AFP: EU to Refuse Military-Age Ukrainian Men Refugee Protection

AFP, 6/27/26

The EU on Friday proposed stopping granting Ukrainian men of fighting age refugee protection to settle in the bloc, while extending the right beyond 2027 for others from the country.

Brussels said the change follows a request from Kyiv, whose army has struggled with manpower shortages as Russia’s war of invasion grinds into a fifth year.

“Our proposal provides that temporary protection should not be granted to newly arriving persons who are not allowed to leave Ukraine because of their military obligations,” Magnus Brunner, the European Union’s internal affairs chief told journalists.

The 27-nation EU granted Ukrainians temporary protection after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, a measure rolled over several times and currently set to expire next March.

About 4.4 million people currently benefit from the scheme, which grants them residence permits, the right to work, and access to medical assistance, social welfare and education.

Under the commission’s proposal the welcome will be extended until March 2028, including for military-age men already living in the bloc.

The EU on Friday proposed stopping granting Ukrainian men of fighting age refugee protection to settle in the bloc, while extending the right beyond 2027 for others from the country.

Brussels said the change follows a request from Kyiv, whose army has struggled with manpower shortages as Russia’s war of invasion grinds into a fifth year.

“Our proposal provides that temporary protection should not be granted to newly arriving persons who are not allowed to leave Ukraine because of their military obligations,” Magnus Brunner, the European Union’s internal affairs chief told journalists.

The 27-nation EU granted Ukrainians temporary protection after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, a measure rolled over several times and currently set to expire next March.

About 4.4 million people currently benefit from the scheme, which grants them residence permits, the right to work, and access to medical assistance, social welfare and education.

Under the commission’s proposal the welcome will be extended until March 2028, including for military-age men already living in the bloc.

But newcoming males aged 23 to 60 — who are prohibited from leaving the country under Ukraine’s martial law — will be excluded from the scheme once the plan is adopted by EU member states, the commission said, noting that however they will still be able to apply for asylum.

Brussels said it will also develop a pilot program to support Ukrainians who wish to return home with practical support in areas such as jobs, housing, and education.

“As the war continues, our support must also continue,” Brunner said, adding that the commission’s proposal took into account “Ukraine’s evolving defense needs and recovery needs.”

“This is something the Ukrainians asked us to do,” he said of the decision to limit protection for men of fighting age.

Adult men account for about 27 percent of all Ukrainians currently benefiting from EU protection, with women making up 43 percent of the total and minors another 30 percent, according to EU data.

Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic host the largest communities.

Uriel Araujo: Ukrainian conflict gaining traction again as Russian troops steadily advance

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 6/29/26

Uriel Araujo is an Anthropology PhD and a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

While the spotlight remains on Iran and the Middle East, the proxy Western war against Russia in Ukraine could be gaining traction again. In recent weeks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has sought to project strength: with a fresh EU financial package in hand, he has portrayed Ukraine as building decisive long-range strike capabilities that could shift the momentum against Russia.

In his June 24 speech, Zelensky highlighted expanding long-range strike capabilities and argued that (with the right support from G7 partners), his country could “force Russia to choose peace”. He pointed to Ukraine’s growing ability to hit “deeper” inside Russian territory as evidence of increasing pressure, while emphasizing plans to bolster domestic weapons production.

It is true that Kyiv has intensified its long-range campaign, striking military, defense-industrial, and energy targets inside the Eurasian great power. For example Ukraine struck targets in Ufa on June 25, hitting Rosneft-linked refineries.

These developments generate striking images and tactical disruption. Yet the reality on the ground is something else: Ukrainian drone warfare has had an impact, but this has not prevented Russian forces from continuing offensive operations, artillery barrages, missile strikes, and their own drone attacks along the front.

Russian advances have in fact been steady: for one thing, its Armed Forces have reported control over settlements including Krasny Liman, Konstantinovka, among others. And the territorial gains continue in key sectors.

Zelensky is, in any case, leveraging the new EU support (roughly $102 billion) to present Ukraine as standing a credible chance.

