defense of Ukraine on the first day of the full-scale invasion. We ask the higher command to deal with this situation and prevent treacherous actions!
Each parcel is meant to last for 7-14 days. We extract water ourselves – rainwater, in winter we melt snow. If it was dumped, then 1.4-2.5 liters. There are frequent situations when there is no connection at all for 3-4 days. This is the situation at all our positions. Even critical medicines are delivered only together with food,”
That same day, army command claimed to have sent new food supplies to the starving troops of the 14th brigade.
Territory
We’ll now take a look at the battlefield.
I’ve noticed that many top Ukrainian military bloggers, which once used to be quite interesting to read for their frankness, have gone rather quiet over 2026. What little they do say tends to be rather neutral or optimistic. I suspect this is related to the desperate need for European aid, and the hope of convincing the Americans into deepening military engagement. As a result, we have these endless media narratives of a victorious Ukraine, along with increased domestic censorship.
However, there is one Ukrainian military channel that continues putting out interesting daily reports about the frontlines — the airborne assault officer Muchnoy Jugend. And in what is surely a sign of the times, his channel went private this week. That means that by providing translations of his reports, I could claim to be relaying ‘confidential Ukrainian military sources’. He also turned off the copy or screenshot option on April 24.
Seemingly a photo of Muchnoy that he posted on his telegram in late 2024
It’s no wonder that Muchnoy went private. He is lauded among Ukrainian military bloggers for his honesty, and that certainly isn’t what the current media conjuncture calls for.
Take, for instance, his April 25 update. Instead of writing about constant Russian ‘meat assaults’, he noted that in the Dnepropetrovsk oblast, Russian forces weren’t always trying to advance. Instead, they were attacking Ukrainian positions with concealed stationary tanks. He also noted several cases of Ukrainian vehicles destroyed by Russian drones.
He also identified the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka directions as the most critical sections of the front. Among other things, he criticized Ukrainian command’s decision to send suicide squads into the village of Stare Selo, near Kostiantynivka:
In the area of Stare Selo, there are inexplicable actions on our side: sending infiltration infantry groups into a zone where the enemy tightly controls the air with fiber optic drones. This is essentially a maximally risky one-way game.
To best immerse my readers in the daily events of the frontlines, I decided to use a somewhat experimental approach today. Think of it as a sort of battlefield stream of consciousness — I separated the frontline into eight main hotspots, and translated Muchnoy’s updates, day by day. Along with labeled maps, of course (identifying micro-villages whose names were often recently changed is no easy task).
But first, here are the main trends I identified.
There have been no notable Ukrainian advances over the past month. Instead, Russian forces have gradually advanced across the frontlines. The high-casualty assaults by Ukrainian assault forces in the south fizzled out by early to mid March. The attempts to move forward continue to this day, but with no success and high losses.
Zelensky finds it very important to keep trying here, because his claims of ‘400 square kilometers liberated in the south’ a few months ago were very effective in the western press. In fact, honest Ukrainian mappers believed that around 75 square kilometers of contested territory, not fully controlled by the Russians, was retaken. But since the nature of the terrain here means there is a higher chance of ‘retaking’ territory than elsewhere, the army will continue trying.
Meanwhile, Russian troops continue increasing the amount of drones it uses and the sophistication of their deployment. Russia’s highly effective Rubikon drone team is reported as active along the frontline, and it continues to inflict heavy losses. In response, Ukrainian troops have focused on trying to destroy Rubikon operators and bases in the area around the frontlines.
The key target for both sides is logistics, the zone under 30 kilometers from the frontline. By achieving dominance in the air through drones and drone-corrected artillery, provisions and reinforcements are blocked off, leading to a steady erosion of enemy positions for the side with air superiority (Russia). In recent months, Ukraine has also tried to increasingly use this tactic, to some success. However, its drone teams are often too preoccupied with trying to stop Russian infantry advancing into Ukrainian positions to be able to focus on mid-range logistics.
