Strana.UA, 7/10/26 (Translation by Prof. Geoffrey Roberts)

In Ukraine and the West, there’s constant talk that the current Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are creating conditions for ending the war.

Yesterday, at the NATO summit, Donald Trump stated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are “an escalation that could help end” the war. And US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that “this now creates space for negotiations to end the war.”

Meanwhile, Western media believe the next two months will be decisive…”By autumn”, write The Economist, “the Kremlin will decide whether to launch an autumn-winter offensive or conclude a ceasefire.”

The strategy of Kyiv and its Western partners is based on the premise that increased Ukrainian military strikes on far and middle rear areas, the threat of Crimea’s isolation, and the growing gasoline crisis will create problems for the Kremlin of such magnitude that it will be forced to either accept Kyiv and the Europeans’ conditions for a ceasefire along the front lines, or internal upheaval will erupt in Russia, making Moscow’s peace terms even worse.

Of course, both scenarios cannot be ruled out, but they are far from the only ones. One thing can be said with certainty: the current situation poses a direct threat to the Kremlin’s previous strategy of attrition, through which it intended to achieve victory within a certain period (a year, two, or three years) given its superior manpower potential, and against the backdrop of Europe’s mounting economic problems, which pose a strategic threat to the stability of its support for Ukraine – a strategy that does not require completely switching the Russian economy to a war footing or declaring a new wave of mobilisation.

This strategy is now being seriously tested. The question is whether Vladimir Putin will be able to manage the emerging problems and continue to pursue it. Or whether the strategy will have to be radically changed; or whether hostilities will have to cease along the current front lines.

Problems arise on several levels.

The first and most important is economic. Unlike Ukraine, Russia is fighting with its own money. Therefore, any blow to its economic potential is extremely damaging to its ability to continue the war. Disabling the refineries not only inconveniences the population in the form of a massive gasoline shortage, but also entails direct losses to the economy and budget, especially given the need to increase fuel imports. It also threatens the harvest (and therefore food prices and availability) and the entire logistics of goods, including essential goods. Furthermore, damage to other industrial and infrastructure facilities is also being caused. This is compounded by the drop in oil prices following the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

However, this last factor is not the most significant. Firstly, as recent days have shown, the crisis in the Persian Gulf is far from over, and prices could rise at any moment. Secondly, even if prices remain low for an extended period, the Russian budget has substantial reserves from which resources could be reallocated to the war effort, if necessary. Thirdly, in an era of increasing demand for electricity due to the development of artificial intelligence, energy resources cannot be cheap in principle, and their price increases will continue for the foreseeable future. However, right now, falling prices are significantly increasing the pressure on the Russian budget.

But, to repeat, the main problem of critical importance for the Russian economy are Ukrainian strikes on industrial facilities, the fuel crisis, and prospective problems with electricity and heating if the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are able to launch large-scale attacks on the Russian energy grid at significant depth.

The second level is the situation in Russian society. Since February 2022, the Kremlin has been trying to maintain the public’s perception that the war is taking place far away, that the country is peaceful, wages are rising, and all is well and calm. So far, this has been quite successful, with the exception of the territories bordering Ukraine. But the gasoline crisis has affected absolutely everyone. And even those Russians who try not to think about the war at all will no longer be able to ignore this obvious consequence of the war. Gasoline lines themselves could become a focal point for mass discontent with the authorities, as they did on the eve of the collapse of the USSR or in February 1917. This is especially true since this is compounded by the already pent-up frustration over the ban on Telegram and VPNs, various other restrictions, and weariness from the protracted war.

The authorities’ attempts to use the Ukrainian attacks to consolidate society under the slogan “Everyone to fight the enemy, let’s close our ranks!” are fraught with difficulties.

Firstly, for a significant portion of Russians, it’s unclear why the war is continuing at all if Kyiv is prepared to stop it at the front line, effectively sealing all of Russia’s territorial gains, which would in itself be a victory for Russia. And many don’t understand what Russia will gain from capturing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, or even all of Ukraine, if this requires many more thousands of military casualties and civilian suffering in the rear due to gasoline shortages, and even power outages in the border regions. Another segment of the population, ready to continue fighting, will ask questions: why haven’t we achieved victory yet? Perhaps our leaders are fighting the wrong way? Why haven’t they used nuclear weapons yet?

It’s unclear whether all this will lead to rebellion or internal upheaval, but such a situation poses a serious challenge for Putin. Especially given the approaching State Duma elections, which the Kremlin has no plans to cancel.

Another risk factor is the ambiguous situation within the elites. Some of them are also tired of the war and want it to end as quickly as possible. And some, just as they did during the preparations for Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny, are trying to create as many difficulties as possible for Putin to force him to make personnel decisions, replacing the prime minister and the army command, and then effectively remove him from real power.

If unrest erupts in society, this could also potentially significantly impact the governance of the state system.

While the “peace party” within the Russian elite is generally loyal to Putin and can only create relatively minor problems for the Kremlin through quiet grumbling behind the scenes, the second group, as Prigozhin’s rebellion demonstrated, is far more dangerous: it is linked to many security officials and pro-war Telegram channels, which are already stirring up panic about what’s happening in the country and promoting the idea that the current Russian government is incapable of adequately addressing the emerging problems of wartime. If these problems continue to mount, it cannot be ruled out that this group, which once actively supported Prigozhin, could resort to active pressure on the Kremlin to force personnel changes in the government and army command, and if they fail, a new attempt at rebellion. Incidentally, representatives of this so-called “party of turmoil” are more vocal than others about the unacceptability of stopping the war along the front lines and demanding a fight to the bitter end. This is entirely logical: the longer and more difficult the war is for Russia, the easier it will be for them to destabilise the situation. Conversely, the sooner the war ends, the easier it will be for Putin to stabilise the situation, quickly resolve the problems caused by the war (fuel shortages, etc), consolidate his power, and thereby minimise the likelihood of any rebellion.

The third factor is the front. For now, problems in the rear are not directly affecting the situation at the front, where the Russians continue their offensive in many directions, albeit slowly. However, it cannot be ruled out that these problems will manifest themselves in the future, especially on the southern front in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the UAF is trying to increase pressure on Russian troops.

If nothing fundamentally changes at the front, the continuation of Russia’s current sluggish advance will become a problem for the Kremlin – because it’s currently promoting the idea of ​​imminent collapse of the UAF, which suggests patience and endurance of the gas shortages, as victory is already near.

But if the Russian army doesn’t demonstrate any major breakthroughs in the coming months, many in Russia will once again ask: why is this war continuing at all if it’s unknown how long the fighting will last? How long will Russian soldiers last without declaring mobilisation? How much longer will Russia be able to replenish its army and replace losses solely with civilian contractors?

Overall, Russia now finds itself in its most dire situation since the fall of 2022, when the UAF launched its counteroffensive. Back then, the problem was resolved through mobilisation, which eliminated Ukraine’s manpower advantage at the front. What will the Kremlin do now?

Based on the signals coming from Moscow, one can conclude that it is relying on mitigating the aforementioned problems, aiming to maintain the previous war strategy without resorting to mobilisation or other radical measures.

