Gilbert Doctorow and a couple of other alternative media writers on Russia have been making the argument recently that Ukraine’s western-backed drone attacks on Russian infrastructure – namely, fossil fuel infrastructure – portends a possible Russian defeat if Russia does not only escalate against Ukraine but also it’s western sponsors/enablers. Scott Ritter and others have continued to make the case that these attacks by Ukraine will not translate into a strategic or meaningful setback for Russia. Below is Doctorow’s essay making his case followed by Scott Ritter’s direct response. Let me know in the comments who you think makes the more convincing argument- Natylie

Russia is losing the war!

By Gilbert Doctorow, Substack, 7/12/26

I have just said this on my morning interview with News X World (podcast to be posted here when it becomes available). And I repeat the point now in writing: Russia is losing the war.

Those who listen to Scott Ritter, to Colonel Macgregor, to Larry Johnson on their nearly daily podcast appearances and believe that the inexorable progress of Russian forces on the line of contact in Donbas, moving towards the Dnieper and conquest of the entire Donbas mean RUSSIAN VICTORY are being deceived. As I have been saying for some time, loss of the Donbas, even loss of Odessa will not force Ukraine to capitulate and will not put an end to the ever more damaging Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure in the energy sector.

Moreover, those attacks deep inside Russia directed against infrastructure could just as easily be directed against President Putin, against his family, against the State Duma. In a word, the Russian Federation is now as vulnerable to “Ukrainian” attacks as is Kiev to Russian attacks. In that sense, the war is now at a stalemate and is going against Russia, because Kiev is waging all-out war while Russia is still holding one arm behind its back while seeking the approval of progressive humanity for its forbearance and humane behavior.

Why do I come to this conclusion? I was prodded to it by the latest news that the broadcaster wanted me to comment upon, namely a successful drone attack on a major refinery near Samara. Look at the map: Samara is more than 1,000 km southeast of Moscow in the heartland of European Russia. It must be close to 2,000 km from wherever in Ukraine these drones were launched. This strike was most likely using highly advanced drones supplied from Europe which are guided by military intelligence provided to Ukraine by the USA. In short, Russia is under attack from NATO, for which the Ukraine is only a dummy warrior.

Today’s New York Times has an article on a secret factory in Germany now providing AI controlled drones to Ukraine. This is a state-of-the-art attack system and it makes Germany a co-belligerent just as the formerly proposed delivery of its Taurus missiles would have been.

The consequences of these infrastructure attacks, on attacks on Russian oil tankers inside Russia as well as on the open seas, is that Russia has severe fuel shortages in many regions. It has now banned export of diesel fuel so as to compensate for shortages at home. Vice Prime Minister Novak has just announced that Russia is importing refined petroleum.

This situation is no longer just an inconvenience for car owners in one or another locale. It is going to cripple Russian industry, including military industry if it continues and escalates, which now seems likely.

Note that until recently Russia accounted for 12% of global diesel exports. That loss now is driving up fuel costs globally.

But for Russia, there has to be a response appropriate to the now developing existential threat: the factories producing these drones, wherever they are, in Germany or elsewhere, must be destroyed. Now! If Russia fails to act, it is going to lose the war and to lose its sovereignty, regardless of how many speeches President Putin makes calling his citizens to sit tight and ignore what is happening to them.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2026

***

The Stupidity of Man

By Scott Ritter, Substack, 7/12/26

Gilbert Doctorow, the highly educated modern manifestation of Henny Penny, has published a new essay entitled “Russia is losing the War!”

Those who listen to Scott Ritter, to Colonel Macgregor, to Larry Johnson, Doctorow starts, on their nearly daily podcast appearances and believe that the inexorable progress of Russian forces on the line of contact in Donbas, moving towards the Dnieper and conquest of the entire Donbas mean RUSSIAN VICTORY are being deceived. As I have been saying for some time, loss of the Donbas, even loss of Odessa will not force Ukraine to capitulate and will not put an end to the ever more damaging Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure in the energy sector.

First, I want to thank Gilbert Doctorow for including me in such company as Colonel Macgregor and Larry Johnson. I am deeply honored.

But this will not stay the sword.

The distinguished graduate of Harvard University (magnum cum laude!) and Columbia University (a two-for-one Ivy Leager!) makes this initial foray into his intellectual evisceration quite easy.

Gilbert Doctorow has never served in the military and clearly doesn’t understand the concept of military math: battles are won by the side that owns the boots that occupy the ground upon which they stand, and those boots almost always belong to the side that kills more of the enemy than the enemy kills of them. And here Doctorow acknowledges that Russia is well on the way to putting Russian boots on the ground where Russia wants them to be, and that this is being done because Russia is killing more Ukrainians than Ukrainians are killing Russians.

But the esteemed “Russianist” now throws away this established reality and inserts his own unique fictional modifier: none of these factors matter because Ukraine is attacking “Russian critical infrastructure in the energy sector.”

The issue of Russian energy will be discussed in greater detail later in this essay.

First, we must address some of the finer points of Dr. Doctorow’s intellectual failings regarding his proposition that “Russia is losing the war!” (Exclamation mark retained to underscore Doctorow’s state of mind when writing his essay.)

As Dr. Doctorow observes, Moreover, those attacks deep inside Russia directed against infrastructure could just as easily be directed against President Putin, against his family, against the State Duma. In a word, the Russian Federation is now as vulnerable to “Ukrainian” attacks as is Kiev to Russian attacks. In that sense, the war is now at a stalemate and is going against Russia, because Kiev is waging all-out war while Russia is still holding one arm behind its back while seeking the approval of progressive humanity for its forbearance and humane behavior.

Let’s start off with the basics: It was Zelensky who had to be reassured by Putin, indirectly, back in February 2022 that Russia wasn’t out to kill the Ukrainian mini- Fuehrer.