Now, to the key sections of the frontlines. We’ll analyze separately the following 8 theaters:
1: Sumy oblast border region
2: Kharkiv oblast border region (Vovchansk)
3: Kupiansk (eastern Kharkiv oblast)
4: Area around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk (northern Donetsk oblast)
5: Kostiantynivka (Donetsk oblast)
6: Pokrovsk area (western Donetsk oblast)
7: Southeastern Dnepropetrovsk oblast, bordering with the Donetsk (northeast) and Zaporizhia (southwest) oblasts
8: Huliaipole and nearby villages (northeastern Zaporizhzhia oblast)
The key battles are taking place in the Donetsk oblast. In the south, there is a fluid back and forth over unpopulated former villages. In the north, Russian troops have moved forward partly due to lack of Ukrainian defenses.
But in the Donbass, the operation to take the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk conglomeration continues. According to Zelensky and the western press, Russia is ready to freeze the war on the current frontlines once it has taken these cities. Most of Russia’s advances over the past month have been concentrated here, to the north and east of these twin cities.
Of course, these haven’t been massive advances, and at the current pace it will take quite a few months until Russian infantry are regularly infiltrating Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. At that point, it is likely that very lengthy urban warfare will ensue, depending on how well Russia manages to encircle the cities from multiple sides and strangle logistics.
To the south of Kramatorsk/Sloviansk, Kostiantynivka’s effective logistical encirclement has been intensifying. Ukrainian troops are increasingly demoralized by constant attacks from the air, including heavy FAB airborne bombs, strike drones like the Molniya and Lancet, and heavy artillery. Meanwhile, open displays of pro-Russian sentiment by the local population have further frustrated Ukrainian soldiers.
And beyond Pokrovsk, the situation is also highly intense. Ukrainian media has publicized demands from Ukrainian troops around Myrnohrad to be allowed to retreat — they have long been effectively encircled.
Now, onto daily reports from the frontlines. All 10,000 words of them.
The north
The past month has seen Russian troops take around 150 square kilometers of territory in northern Ukraine, in the border areas of the Sumy oblast. These are often not quite military operations, but look more like Russian troops advancing into essentially unprotected villages. Here’s a comparison between April 1 and April 25.
It seems unlikely that Russia has particularly grand aims here other than pulling Ukrainian reserves away from the more important parts of the front. The Russian government is also implementing its stated strategy of creating a ‘buffer zone’ along the border in order to prevent Ukrainian incursions into Russia, like the 2024 Kursk operation.
However, some think otherwise. Ukrainian journalist Yuliya Kiriyenko sounded the alarm for the city of Sumy on April 20:
A very dangerous situation in the Sumy region.
Earlier, information emerged that active assaults had begun against two brigades in different sectors of the front.
As of now, there are four penetrations along the border. From the east and the north, Russian troops are advancing in small groups.
There is continuous enemy use of KAB glide bombs and artillery strikes.
The worst possible scenario is that Sumy could end up in partial encirclement.
This post earned Kiriyenko a great deal of criticism from the general staff and DeepState. Nevertheless, she maintained that the threat for Sumy exists.
Meanwhile, in the northern Kharkiv oblast, Russian forces continue probing further beyond Vovchansk. Like Sumy, the goal seems mainly to thin out Ukrainian reserves across the frontlines, rather than achieving key territorial aims (as in the Donbass).
And troops certainly are thinly dispersed. The following April 17 update on Vovchansk from Muchnoy illustrated Ukraine’s manpower problems:
Vovchansk direction: A deep infiltration of the enemy in the area of Zybyne has been recorded, groups have gone up to 5 km before being detected and hit by drones. This is not just reconnaissance, but a serious probing of the defense. Such a distance without contact by our forces is a signal that we are blind in some places. If we do not reinforce control and reconnaissance, the enemy may repeat the attempt with larger forces and consolidate.
In general, the enemy’s main focus is on flanking bypasses, infiltration and control of the sky. In short, he is not breaking the front, but slowly eroding it. Our task: not to let these infiltrations turn into full-fledged breakthroughs.
Further south in the Kharkiv oblast is Kupyansk, which the Ukrainians triumphantly ‘retook’ in late 2025. However, despite constant promises to fully clear remaining Russian troops from the city within weeks, that never materialized. And now, Ukrainian defenses here are once again weakening.
The DeepState map is quite interesting — an island of red consolidated Russian terrain connected by a gray zone. The Russians in Kupyansk are by no means having an easy time and largely receive supplies through drones and such. Nevertheless, their holding out seems to have aided advances nearby.
