By Paul Grenier, Landmarks Journal, 5/15/26

Deciding whether or not to align one’s country with the United States is as fateful as it is difficult. That, at any rate, is what history tells us. For those still pondering that question today, the following essay/detective story (which originally appeared, Feb. 22, 2026, in The Duran) undoubtedly supplies some useful food for thought. —The Editors

It is perhaps only natural that the tiny Republic of Georgia should have fallen out of the news cycle in the U.S. at this point in 2026. The flashy protests in downtown Tbilisi have long since petered out. The Georgian Dream government – the very government against whom the NGO-organized crowds had been protesting — remains stably in power. Meanwhile, there has been one crisis after another, from Venezuela to Greenland to Iran.

And let’s be honest: to most Americans, tiny Georgia just doesn’t matter very much. As so often happens, though, the United States very much matters to Georgia.

Case in point: as punishment for the country continuing to do business with Russia and China, the U.S. Congress, by means of the so-called Megobari Act (the word ‘megobari’ in Georgian means ‘friend’) is likely to soon place the Georgian government under sanctions.

The threat of such sanctions, or rather, the threat of getting on ‘the sanctions escalator’ as the foreign affairs analyst Alexander Mercouris likes to put it, could easily intimidate a small country like Georgia and cause it to change course. And yet, for now at least, Georgians are doing the opposite. They are insisting that it is they who have been ill-used, and they are gradually distancing themselves from Washington as a result.

How has Georgia been ill-used? Georgian officials and experts claim that after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in November 2022, the U.S. pressured their tiny Caucasus nation of 3.8 million to confront Russia militarily. These officials have stated that they were urged to open a second front against Russia from the south, and pressured to transfer vital weapons systems to Ukraine. All this amounted, from the Georgian perspective, to their being asked to commit suicide.

These claims have been roundly dismissed as ridiculous by the U.S. officials involved, as well as by such outlets as The New York Times. And yet the evidence for the Georgia version of the story is well worth taking seriously, all the more so as, in recent months, credible Georgian voices have provided important additional detail.

*

The notion that Washington, in the wake of the Russian invasion of 2022, urged Georgia to confront Russia militarily has been denied by the U.S. ambassador at the time the Ukraine war broke out, Kelly Degnan. It has also been denied by the Hudson Institute’s Luke Coffey during Congressional testimony. And it has been subjected to ridicule by The New York Times.

Indeed, in his lengthy New York Times essay, author Scott Anderson wrote sarcastically about talk in Georgia about some sort of Western ‘global war party’ urging Georgia to open up a second front against Russia “and in that way to seal its own doom.” Significantly, Anderson questioned the plausibility of claims made by Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, that it was indeed true Western officials had urged such a course, but out of national security considerations he couldn’t say who it was. Today those considerations, apparently, no longer apply. Georgians are naming names. Among them: Kelly Degnan.

The first instance of pressure on Georgia – and, specifically, on the king-maker Georgian billionaire, Bidzina Ivanishvili — concerned BUK anti-aircraft missiles. I learned of the US ambassador’s pressure on Ivanishvili from a highly credible source: Petre Mamradze.

Mamradze, a doctor of theoretical physics and mathematics, served, among other high government posts, as head of the Georgian State Chancelry across several administrations, from 2003 – 2012. (It was also Mamradze who, after the collapse of the USSR, helped secure uranium supplies and worked with the U.S. to get them out of the country to a secure location.)

That the US would be interested in sending Soviet-era BUK anti-aircraft missiles to Kyiv is easy to understand. They are effective, and already familiar to the Ukrainian military.

According to Mamradze’s account, a few days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ivanishvili discovered that, without any explanation or any charges having been brought against him, his considerable financial assets held in Western financial institutions had been frozen. Mamradze further states that, almost simultaneously with this discovery, Amb. Degnan requested a meeting with Ivanishvili, and they then met on March 21, 2022. At that meeting, Ambassador Degnan told Ivanishvili to see to it that Georgia’s BUK air defense missiles and Javelin anti-tank weapons were transferred to Ukraine.

Ivanishvili responded that he considered this request to be, at the very least, dishonorable, especially given that the West had just frozen his financial assets. Ivanishvili reportedly described the request as tantamount to blackmail, aside from being insane: it would leave Georgia defenseless and “naked” against Russia, whose tanks are located about two hours’ drive from Tbilisi. In the early days of the Ukraine war, however, Ivanishvili did not publicly come forward about this incident — at least, not in public.

Anatol Lieven, in a published account of his Sept. 30, 2025, conversation with Georgian president Kavelashvili, points out that Georgia went to considerable lengths to prevent Georgian volunteers from going to Ukraine to fight and had also rejected Western pressure to send Kyiv military aid. What is more, and to Western chagrin, the Georgian government rejected Western efforts to force Georgia to impose the full range of EU sanctions on Russia. All the above led, Lieven observed, to accusations against Georgian Dream leaders that they were “pro-Russian.”

In his heated response to this charge, Kavelashvili told Lieven:

…The West demanded that we get involved in war with Russia against our vital national interests…just like in 2008, when the then government’s unreasonable actions on the basis of trust in NATO led Georgia to disaster … but today, Georgia has a government that represents the interests of our people…the same media outlets that accuse us of being under Russian influence tell the same lie about President Trump.

Since this September 2025 conversation, circumstances in Georgia have changed in such a way as to make possible greater public openness about who it was that was pushing the country into a confrontation with Russia, even to the point of opening up a second front. Back in spring 2022, Georgian Dream considered the U.S. its ‘strategic partner.’ The public revelations about how Georgia has been treated, however, have put that relationship in doubt.

Thus, to the account provided earlier by Bidzina Ivanishvili about Western pressure to open a second front, we can now add a December 2025 press conference during which Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that he was present at two meeting in February, 2022 — one in early February, the other on February 27 or 28 — at which US Ambassador Degnan was present. At these meetings, says Kobakhidze, the Georgian government was pressured to not only implement anti-Russian sanctions, but to also open up a second front. When the Americans were asked about what would happen if, or rather, when, Russian troops occupied the country, the Georgians were told that they could start a guerilla war of resistance in the forests, and that the Americans would support them. During this interview, Kobakhidze said he did not wish to say specifically which of the Americans present at the meeting had told them to do these things, but he did insist that the US ambassador was present.

*

Is the above account complete and accurate? It is difficult to say with complete certainty. As we have noted, it has, after all, been contradicted by mainstream sources in the West. And yet the credibility of those Western sources has itself been seriously undermined by accounts such as those of former State Department official Michael Benz. Western reporting – exactly as illustrated by the above-referenced New York Times article – often consists of a kind of circular reasoning whereby Western-financed NGOs on the ground, whether in Georgia or in some other foreign country, repeat back to American reporters more or less exactly what the Western governments that pay their NGO salaries want them to say. Not the most scientific methodology for arriving at the truth of anything.