Not the other way around.

The notion that the Russian President or his family spends their nights worried about a decapitation strike launched by Ukrainian drones is absurd.

I know many members of the Russian State Duma.

None of them have sleepless nights as well.

I was just in Moscow when it was attacked by hundreds of Ukrainian drones.

Other than some inconvenience (internet connectivity was degraded, and my flight was delayed leaving Vnukovo Airport, causing me to miss my connection in Istanbul), no one I saw in Moscow seemed too perturbed by the prospects of a regime-change generating attack from the Ukrainian drone army.

On June 18 of this year, I drove back to Moscow from a ten-day visit to the Donbas and New Territories. As we entered Moscow, Russia was under attack from a massive wave of Ukrainian drones. Russia’s defense ministry said 555 drones were shot down across the country. The Moscow Mayor said 180 drones were shot down around Moscow alone. In the surrounding Moscow region, a high-rise residential building, an industrial facility and several private houses were damaged in the drone attack, which also injured 16.

Were these attacks inconvenient for Russia?

Yes.

Embarrassing to Russian leadership?

Yes.

But fatal to the Russian nation?

Hell no.

But the headlines read around the world focused on the visible flames and plumes of smoke that could be seen over the densely populated southeastern district of Kapotnya, where a critical oil refinery responsible for supplying the Russian capital with fuel was located.

The Kapotnya refinery supplies up to 40 per cent of Moscow’s overall fuel market, including 70 per cent of Moscow and the surrounding region’s gasoline and diesel needs.

It had been previously attacked by Ukraine several times before, most recently at the end of May, when its oil production capacity dropped below 4 million barrels a day. But repairs were made, and the Kapotnya refinery recovered to exceed 4.5 million barrels a day production by June 4.

The attacks damaged both of Kapotnya’s primary oil distillation units; AVT-6, which accounts for 53% of the plant’s capacity, was damaged during Ukraine’s previous strike on June 16, and the Euro+ unit, responsible for 47% of Kapotnya’s production, which was brought back into operation in less than a week.

In Moscow there was no gnashing of the teeth, beating of the breast, or any other demonstration on the part of the populace that things were somehow amiss.

Like went on without interruption.

Ten days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that the Ukrainian drone strikes were causing some disruption in Russian energy supplies. Putin spoke at a meeting of senior officials of the ruling United Russia Party, and in an interview published that night. “As for strikes against critical infrastructure in general,” Putin said in the interview, “and energy infrastructure in particular, of course these attacks on our infrastructure facilities create problems, that’s obvious. Right now, we’re observing a certain shortage, but it’s not critical.”

No panic.

Neither on the part of the Russian leader, nor the Russian people.

But not so Gilbert Doctorow, who continued his essay:

I was prodded to it by the latest news that the broadcaster wanted me to comment upon, namely a successful drone attack on a major refinery near Samara. Look at the map: Samara is more than 1,000 km southeast of Moscow in the heartland of European Russia. It must be close to 2,000 km from wherever in Ukraine these drones were launched. This strike was most likely using highly advanced drones supplied from Europe which are guided by military intelligence provided to Ukraine by the USA. In short, Russia is under attack from NATO, for which the Ukraine is only a dummy warrior.

It is stunning that Doctorow, the noted “Russia watcher”, would come undone because of a single report of a “successful” Ukrainian drone attack on “a major refinery” located near Samara. Maybe it was the adrenaline rush he felt when a “broadcaster” asked him to comment on the attack.

Who knows.

What we do know is that on July 12 Ukrainian drones struck the JSC Syzran Oil Refinery, which is part of the structure of the Russian company Rosneft.

According to preliminary analysis, the strike targeted the refinery’s critical ELOU-AVT-5 unit, which handles up to 30% of the Syzran Oil Refinery’s primary oil processing capacity.

The JSC Syzran Oil Refinery is located more than 800 kilometers (500 miles) from Ukraine’s border and can process between 8.5 and 8.9 million metric tons of crude oil annually.

Reports are that operations at the ELOU-AVT-5 unit have been suspended pending repairs.

I mean, look at a damn map!

This is serious!

Just ask Gilbert Doctrow.

But it was serious in February 2025, December 2025, April 2026, and May 2026, too.

On each of these dates, Ukrainian drones struck the JSC Syzran Oil Refinery.

Each time the refinery shut down.

And each time the refinery was brought rapidly back into operation.

Just like it will be following the latest attack.

No need to panic.

Unless, of course, your name is Gilbert Doctorow.

Because, you know, “this strike was most likely using highly advanced drones supplied from Europe which are guided by military intelligence provided to Ukraine by the USA.”

Yup.

The strike was conducted using the FP-1 drone, built from “highly advanced” plywood (“radar absorbing material”) and powered by a two-cylinder combustion engine that turns a wooden propeller that can generate speeds of up to 60 kilometers an hour.

Damn.

Say it ain’t so, Gilbert.

That’s some advanced stuff.

It is an open secret that since 2024 the CIA has been sharing target intelligence and providing other support for Ukrainian UAV attacks against Russian oil facilities. The “other support” includes enabling what is known as “terminal engagement” capability via Starlink satellite communications relay which, when combined with AI-assisted optical guidance for autonomous terminal homing, allows the FP-1 to operate effectively deep inside Russia.

When the FP-1 first began operations in 2024, it enjoyed a 70% success rate.

Today, that rate has fallen to just around 10%.

And it’s only going to get worse.

Russia is starting to shut down the Starlink network.

And Russia is beginning to deploy more advanced anti-drone capabilities.

The idea that the FP-1 drone should be hyped up as a major NATO weapons system delivering decisive blows against Russian infrastructure via the “dummy warrior” seems like a stretch.