Much of the Russian advances visible on a map this month were to the southeast of Kupiansk. Muchnoy wrote this on April 16:
Kup’yansk direction: Infiltration attempts are being detected in the eastern part of Kivsharyivka. The enemy is entering in small groups, trying to gain a foothold, but our soldiers immediately suppress them and prevent this from happening. At the moment, the situation is controlled, there are no major breakthroughs or deep incursions, the line is holding steady.
And on April 24, Muchnoy wrote that ‘the situation around Kupyansk is starting to change in favour of the Russians’. They are ‘seizing the initiative west of Kupyansk’ and infiltrating several areas northwest and southwest of the city. Russian units are ‘destabilizing the defense not at a single point, but along the entire arc, stretching out of forces and finding open spaces for maneuvering’.
They are also consolidating gains on the eastern bank of the Oskil river, with Kurylivka effectively under Russian control. Assault actions are being conducted into Kivsharivka.
And finally, the Russians are also infiltrating into the eastern outskirts of Kupiansk-Vuslovy, taking control of key infrastructure and logistics.
As a result, Kupiansk is being ‘pressured from the west’, Russian troops are ‘consolidating to the east’, and penetrating certain parts of the city itself.
Muchnoy also suspects that the Russians have intensified their efforts here because Ukrainian troops have been redistributed to the north of the Kharkiv oblast, due to Russian advances around Vovchansk. Having sensed a weakening of defense density around Kupiansk, they struck here. Such is the logic of a war of attrition on a 1200 kilometer frontline.
Kramatorsk/Sloviansk
Now we get into a stream of exclusive Muchnoy updates. 10,000 words, all the better to become truly immersed in the killing fields of the steppe.
The steadiest Russian advances have been throughout the Donetsk oblast, the most important theater of the war. These two maps (DeepState) compare April 1 to April 25:
And here are the key locations in the territory around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk:
The enemy maintains fire control along the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal, preventing us from building up forces. At the same time, they are bringing in reserves for a possible advance toward Minkivka.
In Nykyforivka, the situation remains unclear: strikes south of the center could indicate either enemy attempts to advance or movements by our forces.
Both sides are actively using drones: our forces are operating against Riznykivka, while the enemy is striking Kryva Luka and Ozerne. The area is heavily saturated with UAVs, making any movement difficult.
Lyman direction: The situation in Yampil has transitioned into a phase of close-quarter combat with a completely mixed line of engagement. The settlement is effectively divided into separate control zones, with our units holding positions in the center while the enemy infiltrates and consolidates from the southwest sector. This creates a checkerboard of positions where there is no continuous control—every building could be a battle point. In such conditions, both sides are working to inflict maximum damage, trying to dislodge each other from their positions and prevent the enemy from consolidating.
A key feature is the constant risk of flanking attacks and sudden close-quarter engagements. The enemy operates in small groups, attempting to infiltrate between positions and expand their control zone from the southwest, while our forces hold the center and maintain fire control to prevent the enemy from closing off our flanks.
In Zakitne, our units continue to hold the western outskirts despite systematic pressure. The enemy is trying to dislodge us from this area, as it has tactical significance for further advancement and control of approaches. In response, our forces are working proactively, striking the enemy’s positions east of the central part, which allows us to weaken their defenses and has already yielded results in the form of destroyed fortifications.
Overall, the direction is unstable, with high dynamics and constant clashes. The enemy is trying to expand its presence through the chaos in the built-up area, while we are holding key points and working selectively to prevent them from consolidating and seizing the initiative.
Sloviansk direction: The enemy is methodically working with artillery south of Kryva Luka, simultaneously covering the west of Ozerne. The task is to destabilize the area and not allow us to accumulate forces. This is a classic preparation of the terrain for further movement.
Lyman direction: The movement of new enemy units has been detected. They are already conducting reconnaissance of Lyman and actively adjusting the artillery. This means one thing – the intensity of the fighting here will increase. The enemy is preparing to act harshly, the area is entering a phase of escalation and it will definitely not be easy here.
Sloviansk direction: In Kaleniki, the enemy is already openly visible, the presence in the eastern part is fixed, plus information-psychological pressure: leaflets with calls to surrender are being distributed. In Kriva Luka and Ozerne, intensive artillery work is ongoing, our soldiers’ positions are under constant cover, the enemy is trying to knock out the defense through exhaustion.
