By Gilbert Doctorow, Substack, 10/25/26

To the best of my knowledge, you will not find anywhere else the discussion about money and politics in Russia that I am about to present below. This is not because the subject is marginal or exotic: on the contrary it should be central to any explanation of how Russians vote and why President Putin and his party United Russia maintain control of the Duma and of Russian political elites today. However, de facto Russian Studies have ceased to exist in the United States for well over a decade and for that reason the subject at hand has gone unnoticed, unexamined.

I take for my marker on the last generalization, my close and regular observations of one of the two founding centers of Russian studies at U.S. universities dating from 1949, Columbia University’s Harriman Institute. When I was last on campus as a Visiting Fellow of the Harriman in 2010-2011 the scope of Russian studies had been reduced to discussion of the crimes of Vladimir Putin & Co. against human rights in Russia and assorted freakish but at the time fashionable subjects like how LGBT are treated in Russia today. More recently, even that very skewed definition of Russian studies has been thrown overboard, and the Harriman Institute has implemented the fashionable concept of ‘decolonizing Russian studies’, meaning that Russia itself disappeared from the syllabus and what is studies is the Borderlands of the former Russian Empire: Central Asia, the Caucasus and, first and foremost, Ukraine. Indeed, the Harriman Institute might be better named “The Center for Ukrainian Studies.” The good Governor Harriman, patron of the Institute, must be turning over in his grave.

From my regular correspondence with Professor Francis Boyle (deceased) of the University of Illinois, and holder of both law degrees and a history PhD in Russian from Harvard, I heard his disgust over the way the Davis Center (formerly the Russian Research Center) had similarly degenerated into a totally useless platform for Ukrainian propagandists and anti-Russian studies, even though a properly named Ukrainian Center has existed on campus since the 1970s when I was a witness to its creation.

With that introduction out of the way, let us move on to the substance of this essay: money, investments and how the upper middle classes of Russia, the bulwark of any government have been properly bought off by United Russia and remain on the sidelines of any political tensions there may be over the conduct of the Ukraine War, the state of the economy and other issues that otherwise could attract their attention and activism.

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The common figure given for Russians with money to invest is 6% of the general population. The bottom 94% of the population is living from hand to mouth. It can and is bought off by Power with good subsidies for their home mortgage loans, especially as regards young families, with ever rising pensions for the elderly that are paid on time, with improving civilian infrastructure including roads, schools, hospitals and polyclinics. All of these measures are properly executed by the governing United Russia party. Add to that the ultra-generous sign-up payments for those volunteering to serve in the Special Military Operation. Depending on where you live, that can be approximately 35,000 euros equivalent in roubles, which is typically greater than 3 years of salary that your ordinary bloke would have been making before the war. Death benefits and life pensions for the critically wounded are similarly generous.

All of the foregoing, of course, has little bearing on the top 6% of the population, whose minds are elsewhere, on investments to build upon their acquired capital.

As we know, the prime interest rate set by Elvira Nabiulina at the Central Bank has spiked and remains today far above the official inflation rate of 7%. A year or so ago, the prime was at 21%. Today it is at 14%. As I have indicated repeatedly on these pages, such interest rates have devastated small entrepreneurs, because effectively they are deprived of working capital at rates that their business margins can support. Meanwhile, major corporations, especially those active in the military production and other privileged spheres in this dirigiste economy, receive highly subsidized bank loans and can operate normally.

One may assume that the small entrepreneurs are a minor contingent in the upper 6% and that the vast majority in the 6% of the Russian population are beneficiaries of the high prime rate because it supports very high rates of interest on their time deposits in banks (currently hovering at 12.5%) and on money market mutual funds (currently 13 – 16%).

To be sure, in its attempts to raise money to fill the budget deficit of a ‘guns and butter’ way of running the war, the Russian Treasury has introduced a progressive tax on bank interest, dividends and capital gains from share ownership and mutual funds investments. The tax is mostly at the 13% to 15% level and can be avoided entirely by investing in privately managed mutual funds that are held for at least 3 years before being cashed out.