And so, whether definitively proven or not, the Georgian account detailed above remains highly credible. Indeed, it fits a long-standing pattern. Consider Ukraine. Can anyone doubt that Ukraine would be far better off if, in 2008, the U.S. had not started its obsessive drive to bring that unfortunate land into a military alliance hostile to Russia? By insisting on that policy for so many years, Washington has demonstrated remarkable indifference to the welfare of Ukrainians.

Why should Georgians expect any better?

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 6/3/26

Ukraine hit St Petersburg oil terminals on the morning of June 3 just as Russia’s flagship St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) kicks in a message designed to show that nowhere in Russia is safe from Ukraine’s long-range drones.

Ukraine drones flew over the city before diving into oil storage tanks on the Gulf of Finland only 17km from the conference centre where the event is due to begin today.

Residents posted photos and video footage of loud explosions and a massive fire after the city came under attack and black smoke rising over the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, one of Russia’s largest fuel storage and export facilities.

Authorities immediately shut down the air space over Russia’s former imperial capital making it impossible for any delegates who have not already arrived in St Petersburg to reach the city. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko reported that 50 drones had made the 500km journey from Ukraine and were shot down over the region on June 3 but did not comment on the fires at the port. Nearly 30 flights delayed for over two hours and nine others diverted to other airfields, according to the Russian state news outlet TASS.

This is the fifth summit since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine over four years ago. The attack is part of a sustained campaign by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to cut Russia off from its main export revenues, which has reduced Russia’s exports of refined products, but has yet to affect the overall volume of oil exports or reduce the Kremlin’s income from oil taxes.

The strikes have bitten into Russia’s refined production and forced Moscow to turn to its friend Belarus to cover the shortfall, but production has not fallen enough to spark a fuel crisis yet. While the drone strikes do significant damage, as IntelliNews reported, the payload on the long-range drones is not big enough to destroy a refinery and typically the damage done can be repaired within a few weeks.

The St Petersburg facilities boast a reported throughput of 12.5mn tonnes per year and have been repeatedly targeted, culminating last month with a series of attacks on the Primorsk and Ust-Luga terminals – the two biggest oil terminals on Russia’s western coast.

Dignitaries from over 130 countries and territories of the world are in attendance to show solidarity with Russia and as part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s plan to rebuild Russia’s international and trade relations with the members of the Global South.

Amongst those in attendance are Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of Tanzania Samia Suluhu Hassan, actor Stephen Segal and YouTube star Andrew Tate, as well as China’s vice president and Saudi Arabia’s energy minister. A member of US President Donald Trump’s administration is set to appear at the forum, the first known attendance at the event by an American official in several years.

Unusually, this year there is a large delegation of German businessmen in attendance as the resolve to keep the tough sanctions regime on Russia starts to crack and calls for restarting commercial relations with Russia slowly gather momentum.

Putin is due to give the keynote address on June 5. The new attack on St. Petersburg comes a day after Russia launched a devastating mass missile and drone strike against Kyiv, Dnipro, and other Ukrainian cities, killing at least 23 people, including two children, and injured over 100 others. The Kremlin said the strike was in retaliation for a Ukrainian drone strike on a student dormitory in the university town of Starobilsk on May 22 in occupied Luhansk Oblast in eastern Ukraine, which killed 21 students, injured 42 others and caused outrage in Russia.

Refinery throughput down

Repeated attacks on Russian oil infrastructure have reduced the throughput at Russia’s leading refineries and put domestic supplies of petrol and diesel under pressure.

Output is down by around 10% y/y according to official figures. Ukrainian attacks appear to have disabled most of the spare refining capacity that Russia traditionally maintained, according to Sergey Vakulenko, an independent energy analyst, and any more reduction in refining capacity will have a disproportional effect on supplies of fuel to the domestic market, say experts.

The Kremlin has expanded restrictions on fuel exports as a result, banning overseas sales of jet fuel in addition to earlier limits on gasoline exports. In occupied Crimea, Russian authorities have been forced to ration fuel due to shortages, limiting purchases to 20 litres and banning the filling of fuel canisters. Belgorod and Kursk regions, as well as in Ryazan and parts of the Moscow region, have also reportedly been affected by fuel shortages.

Due to the reduction of refined products, Russian oil companies have compensated by increasing the export of crude oil. Russian seaborne crude oil exports have climbed to their highest levels since the start of the war in Ukraine.

Average crude exports since the beginning of 2026 have reached 3.46mn barrels per day (b/d), about 120,000 bpd higher than in 2025 and above the previous post-invasion annual high of 3.36mn b/d recorded in 2023, according to Bloomberg’s calculations. Seaborne exports averaged 3.64mn bpd in the four weeks to May 31, Bloomberg reported, citing tanker movement data.

The four-week average value of crude shipments stood at about $2.24bn per week in the period ending May 31, down slightly from $2.38bn in the previous four-week period because of lower oil prices.

***

Germans return to SPIEF as Russia sanctions resolve starts to fray

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 6/2/26

German businessmen are going to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Russia’s premier investment forum that kicks off tomorrow.

In fact, German business never left Russia. Following the invasion of Ukraine hundreds of foreign businesses working in Russia said they would leave. In reality only one in ten made the exit. And once you drill into it, those like Apple, that shut down their franchises in Russia, actually continued to sell – just their products went via the traders in Turkey et al and their business didn’t stop at all. Everything just went back to the 1990s set up where intermediaries did everything.

Of those companies that didn’t leave, no country didn’t leave more than the Germans. And Germany had literally ten-times more registered businesses in Russia than any other European country.

When I first arrived in Russia I, and the Russians, assumed that their natural business partner would be the Americans. They are supposed to be the entrepreneurial risk-takers. As it turned out, the American firms are extremely risk adverse. From conversations with many Russian businessmen, they all complained that their US counterparties insisted on lengthy and complicated contracts and talks would go on for months. The Russians found all this a bit silly as they pointed out in the 90s those contracts were not enforceable anyway as everything had collapsed.

It soon became clear the people to do business with were the Germans. They were happy to simply sign an MoU and send some money to get started. If things worked well then they rapidly scaled up. It turned out that the Germans and Russians share a very similar mentality, which is not obvious at first glance.

And it worked very well indeed. The US is dominated by mega-corporations, but Germany’s economy is made up of the Mittelstand, thousands of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) some of which are not that small, employing dozens of people and with a turnover in the millions and tens of millions of euros. These companies are lean, nimble and entrepreneurial. And they are always looking for new markets. Russia was a paradise of unploughed fields hence the inflow of all these German companies. And thanks to the barriers to entry, as Russia was and is a hard market to work in, the upside is that also makes it extremely profitable. From the Russian side, thanks to the Soviet legacy, Russian businesses have an unslakable thirst for high quality specialist machinery. Vorsprung durch Technik. Throughout the last thirty years since the collapse of the USSR I think half of all Russia’s imports for that entire period has been machines.

