By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 8/13/26

For more than a century, Kazakhstan was ruled from Moscow – first under the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union.

Even decades after independence, it still hardly ever challenges its powerful northern neighbor.

Until now.

At a regional cooperation forum last month, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev appealed directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin to end Russia’s 4 1/2-year war with Ukraine. Appearing to depart from scripted public remarks, he declared that the reasons for the war “are not clear to many, including us.”

He went on to suggest that “perhaps it’s time to freeze this conflict.”

While Mr. Putin looked visibly annoyed and dismissed the idea, the rare public dissent illustrated a changing balance between Russia and post-Soviet Central Asia. Once dismissed as periphery states by Russia, they are gaining more of a say, based on geopolitical and economic realignment.

Kazakhstan, the largest landlocked country in the world, might feel empowered enough to speak plainly to Mr. Putin because of Russia’s deepening economic dependence on Central Asia. The costs of the war are also threatening its own oil exports. Kazakhstan’s main oil terminal on the Black Sea – which is at the Russian port of Novorossiysk, some 540 miles from Kazakhstan’s border – has had to close several times because of Ukrainian drone strikes on tankers, though Ukraine has now reportedly agreed to stop targeting non-Russian tankers. Oil exports make up about 35% of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product.

“Kazakhstan is feeling the costs of this ongoing war, and that’s likely the main reason he spoke out now,” says Grigory Mikhailov, a Central Asia specialist who edits a newsletter on the region’s economy. “We don’t know the extent of the damages, but it’s likely to be hundreds of millions of dollars already.”

The moon rises over D Island, a man-made offshore oil-processing hub in the Caspian Sea off the southern coast of Kazakhstan, Aug. 21, 2013. Oil exports make up 35% of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product.

It illustrates the growing complexities affecting Moscow’s relations with some of its closest partners, especially Kazakhstan, the largest and richest of the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

The mainly Muslim and largely Turkic-speaking region was part of the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R. until the Soviet collapse in 1991, but since independence also looks toward China and the West. While some of the new states have partially reduced their former dependence on Russia, Kazakhstan remains a core member of all three key Russia-led alliances created to keep former Soviet republics in Moscow’s orbit.

Almost all of the nine countries that now form one of them, the Commonwealth of Independent States, oppose Russia’s war with Ukraine. Only Belarus has backed the conflict. Some, such as Armenia and Moldova, have even expressed support for Ukraine.

Most, however, have tried to maintain a delicate balancing act by declaring neutrality, while also enforcing some Western-imposed sanctions against Russia, and continuing warm political and profitable economic relations with Moscow. Kazakhstan has played a key role helping Russia sidestep sanctions and channel investments from abroad.

Mr. Tokayev’s departure from protocol was limited, and he subsequently stressed his allegiance to Moscow. But Andrei Suzdalstev, an independent Moscow-based political expert, suggests that the Kazakh leader was probably speaking for many in the region.

“No CIS member has shown any enthusiasm for the war,” he says. “It’s clear that Tokayev is not alone. The same questions are being raised, quietly, in other places.”

Experts describe Kazakhstan and Russia as economically “interdependent,” sharing infrastructure, mutual investment, and a huge trade turnover of $28 billion. The two countries share the world’s second-longest land border – almost 5,000 miles – and travel between them is visa-free. Opinion polls show majorities in both countries have a positive attitude toward the other, though feelings for Russia have noticeably cooled in Kazakhstan. In a 2023 poll by MediaNet and PaperLab, nearly one-third of Kazakhs said their perception of Russia has worsened because of the war.

In recent years, China has become Kazakhstan’s top trading partner, mainly due to sales of oil and raw materials, but Russia remains the country’s top security and political partner.

“I do not see any large-scale competition between Russia and China in Kazakhstan,” says Alexander Knyazev, an expert at the MGIMO University Institute for International Studies in Moscow, which trains Russian diplomats. “Moscow and Beijing are capable of maintaining their interests at a mutually acceptable level.”