A key element of this approach is minimising the impact of air strikes on targets in the Russian rear and along logistical routes to Crimea. Judging by hints from Russian military Telegram channels, work in this area is intensifying, primarily through strengthening the air defense system, and the first results are expected within a month or a month and a half. If results are achieved, this could significantly improve Russia’s position.

By solving his most dangerous problem, Putin will shatter his opponents’ scenario and be able to continue the war of attrition, whereas in Europe and Ukraine a sense of defeat could prevail as a result of the failure of the current euphoria to materialise. Calls for compromise with the Kremlin will grow louder. At the same time, existing problems within the country (accusations of corruption against Volodymyr Zelensky, protests against “busification”) and in Kyiv’s relations with European partners, such as the Poles, will worsen.

In such a scenario, there will also be a small chance that Trump, seeing the strategy of forcing Russia to peace failing, will return to the “spirit of Anchorage” and pressure Kyiv and the Europeans to implement the Alaskan agreements on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbas, among other things.

But whether this would actually result in a reduction in the number of [drone strikes] and resolve the gasoline shortage and other key issues, remains to be seen. So far, this hasn’t happened. Oil refineries are still being hit regularly. The pace of Ukrainian drone strikes, whose production Europe is now also ramping up, is only increasing, and it’s unclear whether it’s even possible to reduce the number of strikes to zero in this situation. The month to six weeks allocated for setting up a new countermeasure system is a long time, which Russia will still have to somehow survive amid fuel shortages. Moreover, this will coincide with peak consumption—the holiday season and harvest season. This means critical problems could arise much earlier than the end of summer.

Even If there’s no change within six weeks, and the gasoline shortage persists, and Ukraine continues to destroy industrial facilities, this won’t mean Russia can no longer wage war but It will mean Putin can no longer wage it the way he did before.

And then the Kremlin will be faced with a choice between two options for continuing the war.

The first is a sharp tightening of internal regulations, but within the framework of a conventional war i.e. a new wave of mobilisation, new restrictions, imprisonment of dissidents, the introduction of elements of a planned distribution system in the economy (for example, gas rationing), and massive spending cuts on all non-military needs will follow.

However, it’s not clear that would fundamentally change the situation for Russia, since with drones dominating the skies, even sending hundreds of thousands of new soldiers to the front may not lead to a breakthrough. And if strikes on oil refineries and other industrial facilities escalate, even planned and administrative measures won’t help keep the economy afloat.

The second is a sharp escalation, which could either complement the first scenario or occur independently. For example, in the form of the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and/or Europe.

Both of these scenarios are extremely dangerous for both Russia and Putin personally.

The alternative is an end to the war along the front lines.

As we have written repeatedly, despite the demands for a ceasefire, Kyiv and the Europeans actually have a completely different baseline scenario: they are proposing a ceasefire only in the hope that Putin will reject it, and they can use his refusal to destabilise the situation within Russia, and then, if successful, impose far harsher conditions than a simple ceasefire. In reality, they don’t want a ceasefire, believing it would be a victory for Russia, something Kyiv sometimes openly admits.

But if Putin suddenly agrees to a ceasefire, then given Trump’s insistence on it and Zelenskyy’s already conditioned the public to believe that Ukraine’s goal is a swift end to the war, it will be difficult for Kyiv and Europe to make a sharp about-face and abandon the ceasefire. At least until the Congressional elections. But that’s if Putin agrees. For now, he’s dismissing this option, even though it’s far less dangerous for him than the two options involving mobilization and escalation. Chatter that the Russian people, not understanding renunciation of initial demands, would perceive it as betrayal, is groundless. The overwhelming majority of Russians would fully support such a solution as a way to save them from mobilisation, from gasoline shortages, and from nuclear war…

Most likely, Putin is hoping for something more than just a ceasefire that will consolidate current gains. And by the end of the summer, and perhaps even much sooner, it will become clear whether he can achieve this “much more” by continuing to wage the war as usual, pursuing a strategy of attrition without mobilising or converting the entire country to a war footing.

If the answer to this question is no, Putin will have three options: mobilisation with a sharp reduction in civilian spending, escalation (nuclear strike, war with Europe), or ending the war along the front lines.

As of now, no one can say with certainty which option he will choose.

***

Kiev Instability amidst Mobilization and Kremlin Caution (Excerpt)

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 7/16/26

The Federov Scandal

In the wake of the Lvov street uprising by citizens against military conscription efforts, we now have street protests across Ukraine against Zelenskiy’s dismissal of Defense Minister Miykhailo Fedorov in favor of the current Minister for the Interior, Ihor Klymenko. At the moment, even as street protests widen and Zelenskiy, in a rare show of humility, has said it is perfectly proper for people to protest, Fedorov has definitely been dismissed, but his replacement by Klymenko has not (yet) been confirmed.

Both these issues suggest that for Zelenskiy what mostly matters right now, despite the apparent success of recent Western-orchestrated drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and on shipping in the Azov and Black Seas (to which Russia has responded with some success by closing down the functionality of the port complex of Odessa) is Ukraine’s continuing ability (or is it inability?) to mobilize.

Klymenko, as a former chief of police, is directly implicated in providing police support for the brutal recruiting tactics (press gangs) that Kiev has long resorted to in order to solve its dire shortage of manpower on the front lines. It is difficult to imagine that his skills will magically enable a significant uptick in military conscription without inciting a popular revolution against Kiev and even if he does, Russia’s response might be it own mobilization with a view to increasing the current Russian force of 800,000 men in Ukraine to an entirely do-able, say, 1,600,000.

The dismissal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov marks a massive political crisis in Ukraine, triggering widespread protests by civilians, veterans, and military personnel. Fedorov, previously known for modernizing the digital sector, served just six months in the defense role but became highly popular for aggressively pushing a high-tech, data-driven approach to the war which Western propaganda, at least, says has had devasting consequences for Russia.

The significance of Fedorov’s dismissal stemmed from an irreconcilable clash with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. Fedorov favored startup-style management, prioritizing autonomous drones, competitive procurement, and asymmetric warfare to bridge personnel shortages. Syrskyi represents traditional, Soviet-style military hierarchy focused heavily on human resources and manpower. Fedorov’s removal has shocked civil society, who viewed him as an anti-corruption crusader. His dismissal sparked large-scale street protests across major cities like Kiev, Lvov, and Odessa. Soldiers and drone commanders on the front lines have openly criticized the move, fearing that his replacement – Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko – will cause military innovation to stagnate.

Fedorov had stated that he proposed replacing Gen. Syrsky and Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov, citing a need to modernize command structures. According to Fedorov, Gen. Syrsky responded with an ultimatum to President Zelensky: “Him or me”. Zelensky chose to back his top army commander and dismissed the defense minister.

President Zelensky has publicly appealed for unity, acknowledging the public’s right to protest while stressing that wartime leadership should not be forced to choose between political and military commands.

During his brief tenure, Fedorov is credited with cutting through bureaucratic red tape, overhauled the military procurement system to save billions of hryvnias, and heavily restricted Russian access to Starlink networks. Protesters and defense experts fear that his departure will stall these critical reforms.

