By Igor Slabykh, Kennan Institute, 4/5/24

Fifteen years after the death penalty was abolished in Russia, the country’s commitment to avoiding executions will be tested. Public officials and pro-Kremlin politicians have called for the lifting of the ban following the March 22 act of terror near Moscow. At least 144 people were killed and hundreds were injured in a brutal attack on the Crocus City Hall, a music venue on the outskirts of Moscow.

Executions, both legal and illegal under the Soviet law, were widely used during the Soviet period of Russia’s history. There were instances of spectacular abuse of justice even after Stalin. At one point in the 1960s, a death penalty was retroactively applied against persons convicted of an economic crime, ignoring the criminal law bedrock principle.

Drive to Join the West

In post-Soviet Russia, the decision to abstain from use of the death penalty has been strongly motivated by a desire to relegate the practice to history. The drive to abolish capital punishment was also associated with the gradual humanization of law enforcement and the country’s intention to join the institutions of the West.

Russia last executed a human in 1996. At the time, Russia was seeking to join the Council of Europe. The country’s participation in the European Convention on Human Rights was a condition for such membership. Russia was admitted to the organization on the condition, among other things, that it would accede to Protocol No. 6, which imposes on member states the obligation not to apply the death penalty.

Despite the lack of ratification of Protocol No. 6 by the Duma (it was signed by the president), Russia ceased executions. Initially, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s president between 1991 and 1999, simply stopped considering clemency for those sentenced to death. Without a refusal of clemency, the death penalty could not be carried out.

Death Penalty Effectively Banned

In 1999 the Constitutional Court of Russia issued a decision recognizing the impossibility of imposing a death sentence as the Russian constitution required jury trials for such a decision, and jury trials were not set up throughout the entire territory of Russia.

In 2009 the Constitutional Court clarified its old decision and stated that the courts could not apply the death penalty at all. The court declared that certain conditions had led to abolishment of the death penalty: the long nonapplication of capital punishment, Russia’s international obligations, and the temporary nature of the use of capital punishment in constitution.

The decision of the Constitutional Court was tested in the early 2000s when a court considered the case of Nur-Pashi Kulaev, the sole surviving perpetrator of the Beslan school siege. Quoting the Quran and discussing the principles of justice and the educative significance of the judgment, the prosecutor requested the court to sentence the defendant to death. The court acknowledged that the severity of the defendant’s actions warranted the death penalty. However, citing the abovementioned decision of the Constitutional Court, the court sentenced Kulaev to life imprisonment.

Today the decision to stop using the death penalty in Russia will once again be tested. However, there is no certainty that Russia will not return to the death penalty this time.

Torture Practices Publicized

The first signs that the requirements of legality would be sacrificed to political expediency emerged almost immediately after the attack. A video of the torture of detainees was posted online. In one case, a law enforcement officer cut off part of Saidakrami Rachabalizodа’s ear, after which, amid threats to cut off the detainee’s penis, he attempted to stuff the severed piece of the ear into the detainee’s mouth.

In another case, the video showed law enforcement officers torturing Shamsidin Faridun using an electric current directed toward the detainee’s genitals. It is self-evident that the videos were not leaked accidentally but rather deliberately by law enforcement.

Despite widespread discussion of the torture, the Investigative Committee and the court, which arrested all the detainees pending trial, were not interested. At the same time, signs of beatings could easily be seen on the faces of the accused in court.

Rachabalizodа had a bandage on his ear, and another accused, Muhammadsober Faizov, was in a wheelchair and accompanied by doctors. The Human Rights Commissioner, Tatiana Moskalkova, who herself is a former police general, has condemned the maltreatment of the prisoners as “inadmissable”; she has declared Russia to be a civilized and mature state where lynching has been avoided. Meanwhile, the defendants’ lawyers began to receive threats immediately after the court hearings and demands that they abandon the defense of their clients.

Talk of Lifting the Ban

Russian society has resumed discussions on the need for the death penalty. This debate is actively fueled by state propaganda. However, it remains unclear whether this is a deliberate operation to prepare public opinion or whether it falls within the usual activities of an authoritarian government trying to escalate hysteria regarding enemies of the state.