Petr Svoik, former deputy chair of the Kazakh opposition Azat party, says that at least for the time being, the Russian-Kazakh relationship will remain stable. “No matter how you look at it, Kazakhstan depends crucially on Russia. The relationship is tight, and functions on the level of strategic partnership. … But as for the ruling elite, their hearts lie mainly in the West. They understand the necessity of good relations with Russia, but materially and mentally they are pro-Western.”

The war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have increased Kazakhstan’s importance as a provider of oil and other raw materials to Europe, a position that the war’s expansion to ports on the Black Sea is now threatening.

Other wars, in Afghanistan and now Iran, have stymied the hopes of Central Asian countries to build southward transport routes that would expand their trading opportunities to the Indian Ocean and beyond. That strengthens their continued dependence on both Russia and China, experts say.

So, while Kazakhstan and others might be emboldened, they are also maintaining traditional links and trying to avoid the fallout of war.

“In the view of Central Asian elites, the world is going crazy,” says Mr. Mikhailov. “In this situation, the minimum task is to stay out of the geopolitical storm. The maximum is to balance interests, extract benefits where possible, and to stay strong until things normalize.”

YouTube link here.

By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 8/16/26

Ever since Russia’s campaign in Ukraine started over four-and-a-half years ago, much of the daily commentary on the conflict has focused on battlefield developments, “game changing” weapons, war-fighting tactics, strikes, counter-strikes, statements and all the usual reporting that accompanies every conflict in the world. Underpinning all of this is a fundamental question: what does a Russian victory mean? More specifically, what insights does history present about what victory has actually meant for the Russian state and what can it tell us about how the current strategic contest will actually be settled?

Russian forces have been advancing slowly but steadily across the frontlines, dismantling key fortifications that have formed critical nodes in Ukraine’s defensive lines across the Donbas. If the current trajectory continues, Russia is on course to win a decisive military victory that might extend to the capture of the key cities of Odessa, Mykolayiv or Kharkiv. The question remains: then what? Moscow would have captured strategic territory but NATO would still exist, a rump Ukrainian state might continue being hostile to Russia and Europe would continue to re-arm.

Putin has distinguished between settling Ukraine and the larger political objective. In his June 2024 he stated:

«Урегулировав украинский кризис… могли бы приступить к фундаментальной задаче… а именно к созданию неделимой системы евразийской безопасности»1

“Having resolved the Ukrainian crisis…we could proceed to the fundamental task…namely, creating an indivisible system of Eurasian security.”

The Russian leadership’s objectives for victory, as announced by Putin on February 24, 2022, and reiterated over the last four years, can be distinguished at three levels: Military victory entails the destruction of Ukraine’s capacity and ability to wage war. Political victory means a postwar Ukraine that is no longer a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Taking that further, a systemic victory would mean a re-ordering of the European security architecture on the principles of indivisible security that Russia has consistently articulated. Russia might be able to achieve the first, perhaps the second, but may lack the power to achieve the third. Putin’s wager on time begins in the distance between them.

Given that the last several years have narrowed the scope for a political solution to end the war, what if Putin no longer expects the battlefield to close that distance? The possibility of uncontrolled escalation leading to nuclear war is one explanation as to why Moscow has exercised restraint in retaliating against NATO countries and sparking a direct war with NATO. History, however, suggests another explanation: Putin may be playing for time. He may be wagering that Russia can consolidate military gains while the political order supporting Ukraine proves less durable than those gains. Russian history repeatedly presents the same strategic proposition: today’s political order cannot be confused with tomorrow’s. There is, however, a warning as well as a precedent that history presents. Strategic patience succeeds only when time is moving in your direction. The real question is therefore whether Putin has correctly judged which side time favors.

Victory is Political, Not Territorial

Victory for the Russian state has seldom derived from battlefield success alone. Victory was considered durable only when military power produced a political order that prevented the re-emergence of the strategic threat that caused the war in the first place. In 1709, Peter the Great defeated Charles XII of Sweden at the Battle of Poltava. This historic battle transformed the balance of power in the Great Northern War. However, the fighting continued for another twelve years. Victory was achieved only when the Treaty of Nystad was concluded in 1721, requiring Sweden to cede Baltic territories to Russia. Peter was thus able to secure Russia’s position in a new, altered European balance of power.