The ouster represents a significant gamble for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is actively undergoing a major cabinet reshuffle. Demonstrators have explicitly directed their anger at the president’s choice to side with traditional generals over innovative reformers.

Surovikin Lining

On the other side of the ledger, there is some speculation that Russia may bring General Sergei Surovikin back to a central position. This is based on his recent return from what was widely viewed as a post-mutiny exile. Surovikin, nicknamed “General Armageddon,” was sidelined in 2023 following a brief rebellion by the Wagner Group, to which he had close ties. Following his dismissal as head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Surovikin was sent to Africa, where UK Defense Intelligence confirmed he was operating as the head of Russian military specialists.

Reports from independent defense analysts suggest that after completing his mission in Africa, he could return to Russia to assume a high-level state or military position., Observers have noted that President Vladimir Putin frequently demotes disgraced or controversial commanders to peripheral roles rather than discharging them entirely. This pattern allows the Kremlin to utilize their expertise and bring them back into the fold when needed.

Given Surovikin’s reputation for ruthless efficiency in conflicts like Syria and as the architect of Russia’s primary defensive lines in Ukraine, some Russian military bloggers speculate that his tactical experience is being rehabilitated to aid broader strategic goals. Given his role in managing the controversial and politically very awkward Russian withdrawal from the city of Kherson west of the Dnieper in the fall of 2022, Surovikin may be just the kind of military intelligence that is needed now in Zapporizhzhia and Kherson.

On the Battlefield

There has still been no evidence of another massive Russian attack, much touted, on Kiev. Last night, Russia fired a total of 164 drones and missiles on targets in Kiev and Odessa – high, but not in the “massive” range (when we are talking about 500 or more). Missiles included Iskander and S400. Industrial facilities were hit in Kiev, and many vessels were damaged or destroyed in the Odessa ports of Yuzhne and Chornomorsk. Ukrainians, in turn, appear, at least temporarily, to have ended their attacks on ships in the Azov Sea and are concentrating more on Russian vessels in the east of the Black Sea where more than 10 vessels were damaged or destroyed in the past 24 hours. Military Summary channel assesses that we can expect either a shutdown of the Black Sea for both Ukraine and for Russia, or else a resort to some kind of “grain deal” that will allow safe passages for grain vessels to their destinations in countries of the South.

In Zapporizhzhia, Russia has resumed its offensive north of Stepovoye and Malye Shcherbaki towards Orikhiv, so that Orikhiv is now threatened by Russia from the east, south and west. Altogether, we can say that Russian forces are moving in the directions of Pavlivka, Novopavlivka and Orikhiv, while bombing Yuviivka and Kamyshuvakha.

Ukrainian forces are trying to take back control over the settlement of Stepnogorsk and have entered Plavni which is an impediment to Russian progress toward the city of Zapporizhzhia, though Russia is subjecting the city to constant bombardment. In the Dnipro area, Russian forces are moving towards Bilytske and consolidating their positions north and northeast of Hryshyne.

In the Donetsk area, Russians have taken Vasiutyvske, and are only five kilometers from the city of Kramatorsk itself, which Russians maintain under constant bombardment. To the north there are minor Russian advances in the Kupyansk, Kharkiv and Sumy areas.

Gilbert Doctorow and a couple of other alternative media writers on Russia have been making the argument recently that Ukraine’s western-backed drone attacks on Russian infrastructure – namely, fossil fuel infrastructure – portends a possible Russian defeat if Russia does not only escalate against Ukraine but also it’s western sponsors/enablers. Scott Ritter and others have continued to make the case that these attacks by Ukraine will not translate into a strategic or meaningful setback for Russia. Below is Doctorow’s essay making his case followed by Scott Ritter’s direct response. Let me know in the comments who you think makes the more convincing argument- Natylie

Russia is losing the war!

By Gilbert Doctorow, Substack, 7/12/26

I have just said this on my morning interview with News X World (podcast to be posted here when it becomes available). And I repeat the point now in writing: Russia is losing the war.

Those who listen to Scott Ritter, to Colonel Macgregor, to Larry Johnson on their nearly daily podcast appearances and believe that the inexorable progress of Russian forces on the line of contact in Donbas, moving towards the Dnieper and conquest of the entire Donbas mean RUSSIAN VICTORY are being deceived. As I have been saying for some time, loss of the Donbas, even loss of Odessa will not force Ukraine to capitulate and will not put an end to the ever more damaging Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure in the energy sector.

Moreover, those attacks deep inside Russia directed against infrastructure could just as easily be directed against President Putin, against his family, against the State Duma. In a word, the Russian Federation is now as vulnerable to “Ukrainian” attacks as is Kiev to Russian attacks. In that sense, the war is now at a stalemate and is going against Russia, because Kiev is waging all-out war while Russia is still holding one arm behind its back while seeking the approval of progressive humanity for its forbearance and humane behavior.

Why do I come to this conclusion? I was prodded to it by the latest news that the broadcaster wanted me to comment upon, namely a successful drone attack on a major refinery near Samara. Look at the map: Samara is more than 1,000 km southeast of Moscow in the heartland of European Russia. It must be close to 2,000 km from wherever in Ukraine these drones were launched. This strike was most likely using highly advanced drones supplied from Europe which are guided by military intelligence provided to Ukraine by the USA. In short, Russia is under attack from NATO, for which the Ukraine is only a dummy warrior.

Today’s New York Times has an article on a secret factory in Germany now providing AI controlled drones to Ukraine. This is a state-of-the-art attack system and it makes Germany a co-belligerent just as the formerly proposed delivery of its Taurus missiles would have been.

The consequences of these infrastructure attacks, on attacks on Russian oil tankers inside Russia as well as on the open seas, is that Russia has severe fuel shortages in many regions. It has now banned export of diesel fuel so as to compensate for shortages at home. Vice Prime Minister Novak has just announced that Russia is importing refined petroleum.

This situation is no longer just an inconvenience for car owners in one or another locale. It is going to cripple Russian industry, including military industry if it continues and escalates, which now seems likely.

Note that until recently Russia accounted for 12% of global diesel exports. That loss now is driving up fuel costs globally.

But for Russia, there has to be a response appropriate to the now developing existential threat: the factories producing these drones, wherever they are, in Germany or elsewhere, must be destroyed. Now! If Russia fails to act, it is going to lose the war and to lose its sovereignty, regardless of how many speeches President Putin makes calling his citizens to sit tight and ignore what is happening to them.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2026

***

The Stupidity of Man

By Scott Ritter, Substack, 7/12/26

Gilbert Doctorow, the highly educated modern manifestation of Henny Penny, has published a new essay entitled “Russia is losing the War!”

Those who listen to Scott Ritter, to Colonel Macgregor, to Larry Johnson, Doctorow starts, on their nearly daily podcast appearances and believe that the inexorable progress of Russian forces on the line of contact in Donbas, moving towards the Dnieper and conquest of the entire Donbas mean RUSSIAN VICTORY are being deceived. As I have been saying for some time, loss of the Donbas, even loss of Odessa will not force Ukraine to capitulate and will not put an end to the ever more damaging Ukrainian attacks on Russian critical infrastructure in the energy sector.