These laws on investments and taxes, just like the prime rate that allows such generous profits to investors in what are essentially risk-free assets like money market mutual funds, are all the work of the United Russia party.

I rest my case there: the potentially agitated Russian elites in that top 6% of the population in a wartime that has lasted nearly 5 years have been bought off very cleverly. Their sons and daughters face no draft that would put them in harm’s way. And their cash hoard is allowed to rise handsomely day by day.

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 10/28/26

President Volodymyr Zelensky recently signed Bill No.16119, a law expanding educational rights for national minorities and indigenous peoples. Ukraine is thereby selectively adjusting, rather than reversing, its post-2014 Ukrainization policies.

The measure was presented as progress on minority rights and a step that could help open further EU accession clusters. Romanian President Nicusor Dan welcomed the legislation, noting that mother-tongue education for ethnic Romanians is “no abstract matter” for families living in Ukraine.

The law expands the use of eligible minority languages in schools, recognizes special institutional status for minority-language schools, and strengthens continuity of education.

Crucially, the additional protections apply only to official languages of the European Union and to indigenous languages such as Crimean Tatar. Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian and Slovak qualify. Russian does not. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education clarified that the additional rights “do not apply to the Russian language.”

Russian remains widely spoken, with 28% or even more Ukrainians still using both Russian and Ukrainian at home despite years of Ukrainization and wartime restrictions.

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe flagged the problem years ago: in its 2017 opinion, it found the less favorable treatment of non-EU languages, particularly Russian, difficult to justify and raised discrimination concerns. Its 2023 opinion report on national minorities legislation reiterated that promoting Ukrainian as the state language does not justify withholding equivalent protections from Russian speakers.

Ukraine’s Constitutional Court took a different view in 2021, holding that preferential treatment for EU languages was permissible – the European advisory body’s criticism and Kyiv’s domestic position have never fully aligned.

The expanded guarantees for ethnic Hungarians and Romanians may reflect Budapest’s and Bucharest’s ability to block or delay Ukraine’s EU accession process.

It is no accident Roma inclusion follows a separate track: a national strategy running to 2030 addresses education, housing and discrimination. These measures concern the social integration of marginalized Gypsies communities, rather than reversing Ukrainization.

Similarly, Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, who cannot exercise comparable leverage inside the EU process, remain outside the new framework.

By comparison, although the ongoing war complicates it, Russia formally recognizes ethnic Ukrainians, while its Constitution and laws guarantee the preservation and study of minority languages.

In any case, Kyiv explicitly differentiates between Russian and EU minority languages, while Moscow formally has an inclusive framework.

Ukraine’s Russian minority-rights controversy predates the 2022 invasion: differential treatment has been a structural feature of post-Maidan policy, rather than just a temporary wartime measure.

After 2014, language, media and minority legislation steadily elevated Ukrainian while narrowing the public space for Russian. US political scientist Nicolai N. Petro, writing in Foreign Policy in late 2023, described policies that further relegated Russian speakers to a permanent second-class status – and warned that such approaches risk alienating a significant share of the population even once fighting ends.

Ukrainian officials have at times declared there is simply “no Russian minority”, a claim that sits uneasily with census data and everyday bilingual reality, to say the least.

Meanwhile, nationalist historical narratives persist: a Lviv’s museum dedicated to Nazi collaborator Roman Shukhevych was being rebuilt just weeks before the education law was signed. Shukhevych incited anti-Polish pogroms in 1930.

The continued public commemoration of such figures is hard to reconcile with any claim of comprehensive ideological retreat from post-Maidan nation-building. Moreover, the reforms will be viewed by Ukrainian ultranationalists as a setback forced by European partners – and are likely to generate domestic pushback.