The FP-1 is, to be sure, a pain in the ass for Russia.

But what Doctorow ignores is that the war with Ukraine is not a one-way street where only the western-assisted Ukrainian forces deliver blows against Russia.

At the same time the FP-1 scores the occasional success against Russian energy infrastructure, Russia is delivery powerful ballistic missile and drone attacks of its own against Ukrainian industry and energy targets.

These attacks don’t go “pop”, like the FP-1.

They go “boom”.

The facilities hit by Russia aren’t damaged but destroyed, including many of the factories used by Ukraine to produce and assemble the FP-1 drones.

Rather than running around like Chicken Little claiming the sky is falling, Doctorow would do well to learn the facts and details of what he is assessing before committing to a narrative that is factually incomplete and analytically embarrassing.

Next, Doctorow informs us of the following: Today’s New York Times has an article on a secret factory in Germany now providing AI controlled drones to Ukraine. This is a state-of-the-art attack system and it makes Germany a co-belligerent just as the formerly proposed delivery of its Taurus missiles would have been.

Here Doctorow again shows his ignorance of military affairs and, frankly speaking, as an analyst (apologies to Harvard and Columbia.) A modicum of due diligence combined with journalistic integrity would have compelled the self-professed “professional Russia watcher” to note that the “secret German factory” is operated by the Bavarian-based German defense technology company, Helsing SE, which was founded in 2021 with startup money provided by Spotify’s Daniel Elk. In the fall of 2024 Helsing SE contracted to provide Ukraine with 4,000 of its HF-1 unnamed loitering drones. By November 2025, some 2,000 HF-1 drones, which make use of three AI components—terminal guidance, midcourse guidance and visual target acquisition—have been delivered to the Ukrainian Special Forces, many of which have been used in combat.

Also in 2024, Helsing SE signed a contract to provide Ukraine with an additional 6,000 X-wing AI-assisted loitering drones—the HX-2.

It is the HX-2 that Doctorow is posturing as a “state-of-the-art attack system”, and the provision of which makes Germany “a co-belligerent” which needs to be attacked by Russia “now.”

Here’s the fine print that Doctorow won’t tell you, either because he is intellectually lazy as a journalist, doesn’t understand a damn thing about modern warfare, or both.

First, the HF-1 sucks.

The Ukrainian Special Forces refuse to use it.

Fully 40% of the inventory of supplied drones remains in storage, unused.

Why? It doesn’t work—the over-hyped AI components glitch.

It’s too expensive.

And given the lethality of drone warfare, where the hunters become the hunted in very short order, the Ukrainians view the HF-1 as a death trap—too much risk for too little gain.

And they feel the same way about the HX-2, which in initial combat tests conducted by the Ukrainian Special Forces has an astounding 75% failure to launch rate.

Moreover, the HX-2 that Doctorow claims is “state-of-the-art” is simply a German knock-off of the vastly superior Russian Lancet loitering munition which has devastated Ukrainian rear-area operations since 2022.

But the biggest error Doctorow makes is conflating the HX-2 with the deep-strike drones used by Ukraine to attack Russia’s infrastructure.

Both the HF-1 and HX-2 are strictly battlefield support weapons.

They are not analogs to the already discussed FP-1 that has been used to attack Russia’s oil and energy sector.

So, in the end, Doctorow’s big “reveal” turns out to be a bust—a giant “nothing burger.”

Just like the rest of Doctorow’s underlying analysis of the situation:

The consequences of these infrastructure attacks, on attacks on Russian oil tankers inside Russia as well as on the open seas, is that Russia has severe fuel shortages in many regions. It has now banned export of diesel fuel so as to compensate for shortages at home. Vice Prime Minister Novak has just announced that Russia is importing refined petroleum.

This situation is no longer just an inconvenience for car owners in one or another locale. It is going to cripple Russian industry, including military industry if it continues and escalates, which now seems likely.

Note that until recently Russia accounted for 12% of global diesel exports. That loss now is driving up fuel costs globally.

Yes, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told a meeting on the energy sector convened by Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8 that the government had halted diesel exports to boost domestic supplies.

“Today, a ban on diesel fuel exports was imposed, and this will allow us to increase supplies to the domestic market,” Novak said.

Russia, Novak added, will also begin importing fuel this month to help stabilize the market, and planned maintenance at oil refineries will be postponed, sustaining domestic production.

The fuel shortages have been driven by the Ukrainian attacks that have put several Russian oil refineries out of operation. Novak also cited rising seasonal demand linked to the harvest.

But this wasn’t Novak’s first rodeo: back in September 2025, Novak had announced that Russia had extended its ban on gasoline exports and introduced new restrictions on diesel shipments until the end of the year in order to stabilize domestic fuel supplies.

The reason?

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.

And the sky did not fall.

Nor will it today, despite what Doctorow believes.

Responding to Novak’s latest announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia’s energy sector had one of the world’s largest supply buffers. He instructed oil companies not to keep surplus fuel as reserves for their own filling station networks, but to share supplies with independent retailers.

He was calm.

Because this was not a crisis.

Just a temporary inconvenience.

One Russia would recover from in due course.

No panic.

No overreaction.

Stay the course.

To victory.

But such an outcome is unacceptable to Gilbert Doctorow.

But for Russia, he concludes, there has to be a response appropriate to the now developing existential threat: the factories producing these drones, wherever they are, in Germany or elsewhere, must be destroyed. Now! If Russia fails to act, it is going to lose the war and to lose its sovereignty, regardless of how many speeches President Putin makes calling his citizens to sit tight and ignore what is happening to them.

Let’s get this straight.

There is no existential threat to Russia now.

At least none that Gilbert Doctorow can define with facts.

The German drone factories pose zero threat to Russia.