Catherine II extended the same logic when Russia annexed Crimea in 1783. The territory altered the political and strategic environment for the Russian state by providing access to the Black Sea, enabling the development of Sevastopol as a naval base and projecting Russian power in a region previously dominated by the Ottoman Empire.

Time as Strategic Depth

Russian history also presents another difficult problem. What if a state cannot defeat a stronger adversary on the battlefield without risking the destruction of the very military power on which its survival depends? In 1812, Tsar Alexander I confronted precisely this dilemma when Napoleon approached Moscow after the Russian armies had fought a devastating battle at Borodino. As the surrender of Moscow was being contemplated, he discovered that Russia possessed another strategic resource besides territory: time. Napoleon needed victory quickly. Alexander merely needed not to lose quickly.

The political value of Napoleon’s victories were diminished with each passing week that Alexander refused to negotiate. French supply lines stretched across an enormous distance. Russian forces regenerated. Winter approached. What had appeared to be strategic depth measured in geography increasingly was measured in time as the balance began to shift in Russia’s favor. Geographic depth creates distance between an enemy and the political center. Temporal strategic depth creates distance between an unfavorable present and a potentially more favorable future.

Alexander’s statements to the French ambassador Armand de Caulaincourt in May 1811 allude to this principle:

«Nous ne nous compromettrons pas, nous avons de l’espace derrière nous, et nous conserverons une armée bien organisée. Avec cela, on n’est jamais forcé, quelque revers que l’on éprouve, de recevoir la paix ; on force son vainqueur à l’accepter… Il faut à l’Empereur des résultats aussi prompts que ses pensées sont rapides : il ne les obtiendra pas avec nous.»2

“We will not compromise ourselves; we have space behind us, and we will preserve a well-organized army”…With that, whatever reverses one may suffer, one is never forced to accept peace; one forces the victor to accept it…The Emperor [Napoleon] needs results as rapid as his thoughts; he will not obtain them from us”.

Mikhail Kutuzov reinforces this logic when he writes to Alexander on September 4, 1812:

«Хотя не отвергаю того, чтобы занятие столицы не было раною чувствительнейшею, но, не колеблясь между сим происшествием и теми событиями, могущими последовать в пользу нашу с сохранением армии…»3

“Although I do not deny that the occupation of the capital is a most grievous wound, I do not hesitate between this event and those events which, with the preservation of the army, may subsequently develop to our advantage…”

And more starkly:

«пока армия вашего императорского величества цела…дотоле еще возвратная потеря Москвы не есть потеря отечества.»4

“So long as Your Imperial Majesty’s army remains intact…the temporary loss of Moscow is not yet the loss of the fatherland.”

Tolstoy would later distill this interpretation of Kutuzov into one of War and Peace’s most memorable formulations:

«Терпение и время — вот мои воины-богатыри»5

“Patience and time are my warriors.”

The words are Tolstoy’s literary reconstruction and not a documented quotation directly from Kutuzov, but the strategy they describe was real.

When Russia Faced Defeat: Time for Regeneration

Russia’s defeats reveal another dimension of strategic time. The Crimean War resulted in Russia losing many of its privileges in the Black Sea. Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov’s response was:

«La Russie boude, dit-on. La Russie ne boude pas. La Russie se recueille.»6

“Russia is sulking, they say. Russia is not sulking. Russia is gathering itself.”

He later explained that “gathering itself” meant Russia should avoid foreign complications that distract from “internal development,” using the interval to “recover from its losses, strengthen its forces and restore its resources.” Fifteen years later, France’s defeat by Prussia ended the balance sustaining the Crimean settlement, allowing Gorchakov to dismantle the 1856 Paris treaty’s provisions. As such, defeat had not ended the contest. Only the timetable had changed.

Lenin carried the principle further. Facing defeat by Germany in 1918, Bolshevik Russia accepted the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He later explained:

«пространства мы отдали много, но время выиграли такое, в течение которого можно было окрепнуть…Мы тогда коренных интересов не отдали в жертву, мы отдали второстепенные и сохранили коренные».7

“we gave away a lot of territory, but we gained time in such a way that we could become strong…We did not compromise on our fundamental interests; we gave up the secondary ones and preserved the fundamental ones.”