They may also, on the other hand, encourage further demands from minority communities, including over the glorification of controversial wartime figures – an issue that still strains relations with Poland. Not surprisingly, Ukrainian tensions with neighbors have been a recurring feature of the regional landscape – Hungary being a case in point.

As part of its EU accession plans, Kyiv is reviewing chauvinistic policies regarding some minorities – while leaving the largest linguistic community outside the latest concessions.

The “macro” dimension of the conflict involves great-power rivalry, proxy dynamics and the long trajectory of NATO expansion. The micro or rather “meso”-level dimension remains the unresolved issue of post-Soviet borders and the ethnopolitics of a post-Soviet republic still consolidating its nation-building project.

In the words of Kristin Henrard (Professor of International Law at the Brussels School of Governance): “Ukraine will need to acknowledge that the Russian minority, as one of the several minorities with kinstates in its territory, is special because of that strong numerical size, and traditional presence.” This would be “in line with Ukraine’s international obligations”, she writes.

So much for the idea that minority-rights problems were ever merely “Russian propaganda.” They were real enough for Hungarians and Romanians that Kyiv had to legislate; they remain real for Russian speakers. The civil-rights issue remains.

By Glenn Diesen, Substack, 10/22/26

The very public execution of my professorship and reputation continues in Norway. Today’s [10/22] media article about me makes three claims that are misleading and/or false.

1) The article dismisses my claim that my research is being criminalized as the journalists merely cite the dismissive comments from the university – no arguments are apparently required.

It is not possible for an academic anymore to analyse the policies of rival powers by assessing their security concerns, as it will be smeared by the government, the government’s NGOs and the media as “legitimizing” the enemy and supporting their narratives. The current Defence Minister singled me out with the accusation of spreading propaganda and criticised two podcasters for even speaking with me (as I have already been cancelled by the media in Norway). How was this accusation by the Defence Minister substantiated? I had argued that NATO expansion triggered the war in Ukraine, which the Defence Minister denounce as dangerous “Russian propaganda”, with no need to substantiate his vile accusation. I can cite a sea of evidence and also refer to statements by American and European political leaders, ambassadors, intelligence chiefs, and others to make my case. However, the purpose is not to engage in debate, but to smear, censor, and cancel. By going after an individual academic for challenging official truths, the government has already claimed a monopoly on the truth. Academics should have their arguments scrutinised and criticised, but these are severe personal attacks from the government without the possibility of even defending myself. How is this not criminalising the research of an academic?

I cannot even speak at any events in Norway without the event being cancelled. The last event I agreed to speak at was because I shared the stage with the former CIA officer John Kiriakou. A newspaper had the event at a church cancelled, and when the backup location did not also cancel, the journalist simply printed in the paper that it had been cancelled so people would not show up. Is this normal? I must use my allotted holiday days to attend conferences because any event I attend can be presented as “controversial,” and then the NGOs and journalists will go after the reputation of the university. Is this normal? Every newspaper article about me merely refers to me as “controversial” or “pro-Russian” without ever assigning meaning to these labels or presenting my argument.

I have argued, much like former CIA director Burns, that if the West attempts to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit, then there would be war and Ukraine would be destroyed. This is considered a “pro-Russian” argument. Arguing that we should respect the will of most Ukrainians who want negotiations to end the war is also considered a “pro-Russian” argument, while in contrast, boycotting diplomacy, deporting Ukrainian refugees, and calling for the conscription of Ukrainian women is “pro-Ukrainian”.

2) To avoid addressing any of my arguments, the journalists go on to uncritically cite personal attacks against me, pointing out that I have been called a propagandist by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. This is a “non-governmental organisation” financed by the government and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was set up by Reagan and the CIA director in 1983 to manipulate the civil society of other states. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee has been relentless in its smears on social media to have me fired, writing hit pieces in the media, pushing to cancel my speaking events, writing a letter to my university, and even posting a picture of my house on social media. This is a governmental “human rights organisation” that cites human rights concerns to build the case for war.