While these firms have continued to work, what is new here is that the leading businessmen are openly participating in SPIEF. This is yet another sign that the resolve to “just increase the pressure on Russia a little more so it will collapse,” is crumbling. The rhetoric coming out of Brussels is as tough as ever – the 21st sanctions package is in the works and may target the scandalous Irish exports of aluminium to Russia – but on the ground, European businesses continue to do as much business with Russia as they can. Die Welt wrote a piece about the German delegation that included an interesting survey: two thirds of German business would like to see commercial ties restored, especially the gas. The more reserved panellists said that shouldn’t happen until after the fighting in Ukraine stops.

It’s gonna happen. We seem to be in silly season already and there are endless pieces about the “turning point” in the Ukraine conflict and how Russia’s economy is about to collapse. But this is all wishful thinking. A careful reading of the battlefield reports shows that the AFU is not taking “hundreds of kilometers” of territory back. What they are taking is “grey zone” territory that has few Russians in it. The AFR advances have slowed down, but that appears to be because they are coming up against the Defensive Line in Donbas.

As for Russia’s budget woes those are real too, but again, the budget deficit is only 2.5% of GDP – well below the EU’s excessive deficit threshold of 3% — while the number of European countries in the Excessive Deficit Club continues to grow with most of the biggest countries now members. That is another reason why the Germans are in SPIEF: they very badly need to make more money.

Russia’s Ministry of Finance (MinFin) has just done a deal with the oligarchs who are going to “voluntarily” contribute RUB300bn to the budget to help close the gap. Given the deficit is likely to be RUB4 trillion this year, that is not very much, but it is part of MinFin’s plan to squeeze a little out of everything and spread the load. It can’t afford to simply borrow everything as the cost of servicing the OFZ bonds is getting very expensive. When you add in the other stuff like dividends then it seems that Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov is going to cobble together a package to cover the short fall. For instance, the oil companies are earning excess profits already. Gazprom paid a whopping RUB51 per share in 2022 or RUB1.2 trillion all by itself. In the pre-sanctions era it used to pay out a mere RUB8 per share much to the annoyance of its shareholders and invest the rest in never-ending production and transport projects. This year we can expect the same sort of big state-owned company dividend payments from anyone who is making money.

Personally, I would love to go to SPIEF again. It’s White Nights in St Pete at the moment and the whole city is out on the streets deep into the night with most of the bars and cafes remaining open well into the small hours. And Russia’s elite throw parties so the whole event becomes a big social do. The metals oligarch Prokhorov used to throw one of the most famous open door parties every year until he quit Russia. And the talks and sessions at the conference are also fascinating as the discussions are surprisingly frank and realistic.

2008 was a vintage year and the high point of Russia’s move towards becoming a liberal modern economy. That year Professor Sergey Guriev was in charge of the economic blueprint and Medvedev was president. Guriev told me he filled the programme out with liberal reforms and massive privatisation plans and Medvedev didn’t change a word. Then the Great Financial Crisis happened and all that had to be abandoned.

Not sure what will come out of this year’s event, but we may look back and say it was a milestone in the reestablishing ties with Russia. Who knows. After all, the economy could collapse too. But I still think that Ukraine is closer to the edge than Russia.

By Gordon Hahn, Substack, 5/12/26

Note: This article is being cross-posted without editing and any typos are contained in the original.

As Ukraine’s political-military situation both at the front and in the rear deteriorates, the potential for major political crises and coup plots against the rule of Volodomyr Zelenskiy grows. As I have noted earlier, war and revolution often come together; war weakens the state, regime, army and society, leading to political fracture and designs by some to seize power for themselves illegally or asystemically. A classic example is World War I and its effect on Imperial Russia, but other manifestations of this phenomena affected Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Poland, later Germany, and other states as well, including a briefly quasi-independent Ukraine. Various forms of regime change and state collapse occurred in each: the illegal seizure of power by revolution from above, revolution from below, palace coups, including military coups. In Ukraine various warlords, military contingents, and socialist and nationalist revolutionary parties seized power in different parts of the country, with several coups occurring at the ’center’ in Kiev. All this could happen again just as the experience of the 17th century Ukrainian ‘Ruin’ is beginning to repeat itself in this war-torn country.

The most likely candidates to attempt and be capable of a successful seizure of power will be armed ones, and there is no more powerful, potentially revolutionary force than the two Azov army corps: The 3rd Army Corps Azov of the Ukrainian armed forces’ ground forces led by the neofascist Azov organization’s founder Brigadier General Andriy Biletskiy and the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard under the Internal Affairs Ministry led by Brigadier general Denys ‘Redis’ Prokopenko. What resources do Azov and its Army Corps possess? How much political and ideological influence do they wield inside Ukraine? And what domestic and foreign allies do they have and what do the latter provide Azov? What are the prospects for and obstacles to an Azov-led military or military-backed coup? In this Part 1, I discuss Biletskiy’s 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov.’ I will examine the 1st National Guard Corps Azov in Part 2.

The Rise of the Militant Azov Movement

Azov has its roots in the pre-Maidan neofascist Black Corps (BC), Social-National Assembly (SNA) and the Patriots of Ukraine (PU) parties all founded by then civilian political actor, Biletskiy. BC was the most immediate precursor organization of Azov and was founded during the Maidan revolt, which itself ended in an ultimately violent revolt led by neofascist in February 2014. The Maidan revolt hijacked the originally more popular ‘Revolution of Dignity’ at that time.[1] BC’s members were tied to members and associates of PU. After the Maidan revolt, the BC fought anti-Maidan elements in Kharkiv in March 2014. In May 2014 Biletskiy founded in Berdyansk, the Azov Battallion in Berdyansk. Thus, the battalion was created in the crucible of the Ukrainian civil war that developed in the Maidan revolt’s wake. Originally named in honor of the Sea of Azov, the Azov Battalion was made up of local volunteers, patriots, nationalists, and football ultras, particularly from Metalist Kharkiv.

Azov played a key role during the disturbances that occurred in Mariupol in reaction against the Maidan regime and its declaration of an anti-terrorist organization targeting the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist movements. The battalion suppressed the Mariupol separatists, firing on a police station, killing and wounding many anti-Maidan policemen. “(P)oliced streets”, the battalion had suppressed the rebellion in Mariupol by June 2014. The batallion fought in the defense of Ilovaisk and Marinka in Donetsk Oblast from the Donetsk separatists backed by Russian forces.[2]

The Azov Battalion like other autonomous, volunteer neofascist and ultranationalist battalions that formed were incorporated nominally under the command of the newly formed Ukrainian National Guard (NGU) under the control of the Internal Affairs Ministry in the course of 2014.[3] Thus, from the outset of the Maidan regime in Ukraine, neofascist groups and the siloviki departments (the organs of coercion – military, intelligence, and police organs) demonstrated an affimnity for each other.[4]

On 11 November 2014, the battalion was expanded, becoming the Azov Regiment in the NGU. The regiment’s official name later became “the 12th Special Purpose Brigade Azov.” The Azov regiment then was supplied with equipment from the Ukrainian government, including T-64B1M tanks, D-30 artillery, and various other vehicles. In February 2015, the regiment carried out an offensive east of Mariupol, towards the settlement of Shyokryne, and liberated five settlements.[5] By the time of the larger Russian ‘special military operation’ begun in February 2022, Azov had been incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces.