First, I want to thank Gilbert Doctorow for including me in such company as Colonel Macgregor and Larry Johnson. I am deeply honored.

But this will not stay the sword.

The distinguished graduate of Harvard University (magnum cum laude!) and Columbia University (a two-for-one Ivy Leager!) makes this initial foray into his intellectual evisceration quite easy.

Gilbert Doctorow has never served in the military and clearly doesn’t understand the concept of military math: battles are won by the side that owns the boots that occupy the ground upon which they stand, and those boots almost always belong to the side that kills more of the enemy than the enemy kills of them. And here Doctorow acknowledges that Russia is well on the way to putting Russian boots on the ground where Russia wants them to be, and that this is being done because Russia is killing more Ukrainians than Ukrainians are killing Russians.

But the esteemed “Russianist” now throws away this established reality and inserts his own unique fictional modifier: none of these factors matter because Ukraine is attacking “Russian critical infrastructure in the energy sector.”

The issue of Russian energy will be discussed in greater detail later in this essay.

First, we must address some of the finer points of Dr. Doctorow’s intellectual failings regarding his proposition that “Russia is losing the war!” (Exclamation mark retained to underscore Doctorow’s state of mind when writing his essay.)

As Dr. Doctorow observes, Moreover, those attacks deep inside Russia directed against infrastructure could just as easily be directed against President Putin, against his family, against the State Duma. In a word, the Russian Federation is now as vulnerable to “Ukrainian” attacks as is Kiev to Russian attacks. In that sense, the war is now at a stalemate and is going against Russia, because Kiev is waging all-out war while Russia is still holding one arm behind its back while seeking the approval of progressive humanity for its forbearance and humane behavior.

Let’s start off with the basics: It was Zelensky who had to be reassured by Putin, indirectly, back in February 2022 that Russia wasn’t out to kill the Ukrainian mini- Fuehrer.

Not the other way around.

The notion that the Russian President or his family spends their nights worried about a decapitation strike launched by Ukrainian drones is absurd.

I know many members of the Russian State Duma.

None of them have sleepless nights as well.

I was just in Moscow when it was attacked by hundreds of Ukrainian drones.

Other than some inconvenience (internet connectivity was degraded, and my flight was delayed leaving Vnukovo Airport, causing me to miss my connection in Istanbul), no one I saw in Moscow seemed too perturbed by the prospects of a regime-change generating attack from the Ukrainian drone army.

On June 18 of this year, I drove back to Moscow from a ten-day visit to the Donbas and New Territories. As we entered Moscow, Russia was under attack from a massive wave of Ukrainian drones. Russia’s defense ministry said 555 drones were shot down across the country. The Moscow Mayor said 180 drones were shot down around Moscow alone. In the surrounding Moscow region, a high-rise residential building, an industrial facility and several private houses were damaged in the drone attack, which also injured 16.

Were these attacks inconvenient for Russia?

Yes.

Embarrassing to Russian leadership?

Yes.

But fatal to the Russian nation?

Hell no.

But the headlines read around the world focused on the visible flames and plumes of smoke that could be seen over the densely populated southeastern district of Kapotnya, where a critical oil refinery responsible for supplying the Russian capital with fuel was located.

The Kapotnya refinery supplies up to 40 per cent of Moscow’s overall fuel market, including 70 per cent of Moscow and the surrounding region’s gasoline and diesel needs.

It had been previously attacked by Ukraine several times before, most recently at the end of May, when its oil production capacity dropped below 4 million barrels a day. But repairs were made, and the Kapotnya refinery recovered to exceed 4.5 million barrels a day production by June 4.

The attacks damaged both of Kapotnya’s primary oil distillation units; AVT-6, which accounts for 53% of the plant’s capacity, was damaged during Ukraine’s previous strike on June 16, and the Euro+ unit, responsible for 47% of Kapotnya’s production, which was brought back into operation in less than a week.

In Moscow there was no gnashing of the teeth, beating of the breast, or any other demonstration on the part of the populace that things were somehow amiss.

Like went on without interruption.

Ten days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that the Ukrainian drone strikes were causing some disruption in Russian energy supplies. Putin spoke at a meeting of senior officials of the ruling United Russia Party, and in an interview published that night. “As for strikes against critical infrastructure in general,” Putin said in the interview, “and energy infrastructure in particular, of course these attacks on our infrastructure facilities create problems, that’s obvious. Right now, we’re observing a certain shortage, but it’s not critical.”

No panic.

Neither on the part of the Russian leader, nor the Russian people.

But not so Gilbert Doctorow, who continued his essay:

I was prodded to it by the latest news that the broadcaster wanted me to comment upon, namely a successful drone attack on a major refinery near Samara. Look at the map: Samara is more than 1,000 km southeast of Moscow in the heartland of European Russia. It must be close to 2,000 km from wherever in Ukraine these drones were launched. This strike was most likely using highly advanced drones supplied from Europe which are guided by military intelligence provided to Ukraine by the USA. In short, Russia is under attack from NATO, for which the Ukraine is only a dummy warrior.

It is stunning that Doctorow, the noted “Russia watcher”, would come undone because of a single report of a “successful” Ukrainian drone attack on “a major refinery” located near Samara. Maybe it was the adrenaline rush he felt when a “broadcaster” asked him to comment on the attack.

Who knows.

What we do know is that on July 12 Ukrainian drones struck the JSC Syzran Oil Refinery, which is part of the structure of the Russian company Rosneft.

According to preliminary analysis, the strike targeted the refinery’s critical ELOU-AVT-5 unit, which handles up to 30% of the Syzran Oil Refinery’s primary oil processing capacity.

The JSC Syzran Oil Refinery is located more than 800 kilometers (500 miles) from Ukraine’s border and can process between 8.5 and 8.9 million metric tons of crude oil annually.

Reports are that operations at the ELOU-AVT-5 unit have been suspended pending repairs.

I mean, look at a damn map!

This is serious!

Just ask Gilbert Doctrow.

But it was serious in February 2025, December 2025, April 2026, and May 2026, too.

On each of these dates, Ukrainian drones struck the JSC Syzran Oil Refinery.

Each time the refinery shut down.

And each time the refinery was brought rapidly back into operation.

Just like it will be following the latest attack.

No need to panic.

Unless, of course, your name is Gilbert Doctorow.

Because, you know, “this strike was most likely using highly advanced drones supplied from Europe which are guided by military intelligence provided to Ukraine by the USA.”

Yup.

The strike was conducted using the FP-1 drone, built from “highly advanced” plywood (“radar absorbing material”) and powered by a two-cylinder combustion engine that turns a wooden propeller that can generate speeds of up to 60 kilometers an hour.

Damn.

Say it ain’t so, Gilbert.

That’s some advanced stuff.