Space could be traded for time because the latter preserved the state capable of exploiting tomorrow’s balance of power. Eight months later, Imperial Germany collapsed and the settlement imposed at Brest was dismantled.

Across these different eras of history, all three historical figures confronted more powerful adversaries and concluded that the prevailing political order cannot be allowed to impose a lasting defeat on the Russian state. The strategy was consistent: Exchange space for time. Preserve the state. Wait for the strategic environment to change. Alexander I used time to exhaust Napoleon. Gorchakov focused it on regenerating Russian strength. Lenin traded territory for time to consolidate the revolutionary state.

There may be a temptation to regard these episodes as artifacts of another Russia. However, Putin’s own thinking reveals a similar long temporal horizon. In March 2018 during an address to the Federal Assembly, he stated:

«…значимость нашего выбора, значимость каждого шага, поступка исключительно высоки, потому что они определяют судьбу нашей страны на десятилетия вперёд.»8

“…the significance of our choices, of every step and action, is exceptionally great because they determine the fate of our country for decades to come.”

This formulation is significant because it demonstrates that Putin conceives consequential state decisions on a time horizon measured in decades. Moreover, Putin and the leaders before him governed radically different states and faced markedly different challenges. The continuity lies not in ideology or personality, but in the strategic problem confronting the Russian state: what must be secured today, what can be deferred and how can the state preserve sufficient power to exploit a more favorable tomorrow.

Putin’s Wager on Time

Relative to past Russian rulers, Putin faces a different challenge today in the ongoing confrontation with the West. Alexander I needed time because Russia was not yet ready to defeat Napoleon. Putin may need time because defeating Ukraine may not be enough for victory. Russia could impose an armistice without dissolving NATO or compelling the West to accept Moscow’s conception of indivisible security.

Putin may be thus operating on two clocks. The first is the military clock where Russia is degrading enemy capacity and establishing strategic facts. The second is the political clock running through the European security order where Russian control is much weaker. The Ukrainian clock runs in years; the European clock could run in decades.

Putin’s public statements confirm his belief that Europe’s security architecture is temporary. In June 2024 he stated:

«Очевидно, мы являемся свидетелями краха системы евро-атлантической безопасности. Сегодня её просто нет. Ее нужно фактически создавать заново.»9

“Obviously, we are witnessing the collapse of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Today, it simply does not exist. It effectively has to be created anew.”

He further states:

«Понимаем, безусловно, что в нынешней ситуации этот тезис может показаться нереалистичным, однако это сейчас.»10

“We understand, of course, that under the present circumstances this proposition may seem unrealistic. But that is now.”

At the same time, this is not evidence that Putin is consciously waiting for the West to fragment. After all, time only has strategic value if it can be used to improve one’s position on the strategic chessboard. Alexander I used time to regenerate his army. Gorchakov used it to rebuild Russian power. Lenin used it to consolidate the revolution. Putin’s strategy must be assessed on whether a) Western cohesion weakens, and b) whether Russia uses this time interval to strengthen its own relative position.

Evidence currently indicates it is doing so. It has re-wired its economy towards Asia and the non-Western world and succeeded in insulating itself to a large degree from Western sanctions. It’s defense-industrial base has expanded and it has successfully deepened partnerships with key emerging powers including BRICS+ and SCO. The real wager is whether Russia can improve its relative position faster than its adversaries can improve theirs.

Restraint Towards NATO

This wager on time might be another explanation as to why Moscow has displayed remarkable restraint in not retaliating against NATO countries in response to Western-sponsored long-range attacks inside Russia. While Putin is facing pressure to retaliate against the growing number of strikes on critical civilian and (in earlier instances) military infrastructure, the Ukrainian battlefield enables Russia to focus its confrontation with the West in a bounded space. Western military and financial support has been exclusively focused on propping up the proxy Zelensky regime and the Ukrainian military. NATO militaries themselves have directly not entered combat.