One may recall that countries such as Slovakia, and the Czech Republic (and initially Hungary) had opted out of financially participating in the EU’s joint package. Post-Orbán, Hungary has reversed its obstruction and facilitated implementation, though Budapest still raises concerns over minority rights in Ukraine and accession issues.

Against this backdrop, UK Prime Minister Starmer announced his resignation, while French President Macron is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term in 2027.

All of that adds uncertainty to the politics and the financial angle of the conflict, in a continent that has long been experiencing “Ukraine fatigue”.

No wonder Zelensky works hard to account for these funds by showcasing military progress.

Kyiv is also purchasing drones (including Hornet ones) in large quantities. The Kremlin, however, still maintains a larger drone inventory for close-range and other responses, not to mention ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces face a serious shortage of interceptor missiles, including for Patriot systems, with no quick domestic fix in sight; and making their own Patriot missiles would be no solution, as Jennifer Kavanagh (a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities) points out.

Moreover, Kyiv is unlikely to receive major new air defense or offensive systems like Tomahawks in the near term.

Thus, Zelensky, again, seeks to create the appearance of successful defense and even turning the tide. This effort helps justify the massive aid to EU creditors amid Europe’s growing fatigue with the conflict and its economic fallout.

Be as it may, Ukraine’s manpower challenges are underreported, with skilled fighters in short supply after years of attrition.

As I’ve argued, too much is often made of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian energy assets: while visually dramatic, damage to refineries has proven relatively limited and repairable. Russia has after all absorbed dozens of such strikes, mitigating impacts through spare capacity, rerouting, increased crude exports, and adjustments at other facilities.

The point is that Kyiv can temporarily disrupt operations, but Moscow can count on dozens of refineries, redundant capacity, large reserves, and the ability to adapt. Analysts from the International Energy Agency, for instance, have confirmed that outages cause temporary dips without crippling the sector.

In other words, tactical successes far from the front do not automatically translate into battlefield victory. Wars are still decided by manpower, artillery, logistics, industrial output, and territorial control. Moscow continues expanding production of tanks, shells, glide bombs, missiles, and drones; its defense industry has shifted to wartime footing, with ammunition and drone output rising significantly despite sanctions. In addition, Russia has adapted by dispersing assets, hardening sites, enhancing electronic warfare, and speeding repairs, thus reducing the long-term bite of strikes.

Additionally, Moscow still fields larger strike campaigns with hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic systems in major waves, retaining superior long-range capacity overall. Kyiv in turn faces persistent constraints: personnel shortages, air defense gaps, ammunition imbalances, and aid dependence.

While drone strikes matter, territorial advances remain the more telling indicator, which is why organizations such as the Institute for the Study of War track control maps so closely.

All of this means that Ukraine’s “deep” strikes carry real psychological weight and can impose costs, but they should not be confused with decisive strategic effects.

Moscow after all holds advantages in aggregate resources, industrial base, and in operational momentum across many front sectors. Ultimately, the conflict’s outcome depends less on dramatic drone footage than on hard realities of attrition and negotiation.

The Ukrainian leader’s latest push may buy time and headlines, but the ground situation suggests a far more difficult path ahead, from Ukraine’s perspective. Europe’s patience and resources, in turn, are not unlimited, and the political landscape could face changes soon.

Ian Proud: Cutting off financial aid to Ukraine is the only way to force peace talks to end the war

Below my latest article in Responsible Statecraft on the currently moribund peace process for Ukraine. With a possible end to the war against Iran in sight, I hope the Americans can reinject energy into the Ukraine peace process; the Europeans have shown themselves unable to do so, and I expect little to emerge from the E3 Ambassadors’ meeting at the Russian MFA yesterday.

Lots of people talk about there being a single peace deal for Ukraine, but in truth it will be far more complicated than that, requiring separate deals on an end to the hostilities, Ukraine’s EU future, NATO, and on the future EU/UK relationship with Russia after the war ends.

Meanwhile, Zelensky is already asking for another $20 billion in military aid, hot on the heels of the EU finally agreeing its 90 billion package after the Hungarian elections removed the final barrier to aid. Zelensky has absolutely no desire to see the cash cow of war end and I continue to be amazed (though not surprised) that European leaders continue to pander to his every ask, while forced mobilisation becomes ever more repressive on the streets of Ukraine, corruption remains rampant, and the neo-Nazis have an ever tighter grip on the Ukrainian military and intelligence apparatus.