It is an open secret that since 2024 the CIA has been sharing target intelligence and providing other support for Ukrainian UAV attacks against Russian oil facilities. The “other support” includes enabling what is known as “terminal engagement” capability via Starlink satellite communications relay which, when combined with AI-assisted optical guidance for autonomous terminal homing, allows the FP-1 to operate effectively deep inside Russia.

When the FP-1 first began operations in 2024, it enjoyed a 70% success rate.

Today, that rate has fallen to just around 10%.

And it’s only going to get worse.

Russia is starting to shut down the Starlink network.

And Russia is beginning to deploy more advanced anti-drone capabilities.

The idea that the FP-1 drone should be hyped up as a major NATO weapons system delivering decisive blows against Russian infrastructure via the “dummy warrior” seems like a stretch.

The FP-1 is, to be sure, a pain in the ass for Russia.

But what Doctorow ignores is that the war with Ukraine is not a one-way street where only the western-assisted Ukrainian forces deliver blows against Russia.

At the same time the FP-1 scores the occasional success against Russian energy infrastructure, Russia is delivery powerful ballistic missile and drone attacks of its own against Ukrainian industry and energy targets.

These attacks don’t go “pop”, like the FP-1.

They go “boom”.

The facilities hit by Russia aren’t damaged but destroyed, including many of the factories used by Ukraine to produce and assemble the FP-1 drones.

Rather than running around like Chicken Little claiming the sky is falling, Doctorow would do well to learn the facts and details of what he is assessing before committing to a narrative that is factually incomplete and analytically embarrassing.

Next, Doctorow informs us of the following: Today’s New York Times has an article on a secret factory in Germany now providing AI controlled drones to Ukraine. This is a state-of-the-art attack system and it makes Germany a co-belligerent just as the formerly proposed delivery of its Taurus missiles would have been.

Here Doctorow again shows his ignorance of military affairs and, frankly speaking, as an analyst (apologies to Harvard and Columbia.) A modicum of due diligence combined with journalistic integrity would have compelled the self-professed “professional Russia watcher” to note that the “secret German factory” is operated by the Bavarian-based German defense technology company, Helsing SE, which was founded in 2021 with startup money provided by Spotify’s Daniel Elk. In the fall of 2024 Helsing SE contracted to provide Ukraine with 4,000 of its HF-1 unnamed loitering drones. By November 2025, some 2,000 HF-1 drones, which make use of three AI components—terminal guidance, midcourse guidance and visual target acquisition—have been delivered to the Ukrainian Special Forces, many of which have been used in combat.

Also in 2024, Helsing SE signed a contract to provide Ukraine with an additional 6,000 X-wing AI-assisted loitering drones—the HX-2.

It is the HX-2 that Doctorow is posturing as a “state-of-the-art attack system”, and the provision of which makes Germany “a co-belligerent” which needs to be attacked by Russia “now.”

Here’s the fine print that Doctorow won’t tell you, either because he is intellectually lazy as a journalist, doesn’t understand a damn thing about modern warfare, or both.

First, the HF-1 sucks.

The Ukrainian Special Forces refuse to use it.

Fully 40% of the inventory of supplied drones remains in storage, unused.

Why? It doesn’t work—the over-hyped AI components glitch.

It’s too expensive.

And given the lethality of drone warfare, where the hunters become the hunted in very short order, the Ukrainians view the HF-1 as a death trap—too much risk for too little gain.

And they feel the same way about the HX-2, which in initial combat tests conducted by the Ukrainian Special Forces has an astounding 75% failure to launch rate.

Moreover, the HX-2 that Doctorow claims is “state-of-the-art” is simply a German knock-off of the vastly superior Russian Lancet loitering munition which has devastated Ukrainian rear-area operations since 2022.

But the biggest error Doctorow makes is conflating the HX-2 with the deep-strike drones used by Ukraine to attack Russia’s infrastructure.

Both the HF-1 and HX-2 are strictly battlefield support weapons.

They are not analogs to the already discussed FP-1 that has been used to attack Russia’s oil and energy sector.

So, in the end, Doctorow’s big “reveal” turns out to be a bust—a giant “nothing burger.”

Just like the rest of Doctorow’s underlying analysis of the situation:

The consequences of these infrastructure attacks, on attacks on Russian oil tankers inside Russia as well as on the open seas, is that Russia has severe fuel shortages in many regions. It has now banned export of diesel fuel so as to compensate for shortages at home. Vice Prime Minister Novak has just announced that Russia is importing refined petroleum.

This situation is no longer just an inconvenience for car owners in one or another locale. It is going to cripple Russian industry, including military industry if it continues and escalates, which now seems likely.

Note that until recently Russia accounted for 12% of global diesel exports. That loss now is driving up fuel costs globally.

Yes, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak told a meeting on the energy sector convened by Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8 that the government had halted diesel exports to boost domestic supplies.

“Today, a ban on diesel fuel exports was imposed, and this will allow us to increase supplies to the domestic market,” Novak said.

Russia, Novak added, will also begin importing fuel this month to help stabilize the market, and planned maintenance at oil refineries will be postponed, sustaining domestic production.

The fuel shortages have been driven by the Ukrainian attacks that have put several Russian oil refineries out of operation. Novak also cited rising seasonal demand linked to the harvest.

But this wasn’t Novak’s first rodeo: back in September 2025, Novak had announced that Russia had extended its ban on gasoline exports and introduced new restrictions on diesel shipments until the end of the year in order to stabilize domestic fuel supplies.

The reason?

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.

And the sky did not fall.

Nor will it today, despite what Doctorow believes.

Responding to Novak’s latest announcement, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia’s energy sector had one of the world’s largest supply buffers. He instructed oil companies not to keep surplus fuel as reserves for their own filling station networks, but to share supplies with independent retailers.

He was calm.

Because this was not a crisis.

Just a temporary inconvenience.

One Russia would recover from in due course.

No panic.

No overreaction.

Stay the course.

To victory.

But such an outcome is unacceptable to Gilbert Doctorow.

But for Russia, he concludes, there has to be a response appropriate to the now developing existential threat: the factories producing these drones, wherever they are, in Germany or elsewhere, must be destroyed. Now! If Russia fails to act, it is going to lose the war and to lose its sovereignty, regardless of how many speeches President Putin makes calling his citizens to sit tight and ignore what is happening to them.

Let’s get this straight.

There is no existential threat to Russia now.

At least none that Gilbert Doctorow can define with facts.

The German drone factories pose zero threat to Russia.

And Russia is in the process of neutralizing the Ukrainian-made, CIA-directed drones that have been responsible for the attacks on Russia’s oil and energy infrastructure.

Attacking Germany (Now!, Doctorow insists) would resolve nothing, since German drones are not a threat.

It could, however, drag Germany and NATO into a direct confrontation with Russia that would upset the very algorithms driving the military math that has Russia moving steadily forward toward victory over Ukraine and the collective West, Germany included.

This is exactly what Ukraine and its Western masters want.

Which is why Russian President Vladimir Putin won’t entertain such nonsense.

This of course begs the question as to why Gilbert Doctorow, the self-proclaimed expert on everything Russian, would be promoting a course of action so obviously detrimental to the welfare of the Russian nation and its people?