And Russia is in the process of neutralizing the Ukrainian-made, CIA-directed drones that have been responsible for the attacks on Russia’s oil and energy infrastructure.

Attacking Germany (Now!, Doctorow insists) would resolve nothing, since German drones are not a threat.

It could, however, drag Germany and NATO into a direct confrontation with Russia that would upset the very algorithms driving the military math that has Russia moving steadily forward toward victory over Ukraine and the collective West, Germany included.

This is exactly what Ukraine and its Western masters want.

Which is why Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t entertain such nonsense.

This of course begs the question as to why Gilbert Doctorow, the self-proclaimed expert on everything Russian, would be promoting a course of action so obviously detrimental to the welfare of the Russian nation and its people?

The answer becomes obvious when one understands that the entire strategy behind the manufacturing of an air of crisis is driven by western intelligence.

If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck.

But that’s an issue for another time.

For now, simply reflect on the notion that the stupidity of man is manifest, and that when I say “man”, I mean “Gilbert Doctorow.”

(The analysis underpinning this article was influenced by my experiences during my most recent trip to Russia. This trip was made possible through the generous donations of readers and supporters. Future visits to Russia intended to capture the reality of that land and its people and bring it back to an American audience are being planned. Please consider donating so this important work can continue.)

EuroNews, 7/9/26

Violence against recruitment officers was almost non-existent at the start of the war, but has proliferated in recent years as the fighting has dragged on and fatigue set in among the population.

Ukraine opened a criminal investigation on Thursday after crowds of people in the western city of Lviv surrounded and overturned an army conscription vehicle the night before.

The incident drew a swift backlash from Ukrainian officials, some of whom called on citizens to direct their anger at Russia and not the army.

The unrest erupted after officers detained a man suspected of evading military service and took him to a draft centre, authorities said.

“An investigation has been launched into the circumstances of an incident that occurred in Lviv involving servicemen of the Ukrainian armed forces, police officers, and around 200 civilians,” Ukraine’s prosecution service said.

“Two criminal proceedings have now been initiated on the grounds of obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a special period (martial law) and using violence against a law enforcement officer,” it added.

Videos published on social media showed crowds surrounding and attacking a vehicle in Lviv late Wednesday, shouting “shame” and filming with their phones.

A police officer who arrived to calm the crowd was later attacked, according to prosecutors.

Ukraine has seen a steady increase in clashes between citizens and army conscription police since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, with authorities reporting over 100 such incidents this year alone.

The issue of mobilisation, mandatory military service for men aged 25 and over, is highly sensitive in Ukraine, with many divided over who should be called up and how.

The governor of the Lviv region condemned the violence, telling citizens “we have only one enemy,” while Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovy warned the incident could “instantly (become) a tool for hostile propaganda.”

“Russia today is most interested in getting Ukrainians to start fighting among themselves…All those who broke the law must be held accountable,” he said on Telegram.

Violence against recruitment officers was almost non-existent at the start of the war, but has proliferated in recent years as the fighting has dragged on and fatigue set in among the population.

Police reported just five cases of attacks against conscription officers in 2022, whereas the number last year totalled 341, the Interfax-Ukraine news agency reported.

Ukraine’s defence minister announced more flexible army contracts for conscripts last month, amid public criticism over the current system of indefinite military service.

Kremlin hits back at US comments

Meanwhile, Russia hit out at the United States on Thursday for saying Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy sites could help end the war.

Ukraine has mounted a retaliatory strike campaign using long-range drones against Russian energy and military facilities, in what Kyiv calls fair retribution for Moscow’s drone and missile barrages on Ukrainian cities.

Asked about the strikes during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Wednesday, US President Donald Trump appeared to endorse the campaign.

“It’s an escalation, but it’s also an escalation that can help lead to an end,” Trump said.

The Kremlin said Ukrainian military pressure would not force it into concessions.

“We see certain misconceptions within the White House administration, that by escalating military pressure it can help move to a peace settlement. That is a mistaken view,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

“Further escalation may prolong the special military operation to some extent,” he said, using Russia’s preferred term for the offensive.

He also threatened that Moscow’s army would respond by “creating a larger security zone,” a reference to seizing more territory in eastern Ukraine.

“Stoking tensions and taking steps that fuel escalation will in no way contribute to the peace process,” Peskov added.

Kyiv’s attacks on Russian oil depots and refineries have triggered a fuel crisis across Russia, forcing Moscow, one of the world’s top oil producers, to ban some exports.

More than 90% of all Russian regions have introduced some form of rationing or reported shortages in petrol and diesel since June, according to official statements and local media reports.

By Sergey Poletaev, RT, 7/10/26

Last weekend, the Russian authorities announced the complete liberation of the city of Konstantinovka, the battle for which had been raging since the end of last year. 

Why did the battle for this city take so long? Is Konstantinovka really strategically important? And why was so much time and effort spent on capturing it? We explore all this below. 

One of the largest cities in Donbass

In terms of size, Konstantinovka (population 98,000 in 2002 and approximately 70,000 in 2022) is the largest city (not urban agglomeration) captured by the Russian Army since the spring of 2022, i.e., following the liberation of Mariupol. The Pokrovsk-Mirnograd agglomeration is larger (its pre-war population, including the suburbs, was up to 200,000 people), but it consists of two cities with a relatively large and less densely populated area between them. This allowed the Russian Army to capture these cities separately, utilizing the area between them to cut through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).

In Konstantinovka, this was not possible since it is a continuous urban area measuring approximately 6 by 12 km. Konstantinovka has 20,000 buildings, about 1,000 of which are multi-storey. In the conditions of modern warfare, each multi-storey building is transformed into a mini-fortress with a developed underground section. The southern part of the city (around Kosmonavtov Boulevard) with its nine-storey panel buildings is particularly challenging in this regard.