We should stop sending money to Ukraine. That appears the only way to force Zelensky’s hand and bring real energy to the peace process. I suspect, however, Ursula von der Leyen and co will continue to stack up debt to keep the war rumbling on.

I hope you find my article interesting.

The time is ripe for European leaders to set aside the self-licking summits in European capitals and get in the room with the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia to orchestrate a modern-day Helsinki Conference.

A durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking agreements, each of which will be incredibly difficult to negotiate, but all of which will be vital if we are to avoid a general war in Europe.

In a recent post on X, former U.S. diplomat Dan Fried, commenting on the June 7 E3 Leaders’ Statement on peace in Ukraine, said, “If Russia wants to end the war it can, you know, end the war.”

It’s important to pause here and note that Fried was the State Department Coordinator for Sanctions Policy from 2013 until 2017. I know, because I was directly involved at the time, that Fried is the architect of the policy of making Russia sanctions permanent by linking them to the full implementation of the Minsk II agreement, which Russia and Ukraine interpreted in radically different ways. The main aim of sanctions conditionality was therefore to delay any possibility of peaceful settlement, and in that it succeeded.

Eleven years on, Fried’s remark echoes a common line of argument in pro-war Western circles: that Russia could simply end the war without a negotiated settlement. And yet an unconditional about-face by Russia is quite obviously never going to happen, and so the comment serves only to prolong the war.

The E3 statement flowed from the same logic. It offered nothing new or unexpected. Critically, it reiterated the line that roughly $300 billion of Russian assets will remain immobilized until Russia “ceases its war of aggression and compensates Ukraine for the damage caused by the war.”

The current World Bank estimate of the cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine stands at $588 billion. So, the E3 position amounts to confirmation that Russia will never see its money again and moreover will still have $288 billion left to pay.

This, I fear, is another example of Fried’s logic — that peace in Ukraine is indeed possible, but only on terms that Russia would be unable or unwilling to accept. As Western mainstream media carpet bombs the world with news that Ukraine is turning the tide in the war and could still win, then the calculus may be among Western policy hawks that continuing the war is no bad thing.

It’s certainly clear that no one appears in a rush. The E3 statement follows a sixteen-month period of endless and repetitive meetings by European leaders and Zelensky in which everyone violently agrees, but to which the Russians are never invited.

Only in recent months, notably since President Donald Trump’s Alaska Summit with Putin, has the topic of a negotiated end to the Ukraine war slowly bubbled to the surface in Europe. President Alexander Stubb of Finland, President Emmanuel Macron of FrancePrime Minister Bart de Wever of Belgium have at various times dipped their toes in the water of suggesting diplomatic talks with Russia.

Last week, Zelensky himself issued an open letter to Putin about a possible meeting.

But, being that the letter contained several pages of personal barbs and insults about Putin, it is hard to see this as anything more than a self-licking stunt, of the type Dan Fried would support. The Europeans and Zelensky appear dug in for the long haul.

A senior Russian contact remarked to me recently that the Europeans spend a lot of time talking about the possibility of talks, but not the substance of what might be on the agenda. In truth, a vast amount of work will be needed in preparatory negotiations to map out the shape of a future peace settlement, requiring a clarity of focus that has hitherto been missing.

A durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking deals, possibly negotiated separately with different signatories. Talk of a single ‘peace deal’ for Ukraine is a lazy over-simplification. The latest E3 statement bundles up separate issues in the same basket as does the now dormant US brokered plan. A peace settlement for Ukraine will require, inter alia, the following.

A bilateral peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the U.S. and others. The existing U.S.-brokered draft is the right place to start, as that includes the most contentious issue of territory, and in particular the future status of the remaining territory in Donetsk which Russia has not conquered. It would also need to cover sensitive topics such as the size of Ukraine’s army, Ukrainian children who were removed to Russia, and minority languages in Ukraine.