3) Lastly, to further avoid addressing my actual arguments, they simply cite the fact that arguments I made at a debate last year have been “wholly or partially debunked” by a fact-check. The state-run media (NRK) invited the state-run military defence institute (FFI) to fact-check three of my claims. What claims did they “debunk”?

My first claim was that only 20% of Ukrainians wanted NATO membership between 1991 and the regime change in February 2014. The fact-checker argued that the number went up by the middle of 2014 (after Russia responded by seizing Crimea), which is a completely meaningless comment intended to muddy the waters, as my argument was about the previous era.

My second claim was that Zelensky had argued in an interview with The Economist in March 2022 that there were some Western countries that would like a long war with Russia to weaken a strategic rival, even if it would result in the destruction of Ukraine. The fact-checker argued that not all Western countries wanted a long war and that it was not an official policy. I never claimed it was an official policy, as it was primarily the US and UK pushing for a long war.

My third claim was that the US and UK sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreement in April 2022. The fact-checker claimed this was incorrect and suggested that it could only be based on one statement by David Arakhamia. The fact-checker did not want to mention that both mediators also confirmed it: Turkey’s foreign minister and the former Israeli prime minister both said that Russia and Ukraine were close to a deal, but the US and UK saw an opportunity to weaken Russia by fighting with Ukrainians. Zelensky’s former adviser Arestovych confirmed it, and the Ukrainian ambassador Chaly, who participated in the negotiations, confirmed that Putin was willing to do almost anything to end the war. The former head of the German armed forces confirmed that Boris Johnson sabotaged it, and Boris Johnson himself wrote articles warning about a “bad peace” and arguing for “strategic patience.” I am being fact-checked by war propagandists.

Unfortunately, none of my arguments matter because in Norway there is no debate and no interest in any arguments. Reality means nothing anymore as war narratives must be defended against inconvenient truths. I used to be naïve and think that the endless smears were caused by misunderstanding, as I had simply not been able to convey my arguments properly. However, the endless articles with smears and labels are deliberate lies and deceptions.

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By Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, Substack, 10/22/26

Summer #5 of the Special Military Operation (SMO) was the “tide is turning” summer for Ukraine. This narrative was inspired by Zelensky’s 40 day “influence campaign” that involved blowing up Russian oil refineries and Internet shopping warehouses. Droning the Omsk refinery was the second Siberian hit following Summer #4’s Irkutsk airbase attack.

The strategic rationale for these actions was that with just a little more nudging at least one of three things would happen: the Russian people will rebel, the Russian government will collapse, and/or Russia will break up.

In Russia, there was no unified message for Summer #5 but a shared weariness and wonder that there was a #5. The closing of IKEA five years ago seems quaint. Everyone has thought deeply about the geopolitical situation and wherever they are on the spectrum, they are still here and they care about their future. Asked if he thought about the SMO, a 30ish IT professional said, “How can you not think about it, it is part of every day”.

Similar to Summer #1 , the foundation for day to day life shifted and a recalibration was necessary. In 2022, the adjustments were directly related to the SMO: sanctions, the loss of western brands, access to Internet sites and social media, inflation, money movement, stay or go etc.

In 2026, the need for recalibration focuses on the long-term future and follows three years of surprising stability and upward trajectories so expectations are higher. The issues that require a rethink are more related to domestic concerns in response to new laws on land (including new flood zone laws) and local governance, the viability of starting or growing a small business, how and where to invest savings, developing better work opportunities etc.

June

Vacation plans were influenced, as everything now, by the SMO or, according to Press Secretary Peskov, “the War”. Throughout Summer #5 it comes up in relation to a Medical Commission summons, a son’s interest in grad school, guys signing up so they have the money to build houses, a nephew who has moved from the front line to become a drone operator, and local deputies increasing the land allotment to returning veterans from 10 cotoks to 45. A wilderness expert described seeing new graves in an Altai village graveyard “…This is terrible for the native people with such small populations”. On a walk along the Katun River in the Republic of Altai a 7 year old, gave his take on the reason for all this disruption, “Russia and America cannot get along”.