The Krivoy Torets River flows through the center of Konstantinovka. The river in itself is a natural defensive line, but it is also reinforced by a large industrial zone that bisects the city. This industrial zone is comparable in size to that of Mariupol: kilometers of concrete workshops, underground utilities, and Cold War-era bomb shelters; in short, it is a ready-made citadel.

Outpost of the AFU’s main fortress 

After the retreat of Igor Strelkov’s forces from Slaviansk and Kramatorsk in 2014–2015, these two cities became the AFU’s main hub in Donbass. They housed the ATO headquarters, and powerful fortifications made of steel and concrete were erected there. Konstantinovka was part of the perimeter of this fortress, serving as a kind of outpost: to reach Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka had to be captured first.

Along with Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka was also fortified for defense: the basements of multi-storey buildings were converted into strongholds, underground heating mains and cable collector tunnels between them were reinforced, cleared of debris, and underground passages were constructed to connect several buildings into a single network. Essentially, the multi-storey buildings were all connected by underground pathways, and one could quickly move and transport cargo from one point to another. 

Similar work was carried out in the industrial zone; most enterprises had ceased operations back in 2014-2015 and were partially demolished or rebuilt for defense in 2015-2020. Weapons, ammunition, and supply depots were also set up in the industrial zone and near the railway station.

Along the city’s perimeter, outside the urban area, field fortifications were created, such as trenches, dugouts, and field strongholds. The outskirts of Konstantinovka – Ilyinovka, Berestok, Pleshcheyevka station, Predtechino, Stupochki, and Novodmitrovka – were also converted into strongpoints and formed a single firing network. 

All this was done in order to delay the Russian army’s advance toward Slaviansk and Kramatorsk – the AFU’s main defense hub not only in Donbass but in the whole of eastern Ukraine.

Russian ‘pincers’

The example of Konstantinovka clearly demonstrates the assault tactics perfected by the Russian Army since 2023 (the time of battles for Bakhmut, Marinka, and Avdeevka).

First and foremost, the Russian Army engages in battles for the flanks and outskirts of a city. This is the longest and, for an outside observer, rather unremarkable process. Fighters of the South Group of Forces approached Konstantinovka from the east as early as December 2025, when Predtechino, Pleshcheyevka station, and Ivanopolye were captured.

Then, in the spring, Novodmitrovka in the north, and Berestok and Ilyinovka in the south, were captured. All battles were fought by small assault groups; they were supplied either by aerial deliveries or from caches that had been airdropped earlier. The advancing Russian forces benefited from the enemy’s poor battle formations: the depletion of the AFU, even in key directions, has reached such a point that an important stronghold or an entire village is sometimes defended by just a few soldiers stationed there without rotation for months on end.

Furthermore, the most combat-ready AFU units remain in the city, since cities have better fortifications, supplies, communication between units, and the command is located there. Therefore, the flanks are usually the first to fall under Russian control. 

Neither can the AFU redeploy forces to the suburbs – since if the city is left without infantry reinforcements it will suffer the fate of Pokrovsk, the southern part of which was taken by Russian assault units without a fight on July 30-31, 2025. The endeavor to drive them out was slow, bloody, and unsuccessful. 

Therefore, the capture of the suburbs of Konstantinovka at the end of April 2026 meant that the Ukrainian garrison in the city was doomed. The Russian Army established tight fire control over all roads leading into the city, 24/7 air control, and was able to identify and destroy enemy presence in the city from the air. At this point, Russian troops could just stop and wait. 

The main instrument of war

Wait for what? Inevitable Ukrainian counterattacks. Over two dozen assault operations have already been carried out in Donbass, Zaporozhye, and Dnepropetrovsk regions using the above-mentioned strategy. But every time the ‘Russian pincers’ close in around another city, the AFU attempt to break the encirclement with counterattacks and either bring additional forces into the city or, in the final stages of fighting, withdraw the remnants of the doomed garrison.

With the exception of Kupiansk, the AFU has so far failed to achieve this goal. Not because they’re bad fighters – far from it. However, the Russian General Staff has imposed extremely disadvantageous combat tactics on the Ukrainian command. The AFU lack firepower, they have significantly fewer personnel (especially assault forces), no aerial bombs, virtually no rocket artillery, and so on. Furthermore, they lack the years of experience in assault operations that the Russian Army possesses. 

In short, the Ukrainian forces are virtually incapable of counterattacking. And to defend its position, an army has to carry out constant counterattacks. In battle, in order to stand still, one has to constantly move forward, and that’s something the AFU are almost incapable of doing – or, rather, are capable of only in certain sections of the front.

This is what happened in Konstantinovka. The bloodiest part of the operation for the AFU lasted from late April to mid-June; they carried out counterattacks on the flanks in an attempt to break the encirclement and withdraw at least part of the garrison. In mid-May, the defense of the southern part of the city (the most heavily-fortified area) collapsed. From then on, the condition of the garrison in the Konstantinovka industrial zone and the railway station area deteriorated even faster. 

What is notable is that, compared to the flanks, there was virtually no fighting in the city: Russian assault units infiltrated city blocks in small groups, accumulated forces, achieved local superiority, and with the help of detailed aerial reconnaissance, engaged in clearing operations rather than direct combat. The powerful fortifications, which had been prepared for many years, were of no use since there were no people left to defend them.

We may wonder, why the Ukrainian command waits for the inevitable to happen, time and time again? Why doesn’t it withdraw the garrison from the doomed city and thereby preserve its most capable, experienced, and motivated fighters?

The answer is also quite rational: if they abandon Konstantinovka, the situation will repeat itself in Druzhkovka; if they abandon Druzhkovka, Kramatorsk and Slaviansk will suffer the same fate, and so on. The Russians could quickly get to Kiev like that. 