A full-scale war with NATO would break that containment. Russia would no longer maintain escalation dominance as it currently does in Ukraine. It would be compelled to fight NATO forces directly across a long frontline possibly including the Arctic, Baltic and Black Sea regions while simultaneously defending Kaliningrad, western Russia and critical strategic infrastructure deep inside the country. It’s armed forces, supply lines and reserve formations would have to contend with a much larger battlefield environment under the threat of uncontrolled escalation and nuclear war. Why trade a geographically constrained conflict where Russia thinks it can prevail for all-out war where it may lose escalation dominance? A war against NATO would merge Putin’s two clocks into one.

On the Western side, a Russian strike on NATO territory could transform European politics overnight. Highly unpopular European governments would see it as an extraordinary strategic gift. It would vindicate years of warnings on Russia, legitimize their commitment to Ukraine, boost their ratings, accelerate rearmament and allow domestic opposition to be suppressed through the imperatives of national security. Moreover, NATO’s purpose would suddenly become self-evident. The coalition Putin may hope time will weaken could be the same one that Russian escalation would reunify.

This is where history holds contemporary resonance. Kutuzov surrendered Moscow because preserving the army preserved Russia’s capacity to continue fighting. Gorchakov avoided entanglements while rebuilding Russian power. Lenin relinquished land instead of gambling away the state that could reclaim it in the future. Putin may be applying this logic in today’s context. Direct war with NATO could transform a war Russia believes it can sustain into one whose escalation could threaten the state itself. While conditions differed across rulers, the underlying principle remains consistent: do not squander the instruments of political and military power on which all future options depend. Preservation of the army preserves the strategic autonomy of the state. The most satisfying retaliation could be the most strategically damaging. As such, Russia must avoid winning the provocation and losing the wager.

The West Understands Putin’s Wager

There exists ample evidence that Putin’s adversaries understand this strategy. Victoria Nuland said Putin believed he could “wait Ukraine out” and “wait out all of us.”11 Former British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak made the counter-wager explicit:

“Putin will never outlast us. We are here for Ukraine as long as it takes.”12

The West views the fight as one of political endurance and are relying on institutional mechanisms to ensure support for Ukraine remains resistant to changes of government. Putin’s weapon is political time. He is wagering that governments change faster than Russian strategic objectives.

When Time Becomes a Trap

Russian history, however, also provides a stark warning. Stalin demonstrates the consequences of misreading time. From the signing of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had bought twenty-two months to prepare for war with Germany. In the months and weeks preceding the German invasion, despite extensive intelligence being provided to Stalin warning of an impending attack, he refused to conclude that Hitler was preparing to invade. The consequences were disastrous. The mistake was not buying time but misjudging how much of it remained.

In fact, the broader Soviet experience offers a further warning of misjudging which side time favored. Soviet leaders believed that capitalism, with all of its inherent contradictions, would ultimately destroy itself. Nikita Khrushchev is remembered for his declaration that “Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.”13 Communism would outlive capitalism in the historical sense. It was the Soviet Union that disappeared first.

Putin’s strategy therefore depends on getting four things right: how long can Russia continue the war without causing unacceptable degradation to itself? Will Western unity weaken faster than Russia does? Will Russian victories divide Europe or make it more united against Russia? And finally, when should Russia turn its military gains into a political settlement?

When the Clock Turns

Russia may determine that the clock has turned when a significant shift occurs in the European balance of power that favors Moscow. This may include any combination of recognizing Ukraine’s neutrality, a tectonic geopolitical shift that would require Russian participation in European security, an erosion of the sanctions regime or an American withdrawal from Europe. None of these outcomes can be predicted.

Moscow is wagering that its objectives can outlast Western unity. The West is betting that its institutions can outlast Russia’s capacity to sustain the war. Neither knows which side will prove correct. Thinking in decades is not by itself strategic wisdom. Wisdom lies in understanding what those decades are changing. The question is not whether Putin possesses strategic patience. It is whether he has correctly identified which side time favors.

by VIPS, Consortium News, 8/28/26

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)

SUBJECT: Dangerous Talk of Putin’s ‘Loss’ in Ukraine

Dear President Trump:

The New York Times is reporting that the outlook for Russia in Ukraine is “bleak.” C.I.A. Director John Ratcliffe is said to have explained that to the Russians while in Moscow Tuesday. He reportedly urged them “to cut a deal before their military and economic situation gets worse.” 