A clear plan and timeline for Ukraine to join the European Union. This can only be negotiated bilaterally by the EU and Ukraine, without U.S. or British involvement. It is arguably as difficult as a bilateral peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

Zelensky has said he wants to see Ukrainian accession by 2027, but this is not going to happen, and not only because the war may still be ongoing. The Europeans aren’t over eager about Ukraine joining because Ukraine is nowhere near ready, and Europe can’t afford it. Chancellor Merz has recently resurfaced the idea of “associate membership,” in which Ukraine gets no voting rights or money. Every rational observer should be able to judge that many Ukrainians will want clarity on the glidepath towards EU membership as a condition for ending the war.

An agreement between Russia and Europe, including the United Kingdom, on the future shape of their relationship. The third issue is equally as complex. Should Ukraine eventually join the EU, then it would join existing former Soviet and Warsaw Pact members (the Balts and Poland) who frame Russia as an existential threat. Relations between Europe and Russia are more shuttered today than they were during the Soviet era.

Europe needs cheap energy to stem the tide of self-imposed deindustrialization; Russia would like European investment again and a more open people-to-people relationship. There will need to be a settlement on how sanctions against Russia are eased during a post-war period. Ignoring an EU-Russia deal risks pressing the pause button on a future general war at a time when Europe is rapidly rearming,

An agreement within NATO. A peace settlement for Ukraine will only land when its future NATO aspiration is taken decisively off of the table. Anyone who still believes that Russia will give up on this clearest of redlines is dangerously misguided.

Ukraine needs cast iron security guarantees that should involve a hard commitment to boots on the ground should Russia renege on its commitments.This will require Russia to have confidence that NATO isn’t stoking the fire in the background to reignite tensions as a pretext for intervention. These are incredibly complex issues and will require U.S. leadership to shift the Europeans into line. The NATO-Russia Council could have provided a forum for discussion and deconfliction but was formally disbanded in December 2025. Perhaps a NATO-Ukraine-Russia Council might emerge, to take its place, reopening a vital avenue for military dialogue and deconfliction.

Amid signs that the Trump Administration is tiring of the Ukraine peace process, the time is ripe for a serious push to bring the disastrous war in Ukraine to a close. Rather than the Europeans and Americans tussling over who should be in charge of the negotiations, the truth is that every Western nation will have a role to play, together with Ukraine and Russia, to hammer out the various agreements needed for peace. That may require a grand summit similar in scale to the Helsinki Conference of 1975. On the back of the E3 Statement, however, I am not holding my breath.

The Forgotten Alliance: How the Soviet Union Created Israel and Why It Matters Today

By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 6/15/26

As Russia positions itself between Israel and Iran today, many observers struggle to understand Moscow’s seemingly contradictory policies. Russia maintains a strategic partnership with Iran and has deepened military and economic cooperation in recent years. It has preserved close ties with Syria and increasingly challenged American influence across the Middle East. Yet Moscow has also maintained channels of communication with Israel, periodically offered itself as a mediator between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and has often avoided treating Israel as merely another Western adversary.

To many observers, this may appear contradictory. It is not. The answer lies in one of the most overlooked episodes of 20th century geopolitics when the Soviet Union played a decisive role in the creation of the State of Israel. This remains one of history’s great geopolitical ironies.

Today Israel is widely regarded as America’s closest ally in the Middle East. Yet in 1947 and 1948, Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union was among the strongest supporters of Jewish statehood. Soviet diplomats championed partition at the United Nations and Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia supplied the weapons that helped Israel survive its first war. The USSR became one of the first governments to recognize the new state.

Understanding this forgotten history also reveals a fundamental difference between Soviet (now Russian) and American political systems. In the United States, a robust ecosystem of interest groups, advocacy organizations and lobbying networks emerged over decades, helping shape US-Israel relations. Organizations such as AIPAC became influential participants in a pluralistic democratic system. Whether one views this influence positively or negatively, it became a permanent feature of American politics. Today, groups like AIPAC exert considerable influence across all institutions of the US government.