***

The battles for individual cities may seem unremarkable and repetitive. However, as we see, in these battles, the Russian Army has been able to force Ukrainian forces into a particularly unfavorable style of combat. This is evident both at the tactical level – since the AFU are forced to sacrifice reserves in useless counterattacks, suffering significantly higher losses than the Russian Armed Forces – and at the operational level, since Ukrainian forces are forced to cling to doomed cities to somehow hold the defense. 

All this gives the Russian Army a key strategic advantage: initiative on the battlefield, which leads to the attrition of the enemy and hastens the moment when the AFU will be unable to conduct counterattacks and hold the front line. 

This moment will mark the collapse of the AFU and will determine the outcome of the war.

Unfortunately, I’m unable to embed this YouTube video but the link is below.

YouTube link here.

More on the hypocrisy of the smug and sanctimonious EU below. – Natylie

Criminalization of Dissent in the “Free World”

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 7/9/26

It was good to hear a colleague, Christian Vukasovich, catalog evidence in our recent WMD podcast (episode 4) of growing intolerance among young Americans for the complicity of the US political and legal system in the abuses of AIPAC lobbying, Gaza genocide, the attacks on Palestinians and illegal seizure of land in the West Bank, and the Zionist “greater Israel” agenda that is being perpetrated without meaningful Western resistance across southern Lebanon, southern Syria and in the aforementioned Palestinian territories.

I shall be looking out for evidence that this change of sentiment led, first and foremost by the younger generations, including many younger candidates for political office in the November elections, will have a substantial effect on US policy any time soon.

For the moment, I suspect, we have seen only the opposite namely, the total unwillingness on the part of the US to withdraw US weapons and aid from Israel even though Israeli stubbornness is a major cause of the current breakdown of the MOU in the context of the Iranian crisis (and its potential to inflict significant harm on the global economy), along with the absence of good faith on the part of the West in acknowledging Iranian authority over the Strait of Hormuz. We should note in passing the full-throated applause in Ankara earlier this week for new US attacks on Iran from none other than the current Secretary General of NATO, Mark Utte, a former Dutch prime minister.

In Europe, the continuing crackdown on dissent against growing EU and European and NATO authoritarianism and aggression – a black stain that has been spreading for over a decade now – is every day more manifest.

The official narrative about political oppression in Europe, even as the European Parliament cries out loudly against what it claims are instances of oppressive human rights in other parts of the world – especially, of course, those countries that European neocons consider to be their enemies and competitors, would prefer that we look only at examples of “democratic backsliding.” This stance exposes an extraordinary level of hypocrisy and determined resistance to self-understanding.

European leaders profess to see “democratic backsliding” in instances such as Hungary under the government of former prime minister Viktor Orban which had used targeted tax audits, severe legal restrictions, and smear campaigns to marginalize “independent NGOs.” A great many of the latter are funded from Western sources such as the IS government-funded US National Endowment for Democracy, a primary instigator for pro-Washington regime change antics – as we have also seen in Georgia, and as we saw at the time of the coup d’etat on the Maidan in Kiev in 2014.

This reminds us that current European authoritarianism is rarely expressed as luxuriously as in its attempts to smear or disappear any elements in Europe that are critical of Europe’s war with Russia over the proxy Ukraine. Europe’s long-term ambition here is to restore European imperial privilege, even in the potential absence of a US protective umbrella, by breaking up and distributing among European members not so much the territories of today’s Russian Federation themselves (which would be very unfashionable), but the privileges of access for Western capital to the mineral and other sources of wealth of the pygmy polities that would be the product of this break-up – a policy helpfully outlined just the other day by Europe’s de facto foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, an Estonian.

More generally, across Europe, governments have increasingly deployed disproportionate force and restrictive legislation against activists. Notable examples include blanket bans and police crackdowns on pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Germany, criminalization of Palestine Action in the UK, and the forceful clearing of student encampments in Sweden. In nations like Germany and France, various legislative changes – including new citizenship laws and anti-separatism measures – have increasingly been utilized to criminalize and scapegoat specific refugee, immigrant, and minority communities.

In Germany and the UK, several pro-Palestinian organizations, Jewish peace groups, and individual activists have had their bank accounts abruptly closed or frozen by major financial institutions like Berliner Sparkasse and Barclays, often without clear explanations or recourse. State authorities in several Western European nations have used anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws to strip advocacy groups of their charitable status, effectively blocking their ability to process donations or maintain banking access. In the UK, climate and anti-war activists have received unprecedented, multi-year prison sentences under the Public Order Act for organizing peaceful disruptions and marches. Activists and public figures in Germany, France, and the UK face criminal prosecution, heavy fines, and potential prison time for using specific slogans, carrying signs, or organizing demonstrations that authorities classify as inciting hatred or supporting banned organizations. Police forces across Western Europe have increasingly utilized pre-emptive detention laws to arrest and hold key organizers before a planned protest can even take place.

Specific, documented legal cases from the UK and Germany illustrate the escalation of state prosecution and counter-terrorism legislation targeting pro-Palestinian and anti-war activists in Western Europe.

A landmark case at Woolwich Crown Court marked the first time the UK government successfully applied counterterrorism sentencing parameters against direct-action political protesters. Four activists linked to the group Palestine Action – Charlotte Head, Leona Kamio, Fatema Rajwani, and Samuel Corner – were tried for a 2024 break-in at a Gloucestershire factory owned by Elbit Systems, Israel’s largest private weapons manufacturer. Although the jury convicted the defendants of criminal damage rather than explicit terrorism offenses, the prosecution argued that the action carried a “terrorism connection” designed to coerce the government. The judge agreed, issuing severe, unprecedented prison terms ranging between 5 and 8 years. Beyond the multi-year prison terms, the court placed the activists under 15 years of mandatory terrorist notification requirements upon release. Human rights groups have condemned the ruling as a dangerous escalation that functionally criminalizes political dissent.