Lyman direction: The city is also under regular artillery pressure, especially the south-eastern part, the enemy is working on residential and front-line infrastructure.
In the forests to the east, our attempt at infiltration failed, the enemy quickly reacted and hit with a fiber-optic drone, there are losses. This shows that their control there is tight, there are minimal blind spots.
At the same time, in Sosnovoe, we carried out a cleanup, knocking out a group of the enemy that had managed to get in and held out for a while on the eastern outskirts.
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Russia’s government warned it will scale back new support for businesses as mounting fiscal pressures limit its ability to sustain the stimulus that helped drive recent economic growth, Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said Friday.
Speaking at an entrepreneurship forum, Reshetnikov said the state would honor existing commitments but offer fewer new subsidies and concessional loans.
“We will never abandon the obligations we have already taken on. But, of course, new disbursements will be much more modest,” he said.
The shift underscores a broader turning point for Russia’s economy, which is slowing after a period of rapid, state-driven expansion that relied heavily on spare labor, industrial capacity and fiscal reserves — many of which are now largely exhausted.
Reshetnikov urged businesses to invest and create jobs but acknowledged that companies would increasingly have to rely on their own resources.
“We have learned to do this, but in conditions of a relatively calm labor market,” he said. “We managed because there were reserves somewhere in the economy. Now these reserves are largely depleted, and the situation is significantly more complex.”
Russia’s economy grew by 4.1% in 2023 and 4.9% in 2024, driven in part by mobilizing idle resources. Officials say those buffers have now been used up.
Deputy Kremlin chief of staff Maxim Oreshkin has pointed to a shrinking labor pool, with unemployment falling to a record low of 2.1% in February.
Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina has said production capacity is also near its limit, while fiscal and financial reserves have been drawn down.
Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund have dropped to 3.9 trillion rubles ($51.5 billion), from 8.4 trillion rubles ($110.9 billion) before the war.
Banks, too, have less capital headroom, while high oil revenues are increasingly being directed toward debt repayment rather than new lending, she has said.
Without those supports, growth has slowed sharply. The economy expanded by just 1% in 2025, while GDP in January-February was 1.8% lower than a year earlier, though fewer working days may have skewed the comparison.
Budget constraints are tightening. The federal deficit reached 5.6 trillion rubles ($73.9 billion), or 2.6% of GDP, in 2024, and in the first quarter of 2026 alone hit 4.6 trillion rubles ($60.7 billion), or 1.9% of GDP, already exceeding the full-year target.
One of the main pressures on public finances is the cost of subsidizing interest rates. The Central Bank estimates that subsidized loans total around 17 trillion rubles ($224.4 billion), including roughly 4.5 trillion rubles ($59.4 billion) in state-backed lending programs across sectors such as small business and agriculture.
This includes about 1.4 trillion rubles ($18.5 billion) in loans under small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) support programs, more than 2 trillion rubles ($26.4 billion) in concessional loans for agriculture and nearly 1 trillion rubles ($13.2 billion) for borrowers in other sectors.
With interest rates still high, the fiscal burden of these programs has risen sharply. Each additional percentage point in the key rate costs the budget about 280 billion rubles ($3.7 billion), according to Andrei Makarov, head of the State Duma’s Budget and Taxes Committee.
“We continue to implement all existing support measures,” Reshetnikov said. “But the current situation, including the budget, does not mean we will subsidize lending programs or distribute grants at the same scale as during Covid.”
Instead, the government is shifting its focus toward encouraging companies to raise equity financing.
“Our vector is moving away from debt-based support — subsidizing interest rates — toward supporting capital in various forms,” Reshetnikov said. “We will develop programs to help more mature businesses access IPOs.”
The Central Bank has long pushed for such a shift, arguing that widespread subsidized lending reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy by dampening the impact of interest rate changes.
“Why don’t companies go to the capital market?” Nabiullina said previously. “Because there are too many subsidized loans.”
President Vladimir Putin has set a goal of doubling the capitalization of Russia’s stock market to 66% of GDP by 2030, from 33% in 2024. But market capitalization has since fallen by roughly one-third.
Achieving the target would require annual initial public offerings worth at least 1 trillion rubles ($13.2 billion) over several years, said Central Bank First Deputy Governor Vladimir Chistyukhin — roughly equal to the total volume of IPOs over the past decade.