No equivalent phenomenon could emerge in the Soviet Union. The Soviet state tolerated no autonomous centers of political power. Religious institutions, ethnic organizations, civic associations and lobbying groups existed only insofar as they served Party objectives. Soviet Jews occupied prominent positions throughout government, science, culture and the military, but no independent Jewish political infrastructure capable of influencing state policy could exist outside Communist Party control.

This distinction would prove crucial. For a brief moment, Stalin believed Israel could become a useful geopolitical partner and perhaps even a socialist-oriented state. However, when the creation of Israel generated visible expressions of Jewish identity inside the Soviet Union itself, Moscow’s enthusiasm rapidly turned into suspicion.

The same state that helped create Israel would soon begin dismantling Jewish institutions, arresting prominent Jewish figures and launching the anti-Semitic campaigns that marked Stalin’s final years. The story that follows is therefore not merely the history of Israel’s birth. It is a story about great-power rivalry, strategic miscalculation and one of the great geopolitical ironies of the early Cold War.

Zionism as a Weapon Against the British Empire

To understand why Stalin supported partition, one must first understand Britain’s deteriorating position in Palestine after the Second World War.

By 1945, Britain found itself trapped. The British Mandate in Palestine had become increasingly ungovernable. London faced mounting pressure from both Arab and Jewish communities while simultaneously struggling with severe postwar economic exhaustion. Maintaining Britain’s position required tens of thousands of troops and substantial financial resources at a moment when the British Empire was already beginning to contract.

The most immediate challenge came from the Jewish underground organizations. The Haganah, Irgun (Etzel) and Lehi (the Stern Gang) increasingly viewed Britain – not the Arabs – as the primary obstacle to Jewish statehood. Although these organizations differed significantly in ideology and tactics, they all contributed to a broader campaign aimed at making British rule untenable.

The most famous attack occurred on July 22, 1946, when Irgun operatives bombed King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which housed the headquarters of the British administration and military command. Ninety-one people were killed. The attack shocked Britain and demonstrated that the Mandate was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

Throughout 1945–47, Jewish underground groups attacked British military installations, railways, police stations, radar facilities, and infrastructure throughout Palestine. British soldiers were ambushed, kidnapped and occasionally executed. The cumulative effect was not military defeat but political exhaustion.

This development did not escape Moscow’s attention. From Stalin’s perspective, the Zionist movement had become an unwitting instrument against one of Britain’s most important imperial positions in the Middle East. Soviet leaders understood that partition would almost certainly accelerate Britain’s withdrawal and remove a major pillar of British influence from the region.

As historian Arnold Krammer observed in his study of Soviet policy toward partition, Soviet leaders viewed Palestine primarily through the lens of great-power competition rather than ideology. Weakening Britain was the central strategic prize. Stalin likely expected that the British withdrawal from Palestine would have ripple effects throughout the region. Britain still maintained major military positions in Egypt (Suez Canal), Iraq, Jordan (through the Arab Legion) and the Persian Gulf. The thinking was that a British retreat from Palestine could accelerate perceptions of imperial decline elsewhere.

Stalin’s Real Objective: Weakening Britain’s Middle Eastern Order

The clearest public expression of this Soviet policy came from Andrei Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister at the time. Speaking before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine on May 14, 1947, Gromyko delivered what remains one of the most consequential speeches in modern Middle Eastern history. Referring to the Holocaust, he declared:

“The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defense of the elementary rights of the Jewish people and to safeguard it against the violence of fascist executioners explains the aspiration of the Jews to establish their own State.”1

The statement is often cited as evidence of Soviet sympathy for Jewish statehood. Yet the more consequential aspect of the speech came when Gromyko endorsed partition if Arabs and Jews proved unable to coexist within a single state. This marked a dramatic departure from previous Soviet policy and signaled Moscow’s willingness to support a political solution that would almost certainly hasten Britain’s departure from Palestine.

The Soviet Union subsequently voted in favor of UN Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947. For Moscow, partition was not merely a humanitarian response to Jewish suffering. It was a geopolitical instrument designed to accelerate Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine and weaken British influence throughout the Middle East.

In the short term, Stalin succeeded. Britain abandoned the Mandate and withdrew. In the longer term, however, the strategy produced one of the great ironies of 20th century geopolitics. The state whose creation Moscow helped facilitate ultimately become America’s closest ally in the Middle East.