We write you on the chance you may be taken in by this latest song and dance. We believe it is orchestrated by the same kind of geniuses who told President Joe Biden to announce on July 13, 2023, in a major speech in Helsinki, that the Russians had “already lost the war” in Ukraine.

We suggest that you “kick the tires,” if they try to sell you that same car. Nothing could be further from the truth. Your predecessor was ill-served by intelligence. We suspect you are getting the same tendentious treatment from your own advisers. Indeed, many of them seem unconscionably relaxed about risking wider war with Russia over Ukraine.

We offer you, as we offered Biden, the following jogs to memory:

— December 3, 2022: “Russia is using up ammunition quite quickly. It’s pretty extraordinary. Our sense is that Russia is not capable of indigenously producing what they are expending at this stage.” (National Intelligence Director Avril Haines)

— March 18, 2022: “Russia has lost in Ukraine. The West should recognize this Russian defeat.” (Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute)

— July 1 & July 7, 2023: “Putin’s war has already been a strategic failure for Russia – its military weaknesses laid bare; its economy badly damaged for years to come.” (C.I.A. Director William Burns)

The Church of Latter-Day Pundits

Two NY Times journalists who specialize in intelligence matters report Thursday that this latest version of the Russia-has-already-lost story is “the current C.I.A. director’s assessment.” They warn somewhat quizzically that, despite this, President Putin might ignore it “and choose to keep fighting.” But why would Putin do that?

Indeed, the Gray Lady and her intelligence sources seem quite baffled by why Putin would keep trying when, according to U.S. officials and pundits, he started losing three and a half years ago and continues to lose. Could it possibly be that it was they that were wrong – terribly wrong?

Dismissing that as a possibility, they perform a somersault, straighten up, and chose to blame Putin’s advisers who, the Times says, have not “given Putin honest assessments of the war’s trajectory and toll.”

If Black Humor is at work here, we do not find it funny. The slaughter in Ukraine brings hundreds of victims daily.

Russia is methodically advancing in Donbass along a thousand-mile front, it is weathering drone attacks on its oil and civilian infrastructure with enhanced interception and has enforced a virtual blockade on Ukraine’s largest port, Odessa, with withering aerial attacks. Ukraine’s manpower and interceptor shortages make it impossible for it to ever recover its lost territory, as you acknowledged after your meeting with President Putin in Alaska.

Mr. President, if you were given access to reality-based, honest intelligence, you would be able to decide for yourself whose advisers have gotten it right over these past five years. And, once apprised of the reality on ground (and in the air), you might choose to do what is in your power to end the disaster in Ukraine.

Déjà Vu

This is not the first time we advised a president to seek unbiased advice with a view toward avoiding unnecessary, catastrophic war. We did that just a few hours after Colin Powell’s deceptive presentation to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003.

Today, we strongly suggest that you broaden your circle of advisers, as we urged President George W. Bush to do then, in our first VIPS Memorandum, which ended with this recommendation:

“After watching Secretary Powell today, we are convinced that you would be well served if you widened the discussion beyond the circle of those advisers clearly bent on a war for which we see no compelling reason and from which we believe the unintended consequences are likely to be catastrophic.”

FOR THE STEERING GROUP, VETERAN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS FOR SANITY (VIPS)

• Fulton Armstrong, former National Intelligence Officer (ret.)
•   Marshall Carter-Tripp, Foreign Service Officer (ret.); Division Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
• Philip Giraldi, C.I.A., Operations Officer (ret.)
• Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq and Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
• Larry C. Johnson, former C.I.A. and State Department Counter Terrorism officer
• John Kiriakou, former C.I.A. Counterterrorism Officer and former senior investigator, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
• Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
•   Douglas MacGregor, Colonel, USA (ret.) (associate VIPS) 
• Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
• Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer/NE, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
• Scott Ritter, former MAJ, USMC; former U.N. Weapons Inspector, Iraq
• Coleen Rowley, FBI Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
• Sarah G. Wilton, CDR, USNR, (ret.); Defense Intelligence Agency (ret.)
• Ann Wright, retired U.S. Army reserve colonel and former U.S. diplomat who resigned in 2003 in opposition to the Iraq War

By Pascal Lottaz, Substack, 8/15/26

German MEP Michael von der Schulenburg argues the western narrative of “wonder weapons” turning the tide in Ukraine is a deadly mirage. It is time for peace with Russia, not against it.