The answer becomes obvious when one understands that the entire strategy behind the manufacturing of an air of crisis is driven by western intelligence.

If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it’s probably a duck.

But that’s an issue for another time.

For now, simply reflect on the notion that the stupidity of man is manifest, and that when I say “man”, I mean “Gilbert Doctorow.”

(The analysis underpinning this article was influenced by my experiences during my most recent trip to Russia. This trip was made possible through the generous donations of readers and supporters. Future visits to Russia intended to capture the reality of that land and its people and bring it back to an American audience are being planned. Please consider donating so this important work can continue.)

EuroNews, 7/9/26

Violence against recruitment officers was almost non-existent at the start of the war, but has proliferated in recent years as the fighting has dragged on and fatigue set in among the population.

Ukraine opened a criminal investigation on Thursday after crowds of people in the western city of Lviv surrounded and overturned an army conscription vehicle the night before.

The incident drew a swift backlash from Ukrainian officials, some of whom called on citizens to direct their anger at Russia and not the army.

The unrest erupted after officers detained a man suspected of evading military service and took him to a draft centre, authorities said.

“An investigation has been launched into the circumstances of an incident that occurred in Lviv involving servicemen of the Ukrainian armed forces, police officers, and around 200 civilians,” Ukraine’s prosecution service said.

“Two criminal proceedings have now been initiated on the grounds of obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during a special period (martial law) and using violence against a law enforcement officer,” it added.

Videos published on social media showed crowds surrounding and attacking a vehicle in Lviv late Wednesday, shouting “shame” and filming with their phones.

A police officer who arrived to calm the crowd was later attacked, according to prosecutors.

Ukraine has seen a steady increase in clashes between citizens and army conscription police since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, with authorities reporting over 100 such incidents this year alone.

The issue of mobilisation, mandatory military service for men aged 25 and over, is highly sensitive in Ukraine, with many divided over who should be called up and how.

The governor of the Lviv region condemned the violence, telling citizens “we have only one enemy,” while Lviv mayor Andriy Sadovy warned the incident could “instantly (become) a tool for hostile propaganda.”

“Russia today is most interested in getting Ukrainians to start fighting among themselves…All those who broke the law must be held accountable,” he said on Telegram.

Violence against recruitment officers was almost non-existent at the start of the war, but has proliferated in recent years as the fighting has dragged on and fatigue set in among the population.

Police reported just five cases of attacks against conscription officers in 2022, whereas the number last year totalled 341, the Interfax-Ukraine news agency reported.

Ukraine’s defence minister announced more flexible army contracts for conscripts last month, amid public criticism over the current system of indefinite military service.

Kremlin hits back at US comments

Meanwhile, Russia hit out at the United States on Thursday for saying Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy sites could help end the war.

Ukraine has mounted a retaliatory strike campaign using long-range drones against Russian energy and military facilities, in what Kyiv calls fair retribution for Moscow’s drone and missile barrages on Ukrainian cities.

Asked about the strikes during a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Wednesday, US President Donald Trump appeared to endorse the campaign.

“It’s an escalation, but it’s also an escalation that can help lead to an end,” Trump said.

The Kremlin said Ukrainian military pressure would not force it into concessions.

“We see certain misconceptions within the White House administration, that by escalating military pressure it can help move to a peace settlement. That is a mistaken view,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

“Further escalation may prolong the special military operation to some extent,” he said, using Russia’s preferred term for the offensive.

He also threatened that Moscow’s army would respond by “creating a larger security zone,” a reference to seizing more territory in eastern Ukraine.

“Stoking tensions and taking steps that fuel escalation will in no way contribute to the peace process,” Peskov added.

Kyiv’s attacks on Russian oil depots and refineries have triggered a fuel crisis across Russia, forcing Moscow, one of the world’s top oil producers, to ban some exports.

More than 90% of all Russian regions have introduced some form of rationing or reported shortages in petrol and diesel since June, according to official statements and local media reports.

By Sergey Poletaev, RT, 7/10/26

Last weekend, the Russian authorities announced the complete liberation of the city of Konstantinovka, the battle for which had been raging since the end of last year. 

Why did the battle for this city take so long? Is Konstantinovka really strategically important? And why was so much time and effort spent on capturing it? We explore all this below. 

One of the largest cities in Donbass

In terms of size, Konstantinovka (population 98,000 in 2002 and approximately 70,000 in 2022) is the largest city (not urban agglomeration) captured by the Russian Army since the spring of 2022, i.e., following the liberation of Mariupol. The Pokrovsk-Mirnograd agglomeration is larger (its pre-war population, including the suburbs, was up to 200,000 people), but it consists of two cities with a relatively large and less densely populated area between them. This allowed the Russian Army to capture these cities separately, utilizing the area between them to cut through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).

In Konstantinovka, this was not possible since it is a continuous urban area measuring approximately 6 by 12 km. Konstantinovka has 20,000 buildings, about 1,000 of which are multi-storey. In the conditions of modern warfare, each multi-storey building is transformed into a mini-fortress with a developed underground section. The southern part of the city (around Kosmonavtov Boulevard) with its nine-storey panel buildings is particularly challenging in this regard.

The Krivoy Torets River flows through the center of Konstantinovka. The river in itself is a natural defensive line, but it is also reinforced by a large industrial zone that bisects the city. This industrial zone is comparable in size to that of Mariupol: kilometers of concrete workshops, underground utilities, and Cold War-era bomb shelters; in short, it is a ready-made citadel.

Outpost of the AFU’s main fortress 

After the retreat of Igor Strelkov’s forces from Slaviansk and Kramatorsk in 2014–2015, these two cities became the AFU’s main hub in Donbass. They housed the ATO headquarters, and powerful fortifications made of steel and concrete were erected there. Konstantinovka was part of the perimeter of this fortress, serving as a kind of outpost: to reach Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka had to be captured first.

Along with Slaviansk and Kramatorsk, Konstantinovka was also fortified for defense: the basements of multi-storey buildings were converted into strongholds, underground heating mains and cable collector tunnels between them were reinforced, cleared of debris, and underground passages were constructed to connect several buildings into a single network. Essentially, the multi-storey buildings were all connected by underground pathways, and one could quickly move and transport cargo from one point to another. 

Similar work was carried out in the industrial zone; most enterprises had ceased operations back in 2014-2015 and were partially demolished or rebuilt for defense in 2015-2020. Weapons, ammunition, and supply depots were also set up in the industrial zone and near the railway station.

Along the city’s perimeter, outside the urban area, field fortifications were created, such as trenches, dugouts, and field strongholds. The outskirts of Konstantinovka – Ilyinovka, Berestok, Pleshcheyevka station, Predtechino, Stupochki, and Novodmitrovka – were also converted into strongpoints and formed a single firing network. 

All this was done in order to delay the Russian army’s advance toward Slaviansk and Kramatorsk – the AFU’s main defense hub not only in Donbass but in the whole of eastern Ukraine.

Russian ‘pincers’

The example of Konstantinovka clearly demonstrates the assault tactics perfected by the Russian Army since 2023 (the time of battles for Bakhmut, Marinka, and Avdeevka).