Back in 2015, a pro-Kremlin politician, Sergey Mironov, proposed lifting the moratorium on use of the death penalty for terrorists. This idea did not progress beyond the discussion phase. Currently, surveys indicate a surge in Russians’ interest in reinstating the death penalty. This increased interest, coupled with the Kremlin’s desire to conceal its failure and the unsubstantiated charge that Ukrainians were somehow involved, could be used to conduct a public and cruel trial with a predetermined outcome. Moreover, Russia, which withdrew from the Council of Europe after the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, is no longer interested in maintaining the moratorium on capital punishment.

The Constitutional Court of Russia’s decision to prohibit the death penalty is still in effect. In the history of modern Russia, however, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to submit the requirements of legality to those of political expediency. Therefore, it will surprise no one if the Constitutional Court finds grounds to change its position, citing war, extraordinary circumstances, or the protection of Russian citizens’ interests.

by Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The National Interest, 4/22/24

When examining the secret annex to the recently released Russian Foreign Policy Concept, many of my colleagues have zeroed in on the recommendations for how Russia ought to play a “sharp power” Wurlitzer piano—utilizing all the tools of disinformation, cyber intrusions, and election interference to cause political turmoil in the nations of the Euro-Atlantic world, with the ultimate goal of eroding the cohesion of the Western bloc.

While these certainly are important topics to focus on, what has struck me in reading this document is that the proposals in question—which only form a portion of the overall advisory points—arise not from a position of confidence but pessimism. In contrast to the relatively anodyne language of the publicly released concept, the annex clearly is concerned that Russia may be on the verge of being knocked out of the ranks of the major powers—and so lose its ability to shape global affairs. In other words, the annex assesses that the United States no longer seeks partnership with a near-peer Russia but wants to ensure that Russia becomes a non-peer competitor with declining and degraded foundations of national power.

Below the surface of the bureaucratic language of the document, I detected three strains of worry.

The first is that some thirty-five years after the Paris Charter laid the hope for achieving a common European home with Moscow as a full partner, the finality of the assessment that Russia will never be part of the Euro-Atlantic world in any shape or form, whether full membership or ongoing association. During his first two terms, Vladimir Putin’s post-9/11 gamble was that the United States would recognize Russia as a near co-equal partner for managing world affairs. When the outreach to George W. Bush faltered, and the Barack Obama reset foundered, Moscow shifted its efforts in the 2010s to craft a working relationship with Paris and Berlin (and perhaps Rome) to encourage some degree of European equidistance from Washington and Moscow. Both efforts are now recognized to be failures. There is no longer a question of whether there will once again be a line between Russia and the West—only where that line will be drawn and how formidable a barrier it will present. 

The second is the Russian recognition that the United States and its allies still largely manage the current international system despite all the rhetoric of multipolarity. Since the restart of major Russian combat operations in Ukraine in 2022, the United States has been working both to isolate Russia from the main sinews of the globalized system and to find ways to exclude Russia from any substantive decision-making and agenda-setting role in international affairs. Of particular concern for Moscow is the efficacy of measures attempting to cut Russia off from the mainstream of the global economy.

Finally, the annex is infused with the recognition that maintaining any degree of Russian autonomy and agenda-setting power in the international system now rests on the goodwill of China and of a set of middle-power countries—what The Economist has labeled the “transactional 25”—to maintain Russia as a hedge against the United States and the expanded “D-10” states (the G-7 countries and the EU plus Australia and South Korea). Russia hopes that the rising powers of the global south and east will be prepared to do more to check the United States—but in so doing, Moscow is also ceding the initiative to them and increasingly will have to accept their terms, especially for trade. This incentivizes Moscow to show how and where the United States is unreliable—particularly in showing that Washington cannot bridge its stated commitments and its actual ability to keep its promises.