American Surprise and the Archival Record

The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) archives reveal how surprising Soviet support appeared to American policymakers. Many officials within the US State Department assumed Moscow opposed nationalism outside Communist control. Some feared the Kremlin might ultimately use the new Jewish state as a vehicle for Soviet influence in the region.

The FRUS records show extensive debates inside the Truman administration regarding Soviet intentions. George Kennan and other officials worried that Soviet support for partition reflected a broader effort to expand Moscow’s influence into the Middle East.

In one of history’s great ironies, American officials in 1947 feared that Israel might become a Soviet client state. The reality turned out quite differently.

When Washington Imposed an Arms Embargo and Moscow Supplied Weapons

Diplomatic support alone did not ensure Israel’s survival. In December 1947, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Palestine. While intended to be neutral, the embargo restricted access to weapons for Jewish forces preparing for what increasingly appeared to be an inevitable war.

At precisely this moment, the Soviet bloc stepped forward. Through communist Czechoslovakia, Moscow authorized extensive shipments of rifles, machine guns, artillery, ammunition, and aircraft. According to the scholarship of Gabriel Gorodetsky and archival materials examined by Laurent Rucker at the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), these transfers represented one of the most important external contributions to Israel’s survival during the 1948 war.

Among the most famous deliveries were Avia S-199 fighter aircraft that were imperfect descendants of the German Messerschmitt, but nevertheless proved critical to the fledgling Israeli Air Force. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion would later acknowledge the significance of Czech arms deliveries. Numerous Israeli military historians have concluded that these shipments helped alter the military balance during the crucial early months of the conflict.

This created one of the great ironies of Israel’s founding. While Washington was attempting to prevent escalation through an embargo, Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia became the principal supplier of weapons to Jewish forces. The result was a situation that would have seemed unimaginable only a few years later. Stalin was arming Israel while the United States was restricting arms shipments.

The Soviet Hope for a Socialist Israel

Moscow’s calculations extended beyond merely expelling Britain. Many Soviet officials believed the new state might evolve in a socialist direction. The dominant currents within Zionism were labor-oriented. The kibbutz system appeared compatible with socialist ideals. Many Israeli leaders originated from Eastern Europe and retained cultural connections to the broader socialist tradition. The Kremlin therefore believed Israel might emerge as either neutral or potentially sympathetic to Soviet interests.

This assumption proved to be one of Stalin’s greatest strategic miscalculations. Israel’s leaders increasingly concluded that their long-term economic and security interests lay with the West. However, before that shift became fully apparent, an extraordinary event in Moscow transformed Stalin’s perception of Israel and Soviet Jewry.

Golda Meir and the Synagogue That Alarmed Stalin

In September 1948, Golda Meir arrived in Moscow as Israel’s first ambassador. What followed shocked Soviet authorities. On October 3, during Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur celebrations, tens of thousands of Soviet Jews gathered around Moscow’s Choral Synagogue to greet her, chanting “Nasha Golda” (Our Golda”).

In her memoir My Life, Golda Meir recalled:

“I felt as though I had been caught up in a torment of love so strong that it had literally taken my breath away and slowed down my heart.”2

Many accounts estimate the crowd approached 50,000 people. For Soviet Jews, Israel’s creation represented a moment of profound emotional significance. For Stalin, however, the gathering carried a different meaning. The Soviet state demanded absolute loyalty. The spontaneous emergence of a mass public demonstration centered on Jewish identity suggested the existence of loyalties and affiliations beyond Communist Party control.

As Yaacov Ro’i has argued, the event became a turning point in Soviet perceptions of Zionism. Israel was no longer merely a foreign-policy instrument. It had become a potential source of identity and inspiration for Soviet Jews themselves. That realization profoundly disturbed Stalin.

Polina Zhemchuzhina and the End of the Soviet-Israeli Honeymoon

The Golda Meir episode intersected with one of the most remarkable personal dramas within the Soviet leadership. Polina Zhemchuzhina, wife of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, was among the most prominent Jewish women in the Soviet Union. She was often regarded as an unofficial First Lady due to her status within the Soviet elite.