Azov has a youth organization, which, according to Clark University Professor Marta Havryshko, who is from Ukraine’s neofascist hotbed Lvov (Lviv) and specializes in studying such extremist groups, “prepares youth for street violence and confrontation with the police” and “has already used political violence against LGBTQI+, leftists, and feminist activists.” Moreover, it has “widened its activities across Ukraine” since the war began. Like its parent group Azov, it maintains close ties and conducts activities with other neo-Nazi groups like the Misanthropic division, Ukrainian Unity in Blood, Ukrainian Galician Youth, and others.[6] Azov’s and Centuria’s cult of violence – so reminiscent of WW II Germany’s Nazis, is evident in a Centuria video posted on the internet.[7] According to Havryshko, ‘Centuria’ celebrates the birthday of OUN anti-Semite and Nazi collaborator Yaroslav Stetsko, who wrote in a 25 June 1941 letter to OUN‘s leader Bandera: “We are are establishing a militia that will help to eliminate the Jews and to protect the population.” Stetsko also called a party colleague “unprincipled” for marrying a Jew and denied him “room at the helm of national life.”[8]

Biletskiy’s Azov and 3rd Army Corps, have a virtual empire, nearly a state-within-the state that includes its own military, technology, and other training programs, an educational institute, ‘educational’ programs in schools, an array of social media, bookstores, consumer products (tee-shirts, flags, etc., etc.).[9]

Azov’s Schism

Azov has seen splits, defections, and spinoff groups. Before the war the influential Azov commander Sergei Korotkikh (nickname ‘Botsman’) defected. At the beginning of the laerge-scale war in February 2022, Azov members based in Kharkiv created their own unit ‘Kraken’ in the Military Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR). This event speaks once more of the affinity between Ukrainian neofascist groups and Ukrainian siloviki.

Azov underwent a split in mid- 2022 resulting from the siege of Mariupol, the port city on the Sea of Azov from whence comes the movement’s name. The long Russian siege eventually ended when the Ukrainian forces, mostly Azov units, encircled by Russian forces underground in the Azov Iron and Steel Works or ‘AzovStal’ surrendered in May 2022 after negotiations. Rather than being sent to Russia, Azov leaders and some fighters were allowed to go into exile in Turkey, where they were supposed to stay until the war’s end by agreement between Moscow, Kiev, and Istanbul. However, Azov fighters returned to Ukraine partially by way of prisoner exchanges and partially by Turkey’s release of many in summer 2023. The returned prisoner-exiles and their commander Denis Prokopenko (nickname ‘Redis’) in the interim had become national heroes for their refusal to surrender for so long and their subsequent exile. Biletskiy and other Azov elements were not in Mariupol or had escaped before the encirclement, and questions arose as to why they were not there. Then Biletskiy formed from among Azov members his military formation, the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, which, because Biletskiy led a propaganda campaign, became known as one of, if not the most effective of Ukrainian military brigades. Upon Prokopenko’s return he re-formed an Azov brigade under the National Guard (Azov NG) and like Biletskiy sold his unit as the most effective fighting unit in Ukraine.

Tensions emerged between the two Azovs. There have been a series of violent episodes between Azov NG and Azov 3rd Brigade soldiers, highlighting the those tensions. In 2024, Azov 3rd Brigade member Semyon Klok (nickname ‘Malysh’ or ‘Little One’), who would beat a 3rd Brigade officer in June 2025, shot and seriously wounded a National Guard officer. On June 2025, the Azov split deepened when a major in the 12th Brigade of the Azov National Guard (Azov NG), Andrei Korenevich (nicknamed “Koren’’), accused fighters of the Azov 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, who, he said, were closely tied to Biletskiy, of beating him up. According to reports, two Azov Corps members beat Korenevich, and two other members accompanied them. The beaten commander said the beating could not have occurred without Biletskiy’s permission or direct order and called upon 3rd Corps members to think over what is happening. Pointedly, Korenevich charged Biletskiy with “criminal habits” and political ambitions: “It is already clear to everyone that after the war he (Biletsky) is going to enter politics. The whole of Ukraine is plastered with his portraits, as if the election campaign has alreadybegun. Guys from the 3rd, give yourself an answer to the question: are we really fighting for Ukraine,led by bandits who do not disdain to organize attacks on their own?”[10]

Deputy commander of the 12th Brigade of Azov NG, Svyatoslav Palamar’ (nicknamed ‘Kalina’) condemned the spread of “thief-like concepts” in the army, presumably Biletskiy’s fault, justifying attacks on brothers. Indeed, one of the Azov 3rd Corps perpetrators of the beating, was wanted on an international warrant for premeditated murder. Indeed, Palamar’ issued a manifesto sorts – “AboutUkrainian Nationalism and Azov” — condemning Biletskiy and the Azov 3rd Corps. Specfically, hecriticized military personnel who “deliberately replaced the commandments of the Ukrainian nationalistwith ‘criminal romance’ and exchanged honor, dignity and ‘fraternity’ for illusory authority, following‘criminal concepts’ and ‘imagined membership in bandit groups.’” Such are “not friends of Ukraine”and are “not on the (proper) path.” “Those who justify attacks on brothers with ‘thieves’ concepts’definitely are not Ukrainian nationalists. The Ukrainian nationalist has never lived, does not live andwill not live according to the ‘concepts’ of banditry. Moreover, he does not have, has not had, and willnot have the right to plant crime and ‘concepts’ among the Ukrainian military.”[11] Even the National Guard itself issued a statement condemning the beating.[12] However, this split proved temporary as evidenced by Biletskiy’s and Prokopenko’s reunion upon the formation of the 3rd Army Corps Azov in 2025.

The split between Azov units in the siloviki – military Azov (Biletskiy’s 3rd Assault Brigade) versus Prokopenko’s Azov NG did not extend to the political movement. Biletskiy denied in October 2023 that such a split existed.[13] In terms of neofascism’s profile within Ukraine, the split mattered little. Both Biletskiy’s and Prokopenko’s Azovs push the neofascist Azov ideology propaganda in schools, universities, and mass and social media. But Biletskiy’s Azov movement and 3rd Army Corps’ has long had a large and growing infrastructure for doing so that now includes its own training school that Prokopenko’s Azov NG endeavors to match.[14]

Despite the 2023-2024 tensions within Azov, Biletskiy’s star continued to rise along with that of his 3rd Assault Brigade ‘Azov’ in the course of the war, even as Ukraine’s military fortunes waned.