Text By Michael von der Schulenburg

As recently as 26 July this year, Ursula von der Leyen appeared full of confidence in victory during her visit to Kyiv: she claimed the tide of the war had turned, that Ukraine had regained the initiative, and that Russia was on the defensive. The cause of this supposed turnaround, after four and a half years of a devastating war, is said to be a new ‘wonder weapon’: drones which, with the help of AI provided by Palantir and others, can carry the war deep into the Russian hinterland and precisely destroy oil refineries and other critical infrastructure there. The Russian economy – particularly the energy sector – is said to be severely weakened, and the war Russia started has now hit the country itself “with full force”.

On the battlefield too, according to these accounts, Ukraine has achieved considerable success with autonomously operating “killer drones”. These drones are said to be capable of automatically detecting and destroying all life at a distance of 30 kilometres on the front line. Technology, it is claimed, has thus more than compensated for the shortage of Ukrainian soldiers. Russian soldiers, by contrast, are now said paying a heavy price in lives without being able to demonstrate any military successes. This must be wearing down the aggressors and forcing Putin to acknowledge that he is going to lose the war.

These accounts were accompanied by media-effective drone attacks on Moscow and St Petersburg. No wonder, then, that the mainstream Western media have been full of victory reports over the past two months. Some even speculated that Russia could only hold out for another six months; a coup in Moscow was deemed possible. The strategically important Crimea was said to have been largely cut off from Russia by Ukrainian attacks. Putin would now be forced to the negotiating table as the loser – and on the terms of the European NATO states, which would amount to a Russian surrender. Their policy of providing massive military, political and financial support to Ukraine, whilst at the same time refusing any talks until Russia was ‘brought to its knees’, seemed to have paid off.

But is that really the case? Or may the tide actually have turned in Russia’s favour?

It is striking that for the past week there have been hardly any reports on the course of the war, and the victory announcements have largely fallen silent. This is because doubts are mounting, both in the US and in Ukraine itself, about the success of the drone war deep within the Russian hinterland. One need only heed the warnings of General Zaluzhnyi: the drone war is not very successful and far too expensive. As a former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and current ambassador to London, he should know. According to the pro-Ukrainian war monitors ‘Dron-Bomber’, the Russians are now reportedly achieving a high shoot-down rate of Ukrainian drones. The dismissal of Ukrainian Defence Minister Fedorov is also likely to be linked to the looming failure of the drone war. Is the realisation taking hold that this conflict cannot be won by a drone warfare alone?

This means that developments on the battlefield remain decisive. However, there can be no question of the military stalemate claimed by the Western media. According to a report by the Ukrainian ‘Telegram Channel’: “in July this year, the armed forces of the Russian Federation occupied 728.45 km² of territory in the SVO (Special Operation) zone, which represents the best result since October 2024 … The pace of the Russian armed forces’ offensive is increasing”. Russian territorial gains are said to have occurred not only in the Donbas but also around Kharkiv and in Zaporizhzhia. This is still proceeding slowly, but it is a war of attrition whose primary aim is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. Could this objective be achieved by capturing the last remaining fortified defensive positions around the Donbas cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk?

Even more serious for Ukraine is the fact that its drone attacks have led to a hardening of the Russian position. The Russian leadership is now openly speaking of a war – including a war by NATO against Russia – and has significantly intensified the conflict. In the cruel logic of war, the destruction in Ukraine now far exceeds that in Russia. Another crucial factor is that Ukraine has no air defences to speak of and is barely able to defend itself against massive Russian drone and missile attacks, whilst the intensity of Ukrainian attacks is reportedly waning.