In Germany, authorities have pivoted toward high-security trials and organized-crime frameworks to prosecute anti-war sabotage. In the “Ulm” case, five activists (Daniel Tatlow-Devally, Zo Hailu, Crow Tricks, Vi Kovarbasic, and Leandra Rollo) went on trial at the high-security Stammheim court in Stuttgart. They were arrested following a September 2025 raid on an Elbit Systems site in Ulm, which caused roughly €1 million in property damage. Rather than standard trespassing or property damage charges, the Federal Prosecutor invoked Section 129 of the German Penal Code, formally indicting the defendants for “membership in a criminal organization” (Palestine Action Germany). Section 129 is traditionally reserved for mafia syndicates or violent extremist networks. Defense attorneys and civil liberties observers point out that the use of a high-security tribunal, prolonged pre-trial detentions, and structural criminal organization charges represent a highly disproportionate effort to suppress political protests.

In the 2025 case of the Staatsräson Deportation Orders State suppression has also expanded into immigration law via the weaponization of Staatsräson – Germany’s political doctrine establishing the security of Israel as a fundamental pillar of the German state. Berlin authorities ordered the forcible deportation of four foreign residents (Cooper Longbottom, Kasia Wlaszczyk, Shane O’Brien, and Roberta Murray). [None of the individuals had prior criminal convictions. They were ordered to leave the country strictly for participating in peaceful pro-Palestinian demonstrations, including a sit-in at Berlin’s central train station and a campus occupation at the Free University Berlin. The state explicitly cited Staatsräson to bypass standard criminal trial procedures, utilizing administrative deportation laws to expel foreign-born dissidents without a jury conviction.

The criminalization of anti-war dissent in the UK and Germany has structurally altered the legal landscape for political activists, moving from traditional civil policing to severe statutory bans, criminal-syndicate frameworks, and counter-terrorism measures.

The UK has systematically rewritten its protest laws through successive pieces of legislation—including the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the Public Order Act 2023, and the Crime and Policing Act 2026. Together, these acts have effectively criminalized non-violent, disruptive civil disobedience.

The Public Order Act of 2023 created broad criminal offenses for tactics historically central to peace movements. Being “locked on” (attaching oneself to an object, building, or person) or merely possessing materials intended for locking on now carries a prison sentence. Under Section 7 of the Act, interfering with “key national infrastructure” – which was expanded via regulations to explicitly shield the life sciences and defense sectors – carries a penalty of up to 12 months in prison. This statutory shield directly targets anti-war blockades at munitions factories. Section 11 of the 2023 Act allows police officers to carry out suspicion less stop-and-search operations within designated protest zones. This authority is paired with the Crime and Policing Act 2026 under which senior police commanders are legally required to consider the “cumulative impact” of recurring protests. This permits preemptive, blanket bans on ongoing anti-war vigils or weekly marches in the same locale, strictly on the grounds that they disrupt local commerce or community routines.

Unlike the UK’s focus on physical disruption, Germany has primarily weaponized speech laws (Volksverhetzung – incitement to hatred) and its domestic intelligence apparatus to suppress and criminalize anti-war and pro-Palestinian advocacy.

The political doctrine of Staatsräson (stating that Israel’s security is a foundational pillar of the German state) has been integrated into the legal code. The phrase “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” has been formally classified by the Federal Ministry of the Interior as a symbol of banned organizations like Hamas or Samidoun. Publicly uttering or displaying it triggers immediate arrest, heavy fines, or prosecution for “approving criminal offenses” or “inciting hatred.”

The federal prosecutor has begun applying Section 129 of the German Penal Code – a statute historically reserved for organized crime rings, the mafia, or armed militant groups – against non-violent direct-action networks. This allows the state to deploy invasive surveillance, wiretapping, and high-security trials against anti-war groups.

Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) issued an official dossier labeling the broader Palestine solidarity movement as “extremist.” This administrative designation gives police and prosecutors the power to treat mainstream anti-war expressions as national security threats. The BfV dossier formally classified common cultural icons as extremist markers. The agency designated the classic cartoon character Handala (a universal symbol of Palestinian refugee status) and visual depictions of a sliced watermelon matching the geographic outline of the region as extremist symbols that supposedly deny Israel’s right to exist. Local authorities, particularly in Berlin, have instituted operational protest rules that ban speech in specific languages. Police have repeatedly shut down demonstrations and arrested activists for delivering speeches or chanting slogans in Arabic, enforcing ad-hoc mandates that restrict all public assembly speech exclusively to German or English.

The Dissenter, 6/30/26

When former CIA officer John Stockwell came forward, he maintained that he was the highest ranking officer to go public and tell the truth about the agency.

He authored a memoir, “In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story,” that further exposed the cult of intelligence in the United States. The CIA retaliated by suing Stockwell for violating his “secrecy agreement” and secured a settlement, where all book royalties would be paid to the United States government. 

Stockwell worked for the CIA for 12 years. During part of that time, he was the station chief for the CIA’s covert operations in Angola. He recalled, “Under the leadership of the CIA director we lied to Congress and to the 40 Committee, which supervised the CIA’s Angola program. We entered into joint activities with South Africa.” (South Africa was an apartheid state.)

“And we actively propagandized the American public, with cruel results—Americans, misguided by our agents’ propaganda, went to fight in Angola in suicidal circumstances. One died, leaving a widow and four children behind,” Stockwell added. “Our secrecy was designed to keep the American public and press from knowing what we were doing—we fully expected an outcry should they find us out.”