Azov at War: Rising Through the Ranks

At the onset of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Azov 3rd Brigade was stationed on the outskirts of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov and fought to defend the city during the Russian siege of 2024. With the encirclement of the city, the Azov fighters withdrew to the massive underground complex of the AzovStal plant, and all its members being severely wounded, killed, captured, or surrendered and placed into Russian captivity or sent into exile in Turkey under agreement they would only return until after the war. In September 2022, many fighters from the regiment were released from Russian captivity, and the commanders, including Denys Prokopenko ‘Redis’ were returned to Ukraine in violation of the agreement, as noted above.

Between January and February 2023, the Azov Regiment was expanded and reformed into the 12th Brigade of Operational Assignment, which was soon disbanded in favor of the Azov 3rd Seprate Assault Brigade under the Offensive Guard program. The new brigade defended areas of southern Ukraine during its disastrous, NATO-conceived summer counteroffensive in 2023 towards Melitopol. Biletskiy’s first major Azov propaganda campaign and his ensuing growing authority coincided with the 3rd Brigade’s combat efforts during the battle of Bakhmut in 2023. The Azov 3rd Brigade later redeployed to the Serebryansky forest in the Kreminna direction and then to New York and Toretsk in mid-2024. Thus, like the rest of the Ukrainian army, Azov units, under whatever name and structure, have experienced defeat after defeat, forced to retreat further and further west in Donetsk Oblast. Recently, the 3rd Brigade had been deployed on the Northern Donbass and Kharkiv fronts that slowly but surely have been giving way to Russian forces after gritty battles albeit.[15]

The 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’, formed officially on 4 August 2025, was founded in March 2025 on the basis of the 3rd Separate Assualt Brigade ‘Azov’ to which the 60th Mechanized Brigade and “many other” but identified “support units” were joined in July. The new corps required an immediate reorganization of Azov’s social media channels in August 2025, and Biletskiy’s August announcement included the usual promotional material. He noted that the 3rd Army Corps’ “bridgehead is the last line of defense for the Northern Donbas and Kharkiv region” and that the corps “holds about 150 kilometers – approximately 12% or 1/8 of the entire front line.” Biletskiy added: “It can be confidently stated that the Third Corps is already influencing the course of this war.” By August, the 53rd Mechanized Brigade and the 63rd Mechanized Brigade had also been placed under the command of the corps. The former held positions in the Serebryansky forest, and the latter had been fighting extensively in the Luhansk direction alongside the 60th Brigade.[16] At present, the 3rd Army Corps Azov consists of the old Azov 3rd Brigade, three mechanized brigades joined to it, plus a communications brigade (see Table below).

The Azov 3rd Army Corps consists of anywhere from 6,000 to 20,000 troops, stationed in a privileged unit that is likely to be well-equipped and well-staffed. It is likely that its number of personnel tends towards the upper limit of the indicated range of 6-20,000. Again, its privileged position will ensure a sufficient number of recruits, and those in the best shape will be sent its way.

It is important to note regarding Azov’s control over the 3rd Army Corps that Biletskiy has been successful in placing hardened Azov members into command positions of the 3rd Corps’ subdivisions, most motably in the 53rd Mechanized Brigade. For example, Lt. Col. Ihor Mykhailenko, commander of the 53rd Mechanized Brigade, was appointed in March 2026, when the decision to form the corps was made. Mikhailenko also was appointed deputy commander of the Azov Corps and is a long-time Azov operator and committed neofascist. He volunteered to the Azov Battalion in 2014 and took command of an assault group during clashes in Mariupol. Mykhailenko also took part in the battles at Ilovaisk and Shyrokyne that same year. In late 2014, he commanded the 3rd Company and soon was second in command of the Azov Regiment, holding that position until 2016. After frontline action, Mikhailenko founded the abovementioned ultranationalist “Centuria” organization, focusing on social mobilization through ideological indoctrination and military training.[17] Upon Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Mikhailenko returned to the front and commanded the Azov-Kyiv Special Operations unit until being appointed deputy commander of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade Azov—that is Biletskiy’s deputy. Mikhailenko says that the 53rd Mechanized Brigade under the Azov 3rd Army Corps will prioritize psychological support, the development of air drones (UAVs), and the training of personnel.[18]

The 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’ units are battle-hardened as well as ideologically oriented. For example, founded in Dnipro in 2015, the Corps’ 60th Mechanized Brigade has had numerous important deployments, including: Kherson Oblast, 2022; Bakhmut, early 2023; Kherson counteroffensive, summer 2023; Kupyansk, January 2024; Liman, March 2024 to present.[19] Commander of the Corps’ 60th Mechanized Brigade, Maj. Dmytro Rohozyuk, has less of an Azov pedigree than the 53rd’s Lt. Col. Mykhailenko but makes up for this with battle experience and planning expertise. Following the full-scale invasion in 2022, Rohozyuk joined the Azov Special Operations Regiment “Kyiv” and took part in the defense of Kyiv and Mariupol. He later became a company commander in the 1st Assault Battalion of the 3rd Assault Brigade, participating in the Bakhmut campaign. He was then appointed Head of the Operations Department as Chief of Planning. Following the creation of the 3rd Army Corps, he has served as its Deputy Chief of Staff, helping to establish corps-level planning structures. Last year Rohozyuk assumed command of the 60th Mechanized Brigade. According to Volodymyr Fokin, a commander from the 3rd Assault Brigade, before Rohozyuk’s appointment to the 60th Brigade, it had poor leadership, a lack of rotation, and little knowledge of its standing forces. By January 2026, Rohoziuk claimed major improvements, including sharply cutting the number of AWOL personnel and integrating experienced units from the 3rd Assault Brigade to train up existing and new personnel in the 60th Brigade.[20]

63rd Mechanized Brigade, like the other units already discussed, is a unit of the Ukrainian Ground Forces and was formed on 14 March 2017 on the basis of a joint directive of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, but its official creation dates from 23 June 2017. Bases in Khmelnistkiy Oblast’ in western Ukraine, the unit was formed from servicemen of the units of Operational Command West. In October 2019 of that year, the brigade was deployed to the “combat zone in eastern Ukraine,” meaning Donetsk or Luhansk. At the beginning of the Russia’s ‘special military operation’ full-scale invasion, the brigade engaged Russian forces in Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts, defending for the right bank of the Dnieper River. In November 2022, after the Kharkiv offensive’s success and its troops helped to retake the city of Kherson. The 63rd saw heavy fighting in Bakhmut from mid-December 2022 and from 2024 operated in Luhansk, defending positions to the west of Kreminna in the region that recently had been taken by Russian forces. In March 2025, the brigade received BTR-4 vehicles, becoming the fourth unit of the Ukrainian Ground Forces to receive them. Joining the newly established 3rd Army Corps by August 2025, the 63rd Brigade was reorganized “to streamline the command, recruitment, management, and other procedures within the brigade,” “likely at the initiative of the corps’ headquarters.[21]