Increased drone activity in the West and South made Siberia a desirable vacation destination. Throughout a hot, sunny, June, tourists screamed as rafts maneuvered through the beautiful but not very challenging Katun River rapids. A man in a red kayak wore rabbit ears during his daily training. Vacationing parents followed their children as they ran to the River and took turns posing on the rocks.

For local people, the Manzherok Village riverbank remains a favorite spot for brides and grooms, fishermen taking advantage of the late sunset to throw in their lines, and teenage pit bikers creating a scandal. Despite new laws limiting the sale of alcohol in the Republic, the lubricated joys of a perfect summer day occasionally overcome buddies who will spend a few hours passed out under a tree before heading home powered by an unsteady gait.

Mid-June, the people of Manzherok filled the House of Culture for their first meeting with the Governor (in office since October 2024). Instead of the expected public hearing, the meeting was a campaign event promoting United Russia’s 27 year old war hero candidate for the State Duma elections in September.

July

July 1^st, just as people had settled into a summer that only required factoring in ever increasing prices, drones, airport delays, and Internet disruptions, someone mentioned gas. By the 3^rd, a young wife and mother went to fill up at 2:30 in the morning and still had to wait 50 min. Two days later, a whole system for dealing with the gas situation had been established informally, spontaneously.

The system in Altai involved buying a couple of 20 litre canisters for your car and joining a social network chat that provided up to date info from travelers on where there was gas, what types were available, how much it cost, and how long the line was.

Then, you had to decide, time or money. 90 r a litre if you are willing to wait hours or cash only, 120-150 rubles a litre with no line. Regardless of up to 7 hour waits, there was never a line at the expensive gas station.

Before long small hotel owners in Altai were offering to stand in line for their guests as a marketing pitch, Instagram featured stories about lines being a great place to meet people, any description of a vacation began with how they filled the tank, and people started to envy friends with diesel cars.

By July 9^th the Altai Republic Government said gas stations must register cars and drivers could only buy 30 litres a day plus 10 in a can. Regardless of all these complications, cars in the Manzherok parking lot came from all over country. Extreme turbulence is nothing new anywhere in Russia. That is what makes the people resilient, it’s their core competence

In the midst of this, over 20 young data scientists, mostly from Moscow and St. Petersburg, attended the second annual Open Data Science summer camp in Altai (AltAI). One participant was delayed because he was attending the July 14^th launch of Expedition 75 from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. It was a perfect summer evening as the rest of the group gathered on the riverbank to watch traces of the launch travel across the clear sky and the lingering puff of smoke from the second stage rocket dropping.

The rocket’s destination was the International Space Station. Onboard were two cosmonauts and one astronaut, an American making his first flight. The Russian engineers and the American Surgeon will spend the next eight months researching human health and long-duration physiology, materials science and in-space manufacturing etc. So far, they are getting along fine.

August

By August, gas was no longer a topic of conversation or a hassle. The quietest campaign in Russia’s history of elections continued. In the Republic you only saw posters and mailbox stuffers from one candidate, United Russia’s. No one talked about it.

The Ukok Plateau is an Altai border district single digit kilometers from China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan. A UNESCO World Heritage site, it is an official “zon pokoya”, a quiet zone that provides tranquility and freedom from disturbance. There is no cell service, no Internet, land lines, wires or pipes. Ukok is a harsh, high altitude, windy steppe filled with geological (melting glaciers), archeological (kurgans/burial grounds), and spiritual wonders.