According to memoir accounts and later historical studies, she met Golda Meir during the ambassador’s visit and reportedly conversed with her warmly in Yiddish. Whether every detail of these accounts is fully verifiable remains debated. What is not debated is what followed. Soon afterward, Stalin ordered her arrest. She was expelled from the Communist Party and exiled. Even Molotov could not protect her. Her downfall was among one of several factors that symbolized the rapid collapse of the brief Soviet-Israeli honeymoon.

From Israel to the Doctors’ Plot

By the early 1950s, Stalin’s attitude had changed dramatically. Jewish institutions came under increasing pressure. Members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were arrested and executed. Campaigns against so-called “rootless cosmopolitans” intensified.

The culmination was the Doctors’ Plot of 1952-53. Historians continue to debate whether Stalin intended broader anti-Jewish measures before his death in March 1953. What is clear is that Israel’s creation, Golda Meir’s reception in Moscow and Stalin’s growing fears regarding Zionism formed part of the political environment that contributed to these campaigns.

The same leader who had helped create Israel now viewed Zionism as a potential threat.

Why This History Matters Today

The Soviet strategy ultimately failed. Britain was expelled from Palestine, but Israel did not become a Soviet partner. Instead, it evolved into America’s closest regional ally. Yet the legacy of this history never disappeared.

More than one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe eventually settled in Israel. Russian remains widely spoken. Economic, cultural, familial and historical ties continue to connect the two countries. This helps explain why Russia’s relationship with Israel has often differed from its relations with other Western-aligned states.

Today, Moscow maintains close ties with Iran, Syria, and numerous Arab governments. It increasingly challenges American policy throughout the region. Yet Russia has consistently sought to preserve communication channels with Israel and often presents itself as a potential mediator.

This is not a contradiction. It reflects a longstanding Russian tradition of viewing the Middle East through the lens of state interests rather than ideological alignments. The origins of that approach can be traced directly to 1947 and 1948, when Stalin made one of the most consequential geopolitical gambles of the twentieth century.

In seeking to expel Britain from the Middle East, he helped create Israel. In hoping to gain a partner, he strengthened the Western camp. In supporting Jewish statehood abroad, he helped awaken fears of Jewish political identity at home that would contribute to some of the darkest episodes of his final years.

Few geopolitical decisions have produced such enduring consequences. The Soviet Union helped create Israel and the echoes of that forgotten decision continue to shape Middle Eastern politics nearly eight decades later.

Kautilya The Contemplator is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, please consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I will always be grateful for your support.

Most Russians are not closely following the war in Ukraine – Levada

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 6/11/26

Most Russians are no longer paying close attention to the war in Ukraine, according to the latest survey from the independent [western-backed] Levada Center, highlighting a gradual decline in public engagement with a conflict that has dominated Russian political life for more than four years.

The poll, conducted in June, found two thirds (66%) of Russians say they only casually or not particularly closely up from a third (35%) in March. Only 13% of respondents said they follow developments around Ukraine “very closely”, down from 29% in March 2022, shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. A further 28% said they follow events “fairly closely”, meaning that a combined 41% are actively monitoring the conflict, compared with 64% at the start of the war.

By contrast, 38% of respondents said they pay attention to the war “without particular attention”, while 28% said they do not follow it closely. Just 1% said they had not heard about the conflict or found it difficult to answer.

The findings suggest that the war has increasingly become part of the background of daily life for many Russians, despite continuing military operations and a growing number of attacks on Russian soil by long-range Ukrainian drones.

The decline in attention has been gradual rather than abrupt. Throughout 2022 and 2023, roughly half of respondents said they followed events in Ukraine either very or fairly closely. That share has steadily fallen during 2024 and 2025.

The results come as Russian authorities continue to present the conflict as a central national priority. State television devotes extensive coverage to military developments, while government officials regularly frame the war as a defining struggle against Nato.

Levada, one of Russia’s best-known polling organisations, has continued to track public attitudes towards the conflict since the invasion began. The organisation is designated a “foreign agent” by the Russian authorities, a label it rejects.

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