The 63rd’s commander is Major Denys Shapoval’, known by his callsign “Shapa.” He is another long-time Azov member. Shapoval joined the Azov Regiment in 2015, undergoing intensive training within a special-purpose unit. He first saw combat in 2016 near Mariupol, seeing further action in Marinka, Krasnogorivka, Shyrokyne, and Novoluhansk in the civil war. After returning “briefly” to civilian life, Shapoval returned to combat with the February 2022 Russian invasion, fighting in Kiev, Kherson, Bakhmut, and Kurdyumivka. He rose through the 63rd Brigade’s command ladder to become from Chief of Staff of 1st Mechanized Battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade Azov before being appointed commander of the 63rd Mechanized Brigade in March 2026.[22] Thus, another long-time Azov soldier has taken command of another brigade pillar of the 3rd Army Corps Azov. The 3rd Corps’ structure is rounded out by the 122nd Communications Brigade that leads the Corps’ technical and drone personnel and operations and is commanded by Ihor Bondarchuk.[23] It is “expected,” according to a supportive social media outlet dedicated to Azov’s military structures, that the 3rd Army Corps “will include a heavy mechanized brigade and a dedicated artillery brigade.”[24] All in all, the well-resourced, battle-hardened, and ideologically-fortified 3rd Army Corps will be a formidable force for both foreign and domestic foes to deal with.

Political Azov

The Azov Army Corps’s two predecessor organizations – Biletskiy’s 3rd Assault Brigade and Prokopenko’s Azov National Guard unit – had been the most politicized elements in the Ukrainian armed forces writ large. After the fall of Bakhmut, the authority and popularity of Biletskiy and his 3rdBrigade continued to grow through the winter 2023-2024 battle for Avdiivka and later battles. Prokopenko’s Azov project had a lesser profile but is well-known. A new level of power and authority within both army and society came with the elevation of 3rd Separate Assault Brigade to the status of an army corps—the 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’—and it marked a new high point for Biletskiy’s political ambitions.

Biletskiy, Prokopenko, and their respective Azov projects have been the only military elements allowed to have a political presence and engage in political – and highly ideological – propaganda.[25]Both Biletskiy, Prokopenko, and other Azov commanders intermittently speak out on larger military, war and state issues that other officers are not allowed to address. Politicization of the army and National Guard through their Azov units now is likely to intensify, feeding on mounting multiple crises and Azov’s growing military power and political authority rising.

Azov is well-financed. Rumors circulate among the political elite that Ukraine’s coal oligarch Rinat Akhmetov was financing both Biletskiy’s and Prokopenko’s Azov brigades and their connected universe of social institutions on instructions from, and under the control of, the Office of the President (OP).[26] Zelenskiy’s goal is said to be the creation of a political party that could drain votes away from the popular Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, Kiev’s ambassador to London and former commander of Ukraine’s armed forces and former President Petro Poroshenko’s ‘European Solidarity’ party. If elected to the Rada, Biletskiy’s Azov party would form a parliamentary majority with Zelenskiy’s declining Servants of the People (Slugi haroda) party and ensure Zelenskiy’s control over the Rada and Cabinet of Ministers, sidelining European Solidarity.[27] As noted above, it is rumored that the OP, at least under the management of its former leader Andriy Yermak, is well-predisposed towards Prokopenko’s Azov.[28]

*I will examine the 1st National Guard Corps Azov in Part 2.

By Pavel Devyatkin, Responsible Statecraft, 5/28/26

This month, as delegates from around the world gathered at the United Nations to talk about nuclear nonproliferation, the U.S. and Russia chose to remind everyone just how much destructive power they command.

On May 12, Russia staged a test launch of its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Russian President Vladimir Putin promptly announced that the Sarmat will go on combat duty by the end of 2026.

On May 20, the U.S. Air Force launched an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM. The missile has been in service since 1970 and may need to operate through 2050 — 14 years longer than planned — because its next-generation replacement, the Sentinel ICBM, is running years behind schedule and billions over budget.

None of these tests made either country safer. Rather, they deteriorated the diplomatic environment. And in political terms, they were corrosive: they further normalized the idea that nuclear policy is about signaling rather than diplomacy at the exact moment diplomats were trying to keep the focus on risk reduction.

The Air Force emphasized that its test was scheduled in advance and “not in response to world events,” but the timing could hardly have been worse: just two days later, the 11th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference wrapped up at the U.N. in New York City without a consensus final document.

Why the conference matters

The NPT Review Conference is a periodic summit where the world’s nuclear and non-nuclear states gather to negotiate next steps toward disarmament and try to keep the promise of the NPT alive. Held every five years, the conference is one of the main pillars sustaining the global nonproliferation order. When states can agree on a final document, it shows that, despite their differences, they still share common ground on the nuclear threat.

But this year, for the third time in a row, the conference ended in failure. The immediate sticking point was a deadlock between the U.S. and Iran over how to address Iran’s nuclear activities in the final text. Washington wanted direct language naming Iran, while Tehran flatly refused and insisted on condemnation of the nuclear-armed states that had attacked it in the past. The chair, Vietnamese Ambassador Do Hung Viet, didn’t even bother to submit the last draft for a vote. Before the conference opened, he had warned that another failure would be catastrophic: “We may lose the credibility of the NPT itself.”

Yet focusing only on Iran misses the deeper fracture. “Tragically, NPT states missed an important opportunity to formally reaffirm their support for the treaty and its core principles, goals, and objectives at a time of increasing nuclear dangers,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

After a month of talks, the draft outcome document failed even to call on nuclear-armed states to pursue disarmament negotiations “with urgency,” despite the fact that this obligation already exists under Article VI of the NPT. Instead, the text called for a vague “constructive dialogue” that “could facilitate” future discussions.

Meanwhile, nuclear-armed states and their allies worked to water down or block long-established language about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use.

Still, not all was lost. Despite U.S. objections, other states managed to insert language supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and opposing any resumption of nuclear explosive testing. That was at least a small defense against an eroding norm; President Donald Trump has floated the idea of resuming testing, with Russia warning it would match any U.S. move.

The conference’s conclusion must also be kept in perspective. As Russian arms control expert Vladimir Orlov points out, the NPT Review Conference is about the review process as well as consensus documents. That review happened, and no country questioned whether the NPT is essential. Even if threats to compliance are growing, the treaty remains in force.

Signaling replacing diplomacy

Actions speak louder than words, and May was full of contradictions between the two. American and Russian diplomats in New York praised the NPT as the foundation of nonproliferation while their military commands showed off capabilities the treaty is meant to restrain.

The Sarmat and Minuteman III launches came alongside large-scale Russian nuclear drills that ran May 19-21. Russia billed these as rehearsals for using nuclear forces if threatened.

“As a result of blatantly provocative moves in the nuclear sphere, strategic risks are increasing, as is the danger of a head-on clash between NATO and our country, with potentially catastrophic consequences,” warned Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov.