This is already having consequences. The Ukrainian Black Sea ports in and around Odessa are said to have been bombed so heavily that Ukraine has effectively become a ‘landlocked country’. If these reports are accurate, this would be a severe blow: to date, around 70 per cent of all Ukrainian imports and exports, as well as 90 per cent of agricultural exports, have been handled via these ports. Key bridges, such as the Zatoka Bridge, which connects Odessa with the Romanian Black Sea ports, have also been destroyed. Furthermore, rail and road links, petrol stations, the power grid, industrial facilities and warehouses are being systematically destroyed.

The European NATO member states can do little to change this – they lack the military capabilities. Plans to station a ‘coalition of the willing’ in Poland or even to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine are completely unrealistic. The United States has recently announced that it will hand over the leadership of the NATO centre in Wiesbaden, which coordinates military support for Ukraine, entirely to European NATO member states. There is even talk of disbanding this NATO facility, which is crucial for Ukraine. Further, with the Iran war ranging, the US has hardly any weapons left to spare. There can therefore be little question of renewed US military involvement in the war in Ukraine.

Even before the latest escalation of the war, there were clear indications that the Ukrainian army was in considerable difficulty. Upon taking office in January, Minister Fedorov spoke of around 200,000 deserters; other MPs even cited significantly higher figures. Furthermore, some two million Ukrainian men are said to have evaded conscription orders. Whichever figures are accurate, they point to an alarming state of affairs within the Ukrainian armed forces – a situation that cannot be remedied either by forced recruitment on the streets or, as is now becoming apparent, by drones controlled by artificial intelligence. Similarly, a proposal now being discussed by the EU – to withdraw refugee status from Ukrainian men who have fled, in breach of international law, and to send them back to Ukraine to face the war – is further evidence of the hopelessness of the situation.

In May, the Ukrainian Minister for Social Affairs, Denys Ulyutin, stated that the population in the government-controlled part of the country had shrunk from 52 million (at the time of independence in 1991) to possibly 22 million. Of these, around 11 million are on social security, predominantly pensioners and war invalids. He expects the population to continue to fall after the war ends, as young men – once exempt from military service – would follow their families to the West. He does not expect any significant return of Ukrainians living abroad. Added to this demographic decline are increasing impoverishment, deep social inequalities, pervasive corruption, astronomical public debt and the country’s economic collapse.

This is hardly a state – let alone an army – to which the media could realistically attribute an imminent military turnaround or even victory.

Of course, such forecasts must be treated with caution. Yet the apparent failure of the drone war to bring about a strategic turning point should make it clear to the European NATO member states that, at the end of this escalation which we have accompanied with such fanfare, Ukraine may not emerge as the victor, but is instead sliding into an increasingly devastated, depopulated and bled-dry country. This should give us cause for great concern for the suffering people in Ukraine. European NATO-states must ask themselves whether a continuation of the war – which they have demanded and supported – can still be morally justified at all.

The European NATO member states are only harming Ukraine with their illusions of victory and wonder weapons, and must finally base their policy on a more realistic assessment of how the war is unfolding. It is therefore time to consider what would happen if the Ukrainian army’s resistance were to collapse one day and Russia were to capture Kharkiv and Odessa as well. Any remnant of Ukraine that remained would scarcely be viable. It must be in the top interest not only of Ukraine but also of its western backers to prevent such a scenario to develop. But how?

Certainly, this cannot be prevented through direct military intervention by NATO. This would make the situation only much worse – also for Ukraine – as such a course of action would inevitably entail the risk of a nuclear war, which nobody can win. Diplomacy therefore remains the only realistic option. After almost five years of war, it is high time that the European NATO member states actively sought dialogue with Russia. Germany – given its role as the strongest country in the EU, its geographical location and its historical responsibility – should take the first step.

To move beyond the entrenched positions of both governments, an initial rapprochement through a civil‑society initiative involving respected and influential figures may be advisable. Such an approach could open a first, cautious pathway toward renewed understanding after years of silence and mutual demonisation. Europe needs peace, and lasting peace can only be achieved with Russia, not against it.

There is not much time left for this.

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Michael von der Schulenburg is a Former UN Assistant Secretary General and currently a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the German BSW party.

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