On June 14, Stockwell died at the age of 88. He went missing, and police later found his body in a “wooded area” not far from his home in Austin, Texas.  

The New York Times’ obituary mentioned that Stockwell’s family moved to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1940s after his father was “contracted to build a hydroelectric plant for a Presbyterian mission. At a boarding school that his mother supervised, his classmates were from the country, and when revelations about the CIA’s plot to poison Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba became public, it deeply affected him.

“First, men I had worked with had been involved,” Stockwell shared. “Beyond that, Lumumba had been baptized into the Methodist Church in 1937, the same year I was baptized a Presbyterian.” Lumumba and Stockwell were part of overlapping church communities, and the future prime minister was a “member of the missionary community” where he grew up.

A resignation letter to CIA Director Stansfield Turner, published by the Washington Post in 1977, specifically described how he became disillusioned with the CIA while stationed in Angola.

“From a chess player’s point of view the intervention was a blunder. In July 1975, the MPLA was clearly winning, already controlling 12 of the 15 provinces, and was thought by several responsible American officials and senators to be the best-qualified to run Angola; nor was it hostile to the United States,” according to Stockwell. “The CIA committed $31 million to opposing the MPLA victory, but six months later, the MPLA had nevertheless decisively won.”

“[T]he United States was solidly discredited, having been exposed for covert military intervention in African affairs, having allied itself with South Africa, and having lost.” 

Stockwell additionally contended that when he was recruited in 1964 it was emphasized that the CIA was “high-minded and scrupulously kept itself clean of truly dirty skullduggery such as killings and coups, etc.” Yet the CIA was involved in assassinations of Latin American politicians and engaged in a coverup of the agency’s involvement in the assassination of Lumumba. 

Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, including when President Ronald Reagan’s administration was embroiled in the Iran-Contra scandal, Stockwell gave numerous interviews and delivered many lectures. (Here is a video of Stockwell at American University in 1989, when he talked for nearly three hours about the “secret wars of the CIA.”) 

Stockwell said in a 1985 interview that he went into the CIA thinking that he was doing the “best thing” that he could do with his life, “the contradiction being that I was a humanist at heart. But, of course, their propaganda line is that you’re serving humanity by struggling to keep the world free from communism. It just took a lot of years making my way up the chain of command until I became convinced just the opposite was true.”

From his time on a National Security Council subcommittee that managed covert action in Angola, he insisted that in “meeting after meeting, 170 meetings,” all he heard were discussions about “what lies to tell the American people, what lies to tell the Congress, what lies to tell each other, and never, ever any conception of telling the truth.”

By his estimation, during the time that he was in the CIA, anywhere from three to six million people died as a result of covert operations and the agency’s role in wars in Vietnam and Cambodia. 

Stockwell mentioned in his memoir that he “testified for five days to Senate committees,” giving them full details about agency activities before writing “In Search of Enemies.” 

“Unfortunately,” as he observed, the “intelligence committees in Washington are unable to dominate and discipline the agency. Some senators even seem dedicated to covering up its abuses.” He concluded that “only an American public can bring effective pressure to bear on the CIA.”

Part of Stockwell’s resignation letter to Turner took a stand for freedom of expression amidst the CIA director’s push to criminalize any disclosure of information. He argued that if this happened then “Americans who work for the CIA could not, when they find themselves embroiled in criminal and immoral activity which is commonplace in the Agency, expose that activity without risking jail or poverty as punishment for speaking out.” 

“Cynical men, such as those who gravitate to the top of the CIA, could then by classifying a document or two protect and cover up illegal actions with relative impunity,” Stockwell declared.

Sadly, in the past twenty years, this is the status quo that developed at the CIA, and more broadly, the national security state. Former CIA officers like John Kiriakou and Jeffrey Sterling came forward to criticize the CIA. They were then prosecuted under the Espionage Act and sentenced to prison after the Justice Department secured convictions. 

The CIA did not have to prosecute Stockwell. There was no internet, and precedents in two cases were effective enough in establishing a prepublication review system that empowered the agency to suppress books detailing corrupt, criminal, or shameful acts.

Former CIA employee Victor Marchetti co-authored a 1974 book, “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,” that described the CIA as a “secret fraternity of the American political aristocracy.” The agency went to court and secured a decision that allowed the government to enforce secrecy agreements against intelligence employees. The book was published with text that indicated where lines were exactly deleted. 

After former CIA officer Frank Snepp authored “Decent Interval” in 1977 about the CIA’s role in the fall of Saigon, the CIA sued Snepp. The American Civil Liberties Union, the National Lawyers Guild, and other groups argued that the precedent was an “intolerable restraint on the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.” The Supreme Court later ruled that the agency not only had the authority to censor Snepp but they could also collect the royalties from Snepp’s book, too. 

Stockwell grew disillusioned with the CIA during a time that the agency had hundreds of journalists on the payroll. He recognized that it was unusual for the Washington Post, the New York Times, and Mike Wallace and “60 Minutes” to be interested in his story. 

“Three Days of the Condor” (1975) had Robert Redford walk into the New York Times with his story. That’s the way the movie ended, but of course, by and large if you walk into the New York Times with a story like that, they’ll throw you out,” Stockwell contended. “[T]he simple truth, the unending and continuing horror of what the CIA is doing, they don’t publish it.”

Stockwell saw his book as a way to reclaim his First Amendment right to freedom of speech, which did not exclude Americans who “signed CIA oaths.” And as he eloquently declared in his resignation letter to the CIA director, “I predict that the American people will never surrender to you the right of any individual to stand in public and say whatever is in his heart and mind.”

“That right is our last line of defense against the tyrannies and invasions of privacy which events of recent years have demonstrated are more than paranoiac fantasies.”