First and foremost, the Russian Army engages in battles for the flanks and outskirts of a city. This is the longest and, for an outside observer, rather unremarkable process. Fighters of the South Group of Forces approached Konstantinovka from the east as early as December 2025, when Predtechino, Pleshcheyevka station, and Ivanopolye were captured.

Then, in the spring, Novodmitrovka in the north, and Berestok and Ilyinovka in the south, were captured. All battles were fought by small assault groups; they were supplied either by aerial deliveries or from caches that had been airdropped earlier. The advancing Russian forces benefited from the enemy’s poor battle formations: the depletion of the AFU, even in key directions, has reached such a point that an important stronghold or an entire village is sometimes defended by just a few soldiers stationed there without rotation for months on end.

Furthermore, the most combat-ready AFU units remain in the city, since cities have better fortifications, supplies, communication between units, and the command is located there. Therefore, the flanks are usually the first to fall under Russian control. 

Neither can the AFU redeploy forces to the suburbs – since if the city is left without infantry reinforcements it will suffer the fate of Pokrovsk, the southern part of which was taken by Russian assault units without a fight on July 30-31, 2025. The endeavor to drive them out was slow, bloody, and unsuccessful. 

Therefore, the capture of the suburbs of Konstantinovka at the end of April 2026 meant that the Ukrainian garrison in the city was doomed. The Russian Army established tight fire control over all roads leading into the city, 24/7 air control, and was able to identify and destroy enemy presence in the city from the air. At this point, Russian troops could just stop and wait. 

The main instrument of war

Wait for what? Inevitable Ukrainian counterattacks. Over two dozen assault operations have already been carried out in Donbass, Zaporozhye, and Dnepropetrovsk regions using the above-mentioned strategy. But every time the ‘Russian pincers’ close in around another city, the AFU attempt to break the encirclement with counterattacks and either bring additional forces into the city or, in the final stages of fighting, withdraw the remnants of the doomed garrison.

With the exception of Kupiansk, the AFU has so far failed to achieve this goal. Not because they’re bad fighters – far from it. However, the Russian General Staff has imposed extremely disadvantageous combat tactics on the Ukrainian command. The AFU lack firepower, they have significantly fewer personnel (especially assault forces), no aerial bombs, virtually no rocket artillery, and so on. Furthermore, they lack the years of experience in assault operations that the Russian Army possesses. 

In short, the Ukrainian forces are virtually incapable of counterattacking. And to defend its position, an army has to carry out constant counterattacks. In battle, in order to stand still, one has to constantly move forward, and that’s something the AFU are almost incapable of doing – or, rather, are capable of only in certain sections of the front.

This is what happened in Konstantinovka. The bloodiest part of the operation for the AFU lasted from late April to mid-June; they carried out counterattacks on the flanks in an attempt to break the encirclement and withdraw at least part of the garrison. In mid-May, the defense of the southern part of the city (the most heavily-fortified area) collapsed. From then on, the condition of the garrison in the Konstantinovka industrial zone and the railway station area deteriorated even faster. 

What is notable is that, compared to the flanks, there was virtually no fighting in the city: Russian assault units infiltrated city blocks in small groups, accumulated forces, achieved local superiority, and with the help of detailed aerial reconnaissance, engaged in clearing operations rather than direct combat. The powerful fortifications, which had been prepared for many years, were of no use since there were no people left to defend them.

We may wonder, why the Ukrainian command waits for the inevitable to happen, time and time again? Why doesn’t it withdraw the garrison from the doomed city and thereby preserve its most capable, experienced, and motivated fighters?

The answer is also quite rational: if they abandon Konstantinovka, the situation will repeat itself in Druzhkovka; if they abandon Druzhkovka, Kramatorsk and Slaviansk will suffer the same fate, and so on. The Russians could quickly get to Kiev like that. 

***

The battles for individual cities may seem unremarkable and repetitive. However, as we see, in these battles, the Russian Army has been able to force Ukrainian forces into a particularly unfavorable style of combat. This is evident both at the tactical level – since the AFU are forced to sacrifice reserves in useless counterattacks, suffering significantly higher losses than the Russian Armed Forces – and at the operational level, since Ukrainian forces are forced to cling to doomed cities to somehow hold the defense. 

All this gives the Russian Army a key strategic advantage: initiative on the battlefield, which leads to the attrition of the enemy and hastens the moment when the AFU will be unable to conduct counterattacks and hold the front line. 

This moment will mark the collapse of the AFU and will determine the outcome of the war.

Unfortunately, I’m unable to embed this YouTube video but the link is below.

YouTube link here.

More on the hypocrisy of the smug and sanctimonious EU below. – Natylie

Criminalization of Dissent in the “Free World”

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 7/9/26

It was good to hear a colleague, Christian Vukasovich, catalog evidence in our recent WMD podcast (episode 4) of growing intolerance among young Americans for the complicity of the US political and legal system in the abuses of AIPAC lobbying, Gaza genocide, the attacks on Palestinians and illegal seizure of land in the West Bank, and the Zionist “greater Israel” agenda that is being perpetrated without meaningful Western resistance across southern Lebanon, southern Syria and in the aforementioned Palestinian territories.

I shall be looking out for evidence that this change of sentiment led, first and foremost by the younger generations, including many younger candidates for political office in the November elections, will have a substantial effect on US policy any time soon.

For the moment, I suspect, we have seen only the opposite namely, the total unwillingness on the part of the US to withdraw US weapons and aid from Israel even though Israeli stubbornness is a major cause of the current breakdown of the MOU in the context of the Iranian crisis (and its potential to inflict significant harm on the global economy), along with the absence of good faith on the part of the West in acknowledging Iranian authority over the Strait of Hormuz. We should note in passing the full-throated applause in Ankara earlier this week for new US attacks on Iran from none other than the current Secretary General of NATO, Mark Utte, a former Dutch prime minister.

In Europe, the continuing crackdown on dissent against growing EU and European and NATO authoritarianism and aggression – a black stain that has been spreading for over a decade now – is every day more manifest.

The official narrative about political oppression in Europe, even as the European Parliament cries out loudly against what it claims are instances of oppressive human rights in other parts of the world – especially, of course, those countries that European neocons consider to be their enemies and competitors, would prefer that we look only at examples of “democratic backsliding.” This stance exposes an extraordinary level of hypocrisy and determined resistance to self-understanding.

European leaders profess to see “democratic backsliding” in instances such as Hungary under the government of former prime minister Viktor Orban which had used targeted tax audits, severe legal restrictions, and smear campaigns to marginalize “independent NGOs.” A great many of the latter are funded from Western sources such as the IS government-funded US National Endowment for Democracy, a primary instigator for pro-Washington regime change antics – as we have also seen in Georgia, and as we saw at the time of the coup d’etat on the Maidan in Kiev in 2014.