Nobody seriously thinks a first strike is coming. Deterrence is working in that sense. The real problem is the crumbling diplomatic space. Even routine missile tests may be seen as threats. In turn, threats start to look like preparations for war.

Meanwhile, the architecture of arms control is eroding. The last major agreement capping U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arms, New START, expired on February 5. Although the U.S. and Russia appear to be informally observing New START’s numerical limits following the treaty’s expiration, neither side is bound by any legal obligation to do so, and there is no verification mechanism to confirm compliance.

So, where does arms control go from here? The NPT Review Conference was a chance for nuclear states to do the bare minimum: restate their commitments and treat disarmament as essential to security.

They failed. Now, as yet another deadlocked conference fades and missile tests make headlines, the NPT’s bargain that non-nuclear states forgo the bomb in exchange for progress on disarmament by nuclear states looks more lopsided than ever.

History shows that arms races always end with arms control, but often after unnecessary escalation, and occasionally after near-catastrophe. How much brinkmanship will it take before real talks resume?

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 5/17/26

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had a basic problem: having ignored investing into anything except military technology, the newly independent country found that nothing worked properly. All its technology and machinery was vastly inferior to their Western analogues. And it made no sense to invest millions of dollars in trying to catch up, as at the end of the day, the Western machines would still be better and cheaper than anything a Russian firm could produce. So for most of the last three decades by far the largest import category was machinery.

Sanctions changed all that. Extreme sanctions imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine cut Russia off from even basic things like high quality printer paper, let alone sophisticated computer chips. Central Bank of Russia (CBR) governor Elvia Nabiullina warned businesses in a speech at the time that they should be prepared to go back “at least two generations” of technology if they wanted to keep their businesses going.

Fast forward four years and Russia is rolling out tech innovation after innovation to replace those imported machines it couldn’t make for itself. As IntelliNews reported, thanks to the collapse of the economy in 1991, Russia missed out on at least two revolutions in precision tool making which is at the heart of modern consumer and industrial goods production, left so far behind that it seemed almost impossible that it would ever be able to catch up.

Rosatom expands machine-building ambitions as nuclear orders surge

Russia’s Rosatom is best known as the state-owned nuclear corporation responsible for building and maintaining nuclear power plants (NPPs). Russia’s nuclear exports are booming as uranium is the new gas for Russia’s energy-linked foreign policy.

However, Rosatom is playing a second and probably more important role. It is positioning itself as a major machine-building group as demand rises for equipment linked to nuclear energy, Arctic shipping and industrial manufacturing, according to comments made by chief executive Alexei Likhachev at a congress of Russian engineering companies last week.

Likhachev said more than 200,000 people are now employed in machine-building production across its enterprises, as the government has yet another stab at doing something about its inability to make high quality machines.

Rosatom acts both as a customer and producer of heavy engineering equipment for sectors including defence, nuclear energy and industrial technology projects tied to Russia’s import substitution drive. The group also manufactures equipment for external customers in industries ranging from oil refining to liquefied natural gas. The idea is to learn by doing, and thanks to sanctions it has plenty of customers.

“The nearest horizon we see is 2040, which promises us an order for machine-building products worth around RUB25 trillion ($263bn),” Likhachev said during the congress of the Russian Machine Builders Union.

The nuclear sector remains the largest source of future demand. Under Russia’s General Scheme for the Placement of Electric Power Facilities until 2042, the country plans to construct 38 nuclear power units of varying sizes. Rosatom is also building reactors abroad, with projects under way in Bangladesh, Turkey, India, China, Hungary, Egypt and Uzbekistan.

Likhachev said Rosatom had also reached agreements on future nuclear power plant construction in Rwanda, Vietnam, Myanmar and Kazakhstan, underlining Moscow’s efforts to preserve influence in global nuclear markets despite Western sanctions targeting parts of Russia’s energy sector.

Rosatom’s engineering operations also support Russia’s expanding nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet. The Baltic Shipyard is currently constructing the nuclear icebreakers Chukotka, Leningrad and Stalingrad, vessels considered central to the development of the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic.

Beyond nuclear infrastructure, Rosatom manufactures spiral-wound heat exchangers for LNG production, equipment for oil refineries, battery cells, radiopharmaceuticals and medical technology. The corporation has also expanded training programmes, opening engineering classes and operating 12 colleges in Russia’s nuclear cities. Annual graduate recruitment has increased from 1,300 to 5,400 over the past decade, according to the company.

Aviation catching up

Aviation was one of the sectors that was hardest hit by sanctions. Again, the massive Russian plane-building sector built up in Soviet times was stuck in the past and unable to manufacture the nuts and bolts spare parts needed to keep the fleet in the air. During the boom years, like in the power sector, Russia had largely bought the cheaper, but higher quality foreign-made planes. Cut off from spare parts by sanctions, companies were forced to ground aging planes and started to cannibalise them to keep the rest in the air.

Now Russia is preparing to begin deliveries of domestically produced passenger aircraft as Moscow pushes to reduce its dependence on Western aerospace technology thanks to progress in domestic manufacturing capabilities.

The first import-substituted SJ-100 regional jets equipped with Russia’s PD-8 engines are expected to be delivered to airlines by the end of 2026 or in the first quarter of 2027, according to industry officials and state media reports. Certification of the PD-8 engine has been completed, with aircraft and engine approvals expected to be synchronised before deliveries begin.

The SJ-100 programme, developed by the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation, is central to the Kremlin’s strategy of replacing foreign-made components previously sourced from suppliers in Europe and the US.

In the medium-haul segment, the Tupolev Tu-214 received certification in December 2025 and deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2027. Red Wings will become the first operator under a firm leasing agreement covering 11 aircraft financed through Russia’s National Welfare Fund.

But production volumes remain limited. The Kazan Aviation Plant is expected to assemble three Tu-214 aircraft in 2026, up from a rate of one or two aircraft annually in recent years. However, United Aircraft Corporation has secured preliminary commitments for 100 Tu-214s from Russian carrier S7 Airlines, with deliveries due to start in 2029.

“The entire lineup — from short-haul to medium-haul — is converging at a single point in time,” the report said, describing the emergence of “a fully independent ecosystem”.

 “Russia has managed to do what no one in the world has been able to do for decades: displace the US in their monopoly in critical avionics,” the report said.

The effort contrasts with China’s approach to aircraft development. While China’s COMAC has advanced production of the ARJ21 and C919 passenger jets, both programmes continue to rely heavily on Western suppliers, including engines produced by CFM International, the joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran. One of the only deals that US President Donald Trump was able to strike during his trip to Beijing last week was the sale of 200 Boeing jets to Beijing – and even then the market was disappointed as they were expecting 500 planes to be sold.

One of the biggest innovation is Russia has developed its own engines, the most complicated part of plane-making. The fully indigenous PD-8 engine for the Superjet has officially passed all certification tests. This involved: 

-Over 6,500 hours of gruelling real-world and lab testing completed.