Artist/philosopher Nicholas Roerich believed that Ukok was the gateway to the spiritual kingdom of Shambala. It gained international attention in 1993 with the discovery of the 2,400 year old tattooed Princess of Ukok. The movement to return her from the Museum to her burial ground was revived this summer. Supporters believe she guarded the gates of the underworld keeping evil out. “Today, the number of armed conflict hotspots across the planet is growing and we face the imminent threat of a Third World War—a nuclear war! Such a conflict would be the last for humanity; there would be no victors.” Activists believe peace will only come when the Princess is at rest.

It has been a record breaking year for the Kochyi (To Roam) tour organizers with their weekly excursions to the Plateau. Our group consisted of 3 couples and 7 women from Moscow and Siberia who work in banking, real estate, IT, and healthcare. Everyone agreed on two things, no talk about work and time to be alone.

The only way in or out is through a mountain pass made up of small and medium sized rocks with a steep drop to one side. It is only open to the public in July and August. A Land Cruiser and similar high priced all-terrain vehicles can do it but more common are ultra non luxurious Soviet UAZ vans or “Bukhankas”, so called because of their bread loaf shape.

Our group traveled in three Bukhankas driven by their owners Valera, Ruslan, and Bayram. They all live in Kosh Agach, the district center, and each one is a gear shifting Mozart. Valera was the elder, Bayram works in a gas station during the off season, and Ruslan helps in the store his wife owns. He used to keep a herd of horses on the Plateau but it didn’t make sense financially. Ukok drivers are a brotherhood with a code. You stop, check in, and share a cigarette with the drivers of all moving or stationary vehicles.

I traveled in Valera’s van and no amount of mastery could compensate for the brain rattling lack of shock absorbers with nothing to hold on to. The only relief came when our Bukhanka broke down, which was often. The drivers’ routine of smoke, discuss, crawl under the van, and Valera says “what will be will be” before starting the motor continued for two days. The morning of day three Valera was gone and we were told to divide up between the remaining two vans.

The Valera refugees experience was transformed from fate driven “what will be will be” grim misery to party wagon fun. Not only had Ruslan and Bayram put in shock absorbers, their Bukhankas had state of the art sound systems cranking a mix of ethnic and Russian music. Ruslan waved his right arm in the air like a lasso to the music and explained that trips to Mongolia for cheap, better parts was of no interest to “what will be will be” Valera.

When we returned to civilization every cell phone was turned on as soon as a signal bar appeared. Nothing new on the geopolitical front, the headline news was the first death this century by a bear in Altai. Hours after her boyfriend proposed, a 29 year old woman was dragged out of their tent and killed. The tent was pitched in a hotel campground by Teletskoye Lake.

Typically, there are 20-30 bear attacks annually in Russia. This year 59 attacks have been reported with 22 people killed. Experts say bears are surfacing because a hot, dry summer produced less nuts and berries and there is an explosion in the bear population because no one wants to hunt them. In Altai, to this must be added massive and escalating development that is disturbing their habitat.

Fall #5

The quiet election came and went. United Russia won In the Republic. The turnout was 45% of registered voters. 49.17% (36,406 people) of those who participated voted for United Russia. 78% or 128,132 people either stayed home or voted for someone else.

At an October St. Petersburg “RusHydro” conference, Altai Republic Governor Andrey Turchak presented a new concept for a massive transportation and energy corridor. It will connect the Arctic to Chinese and Asian Pacific region markets through the inland waterways of Siberia. The final leg of the corridor requires building a railroad across the length of Altai through the Ukok Plateau to China. The Governor recognizes, “The most sensitive issue is the environment. The Katun River and the natural landscape as a whole has sacred significance to residents”.

As an unseasonably dry and warm fall lingers in Siberia, bears are now solidly on the list of things we need to worry about. Gas is not a problem but there are occasional Yandex pay or taxi outages. The last of the villagers’ garden harvest has been gathered, pickled, and stored and the land prepared for spring planting. The first snow has fallen and melted with only white caps remaining on the mountaintops as we wait for Winter #5.

Thanks for reading Siberia Calling!

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