This reminds us that current European authoritarianism is rarely expressed as luxuriously as in its attempts to smear or disappear any elements in Europe that are critical of Europe’s war with Russia over the proxy Ukraine. Europe’s long-term ambition here is to restore European imperial privilege, even in the potential absence of a US protective umbrella, by breaking up and distributing among European members not so much the territories of today’s Russian Federation themselves (which would be very unfashionable), but the privileges of access for Western capital to the mineral and other sources of wealth of the pygmy polities that would be the product of this break-up – a policy helpfully outlined just the other day by Europe’s de facto foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, an Estonian.

More generally, across Europe, governments have increasingly deployed disproportionate force and restrictive legislation against activists. Notable examples include blanket bans and police crackdowns on pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Germany, criminalization of Palestine Action in the UK, and the forceful clearing of student encampments in Sweden. In nations like Germany and France, various legislative changes – including new citizenship laws and anti-separatism measures – have increasingly been utilized to criminalize and scapegoat specific refugee, immigrant, and minority communities.

In Germany and the UK, several pro-Palestinian organizations, Jewish peace groups, and individual activists have had their bank accounts abruptly closed or frozen by major financial institutions like Berliner Sparkasse and Barclays, often without clear explanations or recourse. State authorities in several Western European nations have used anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws to strip advocacy groups of their charitable status, effectively blocking their ability to process donations or maintain banking access. In the UK, climate and anti-war activists have received unprecedented, multi-year prison sentences under the Public Order Act for organizing peaceful disruptions and marches. Activists and public figures in Germany, France, and the UK face criminal prosecution, heavy fines, and potential prison time for using specific slogans, carrying signs, or organizing demonstrations that authorities classify as inciting hatred or supporting banned organizations. Police forces across Western Europe have increasingly utilized pre-emptive detention laws to arrest and hold key organizers before a planned protest can even take place.

Specific, documented legal cases from the UK and Germany illustrate the escalation of state prosecution and counter-terrorism legislation targeting pro-Palestinian and anti-war activists in Western Europe.

A landmark case at Woolwich Crown Court marked the first time the UK government successfully applied counterterrorism sentencing parameters against direct-action political protesters. Four activists linked to the group Palestine Action – Charlotte Head, Leona Kamio, Fatema Rajwani, and Samuel Corner – were tried for a 2024 break-in at a Gloucestershire factory owned by Elbit Systems, Israel’s largest private weapons manufacturer. Although the jury convicted the defendants of criminal damage rather than explicit terrorism offenses, the prosecution argued that the action carried a “terrorism connection” designed to coerce the government. The judge agreed, issuing severe, unprecedented prison terms ranging between 5 and 8 years. Beyond the multi-year prison terms, the court placed the activists under 15 years of mandatory terrorist notification requirements upon release. Human rights groups have condemned the ruling as a dangerous escalation that functionally criminalizes political dissent.

In Germany, authorities have pivoted toward high-security trials and organized-crime frameworks to prosecute anti-war sabotage. In the “Ulm” case, five activists (Daniel Tatlow-Devally, Zo Hailu, Crow Tricks, Vi Kovarbasic, and Leandra Rollo) went on trial at the high-security Stammheim court in Stuttgart. They were arrested following a September 2025 raid on an Elbit Systems site in Ulm, which caused roughly €1 million in property damage. Rather than standard trespassing or property damage charges, the Federal Prosecutor invoked Section 129 of the German Penal Code, formally indicting the defendants for “membership in a criminal organization” (Palestine Action Germany). Section 129 is traditionally reserved for mafia syndicates or violent extremist networks. Defense attorneys and civil liberties observers point out that the use of a high-security tribunal, prolonged pre-trial detentions, and structural criminal organization charges represent a highly disproportionate effort to suppress political protests.

In the 2025 case of the Staatsräson Deportation Orders State suppression has also expanded into immigration law via the weaponization of Staatsräson – Germany’s political doctrine establishing the security of Israel as a fundamental pillar of the German state. Berlin authorities ordered the forcible deportation of four foreign residents (Cooper Longbottom, Kasia Wlaszczyk, Shane O’Brien, and Roberta Murray). [None of the individuals had prior criminal convictions. They were ordered to leave the country strictly for participating in peaceful pro-Palestinian demonstrations, including a sit-in at Berlin’s central train station and a campus occupation at the Free University Berlin. The state explicitly cited Staatsräson to bypass standard criminal trial procedures, utilizing administrative deportation laws to expel foreign-born dissidents without a jury conviction.

The criminalization of anti-war dissent in the UK and Germany has structurally altered the legal landscape for political activists, moving from traditional civil policing to severe statutory bans, criminal-syndicate frameworks, and counter-terrorism measures.

The UK has systematically rewritten its protest laws through successive pieces of legislation—including the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the Public Order Act 2023, and the Crime and Policing Act 2026. Together, these acts have effectively criminalized non-violent, disruptive civil disobedience.

The Public Order Act of 2023 created broad criminal offenses for tactics historically central to peace movements. Being “locked on” (attaching oneself to an object, building, or person) or merely possessing materials intended for locking on now carries a prison sentence. Under Section 7 of the Act, interfering with “key national infrastructure” – which was expanded via regulations to explicitly shield the life sciences and defense sectors – carries a penalty of up to 12 months in prison. This statutory shield directly targets anti-war blockades at munitions factories. Section 11 of the 2023 Act allows police officers to carry out suspicion less stop-and-search operations within designated protest zones. This authority is paired with the Crime and Policing Act 2026 under which senior police commanders are legally required to consider the “cumulative impact” of recurring protests. This permits preemptive, blanket bans on ongoing anti-war vigils or weekly marches in the same locale, strictly on the grounds that they disrupt local commerce or community routines.

Unlike the UK’s focus on physical disruption, Germany has primarily weaponized speech laws (Volksverhetzung – incitement to hatred) and its domestic intelligence apparatus to suppress and criminalize anti-war and pro-Palestinian advocacy.

The political doctrine of Staatsräson (stating that Israel’s security is a foundational pillar of the German state) has been integrated into the legal code. The phrase “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” has been formally classified by the Federal Ministry of the Interior as a symbol of banned organizations like Hamas or Samidoun. Publicly uttering or displaying it triggers immediate arrest, heavy fines, or prosecution for “approving criminal offenses” or “inciting hatred.”

The federal prosecutor has begun applying Section 129 of the German Penal Code – a statute historically reserved for organized crime rings, the mafia, or armed militant groups – against non-violent direct-action networks. This allows the state to deploy invasive surveillance, wiretapping, and high-security trials against anti-war groups.

Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) issued an official dossier labeling the broader Palestine solidarity movement as “extremist.” This administrative designation gives police and prosecutors the power to treat mainstream anti-war expressions as national security threats. The BfV dossier formally classified common cultural icons as extremist markers. The agency designated the classic cartoon character Handala (a universal symbol of Palestinian refugee status) and visual depictions of a sliced watermelon matching the geographic outline of the region as extremist symbols that supposedly deny Israel’s right to exist. Local authorities, particularly in Berlin, have instituted operational protest rules that ban speech in specific languages. Police have repeatedly shut down demonstrations and arrested activists for delivering speeches or chanting slogans in Arabic, enforcing ad-hoc mandates that restrict all public assembly speech exclusively to German or English.