-Extreme icing tests (ground rig at CIAM + in-flight over Arkhangelsk).

-150-hour endurance runs simulating years of heavy operation.

-Bird strike, water ingestion, and fan blade failure trials.

-Full hail cloud simulation.

-And dozens more brutal certification tests.

Russia is building its own future in civil aviation, completely independent of Western supply chains.

“Russia — a slower, but autonomous trajectory,” the report said. “In the long run, the second model gives a strategic advantage.”

Microchip factory

One of the lack of technology’s hardest tells is the weakness in Russia’s missile production: it is still heavily dependent on Western microelectronics for much of the guidance and control systems, but that is changing too.

In the first few years of the Ukraine war, 95% of the electronics in captured unexploded Russian missiles was Western-made, but last year a captured decoy drone was discovered that was almost totally made up of Chinese electronics. Chinese tech has also been making rapid progress. Likewise, during last year’s war with Israel, Iranian drones relied on the US-controlled GPS satellite network for guidance, making them vulnerable to Israeli electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures. This year, Iranian drones have changed over to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, negating Israel’s ability to spoof inbound drones that have been doing devastating damage as a result.

However, it seems that Russia is finally overcoming this hurdle too. Russia has just unveiled its first domestically produced photolithography machine, the Progress STP-350, in a move aimed at reducing dependence on foreign semiconductor equipment amid western sanctions.

The system is designed to manufacture 350 nanometre chips, a generation far behind the most advanced processors used in consumer electronics but one that remains relevant for military and industrial applications. Larger transistors are generally more durable and can operate in conditions that would damage cutting-edge chips.

Russian developers said the chips produced by the machine are resistant to radiation exposure, electromagnetic pulse attacks and extreme temperatures, making them suitable for defence systems, aerospace equipment and critical infrastructure. The components are also designed to withstand vibration and operate at higher voltages of up to 100V, capabilities valued in military hardware and heavy industry.

The launch reflects Moscow’s broader effort to localise semiconductor production after export controls imposed by the US and its allies restricted access to advanced chipmaking tools. Russia has struggled to develop domestic alternatives to highly specialised lithography systems, a market dominated globally by companies in the Netherlands, Japan and the US.

While the Progress STP-350 does not compete with the sub-10 nanometre technology used by leading global chipmakers, analysts say mature-node semiconductors remain strategically important because of their reliability and resilience in harsh operating environments.

These are very large chips compared to the 7nm chips used in today’s smart phones and highlight how far Russia remains in the microelectronics industry, but they are sufficient for use in missiles and many other consumer electronic goods production. By comparison, China is now capable of making 12nm chips and recently announced it was able to make commercially viable 7nm chips.

From cheese to turbines

Sanctions have sparked heavy investment into innovation that is starting to bear fruit. It all started with the famous complete disappearance of European cheese from Russian supermarket shelves after Russian President Vladimir Putin imposed tit-for-tat sanctions on EU agricultural goods in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea.

Cheese suffered from exactly the quality/cost problem, but as Russians were cut off from their favourite cheeses, one woman flew to Paris to buy the cheese moulds and started to produce Siberian camembert. Likewise, the patriotically named Koza Nostra firm began to produce very decent Russian goat cheese. (Koza is Russian for goat, so the company’s name roughly translates into “Our Goats”.) Within about two years after the sanctions were imposed, Russia had its own flourishing domestic cheese industry.

Closing the gap on gas turbines was an altogether more daunting task. German engineering firm Siemens had a total monopoly on high efficiency gas turbines during the upgrade of the Russian power sector during the boom years of the noughties. Russian technology couldn’t come anywhere close to Germany’s high precision engineering these turbines rely on as a result of the missing precision tool industry.

The Russian engineering giant Siloviye Mashiny (Power Machines), owned by sanctioned oligarch Alexey Mordashov, had a joint venture with Siemens and was trying to develop a domestic equivalent, but that effort was stymied after Siemens was reluctantly forced to withdraw from the Russian market.

However, as IntelliNews reported, last year specialists from the United Engine Corporation (UEC), part of the Rostec State Corporation, completed testing of the second prototype of the new AL-41ST-25 industrial gas turbine engine in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, that is almost as good as anything Siemens makes.

It also appears that there has been a technology transfer between Iran and Russia, which has been under a similar extreme sanctions regime for even longer than Russia and has likewise innovated. Last September Iran delivered high efficiency gas turbines to replace Russia’s Siemens gas turbines that were on a par with the German maker’s quality.

Military hardware

With military hardware, Russia has kept its Cold War edge in developing innovative weapons. Iran played a key role here too, as before the war in Ukraine started it was already a world leader in drone technology, sparked by reverse engineering a crashed US drone in its territory.

Following the invasion of Ukraine, Iran sold hundreds of millions of dollars worth of drones to Russia, but in 2025 there was a technology transfer deal between Moscow and Tehran and Russia built its own drone factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. Since then Russia has taken drone technology forward with things like the new Geran-5 jet propelled drones. Some of these innovations have also been showing up on the battlefield in the Gulf war, suggesting the CRINK alliance (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) are increasingly sharing military innovations with each other.

More generally, both Russia and China have run far ahead with a family of super weapons. Most importantly is the family of hypersonic missiles that can penetrate any US air defence and is a class of weapons America does not have yet. Since 2018, Putin has rolled out several more groundbreaking super weapons, including the Oreshnik cruise missile that can hit any capital in Europe, the “unstoppable” Poseidon nuclear torpedoes, which were just deployed last week, and most recently the super heavy Sarmat cruise missile, the biggest ever made that can hit any target on the planet. America and Europe are currently defenceless against all these weapons, experts say. At the same time, Russia has ramped up its drone production to over 7mn units a year, whereas the US cheap drone equivalent is still in its pilot development phase and Europe has no large-scale drone production at all.

The same thing happened in China 

During his trip to Beijing last week US President Donald Trump offered to reverse CHIPS, the Biden-era US ban on exporting top flight microchips to China, but Chinese President Xi Jinping refused the offer, as in the meantime, China has developed its own equivalents.

The CHIPS ban was supposed to stymie Chinese tech development and ensure that the US stayed at least one, if not two, generations ahead in the race. But according to a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the export controls backfired in spectacular fashion.

“The US has imposed export controls to deny China access to strategic technologies [but] we find no evidence of reshoring or friend-shoring. As a result of these disruptions, affected suppliers have negative abnormal stock returns, wiping out $130bn in market capitalisation, and experience a drop in bank lending, profitability, and employment. [US firms’] total number of customers declines, potentially inflicting collateral damage upon the same US firms whose technology export controls are trying to protect,” the report said.

What happened was the reverse: it forced a consolidation of a fragmented sector and a massive investment impulse that has seen Chinese technology race ahead and is now increasingly displacing the US from the lead in sector after sector, starting with green energy tech and EVs. China has gone from a net importer of technology to a net exporter in the last few years.