The annex lays out recommendations to find ways for Russia to safely raise costs for the United States if it wishes to continue its expansive program of global engagement. It is based on the hope that the United States will recognize its limitations and accept that it can no longer afford to maintain the post-Cold War settlement—and thus will be more open to proposed Russian modifications.

Russia’s proposed revisions have generally proven to be unacceptable to most of the U.S. national security establishment, and if, since 2022, the United States accepts that Russia cannot be persuaded to change its approach, then reducing the sources of Russian power and influence is the logical assessment. However, recognizing that Moscow is not prepared to reduce its footprint to accord with American preferences voluntarily, the United States should not be surprised that Russia will use any means necessary to foil American efforts. There is no reason to expect Moscow to refrain from exploiting the U.S. (or allied) domestic political dysfunction or take advantage of American missteps (such as in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa).

The problem, of course, is that U.S. political leaders have promised Americans that the costs of forward engagement can be kept at a minimum. Russia did not create the growing sentiment that the United States must recalibrate and restrain its global activism, even if it seeks to benefit from it. The annex makes clear that much of the Russian establishment believes that the United States cannot coexist with Russia in its current configuration—and that America seeks changes in Russia’s position that would be highly detrimental to the present Russian political establishment. (This is why fantasies that Putin’s departure somehow magically improves U.S.-Russia relations are far-fetched.) If Washington assesses that those changes are necessary to achieve fundamental U.S. national interests, this annex serves as a wake-up call that meeting this challenge will prove neither easy nor inexpensive.

Wall Street Journal, 4/27/24

U.S. intelligence agencies have determined that Putin likely didn’t order Navalny to be killed at the notoriously brutal prison camp in February, people familiar with the matter said, a finding that deepens the mystery about the circumstances of his death.

“Make no mistake. Putin is responsible for Navalny’s death,” Biden said after the world learned of the death.

But the U.S. now believes the timing of his demise wasn’t intended by Putin.

Full article here.

US Spy Agencies Surprisingly Concluded That Putin Didn’t Order Navalny’s Death

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 4/28/24

The Wall Street Journal cited unnamed people familiar with the matter to report that the CIA, the National Directorate of Intelligence, and the State Department’s intelligence unit, among other US spy agencies, concluded that President Putin didn’t order Navalny’s death earlier this year. They still believe that he’s culpable since the US’ view is that he was wrongly imprisoned and lacked adequate medical care, but this disclosure still throws a wrench in the West’s information warfare operations.

Objective observers were already aware that “Putin Had No Reason To Kill Navalny But The West Has Every Reason To Lie That He Did”, with the first being due to the fact that he posed no threat to the Russian leader from behind bars while the second was attributable to their interest in smearing him. The West also wanted to reduce turnout during March’s presidential elections and pressure Congress into breaking its deadlock on Ukraine aid. Now that neither is relevant anymore, the truth is coming out. [https://korybko.substack.com/p/putin-had-no-reason-to-kill-navalny]

President Putin revealed during his re-election speech that he had actually approved swapping Navalny for unnamed Russian prisoners being held by the West before that convicted non-systemic opposition leader’s untimely demise that Ukrainian military-intelligence chief Budanov blamed on a blood clot. Even so, many anti-Russian activists in the West refused to believe either of those two, and this was in spite of them previously treating the latter’s words as gospel.

It remains unclear why US spy agencies reportedly concluded that the Russian leader didn’t order Navalny’s death despite being in positions of authority to launder this lie for easy soft power points against his country. One possible reason is that his public confirmation that he was about to be swapped made it difficult for them to cling to that story since it truly doesn’t make sense why President Putin would approve of that only to then turn around and kill him.

In other words, they couldn’t lend false credence to the initial narrative that he was responsible if they wanted to retain a semblance of credibility, though the consequence of doing so was that Biden was made to look like a fool after their boss claimed that “Putin is responsible for Navalny’s death.” Everyone interpreted that to mean that he ordered it, but their new caveat appears to be that he created the conditions for him to pass away prematurely from a medical issue, thus helping Biden “save face” a bit.

Nevertheless, many anti-Russian activists still can’t accept those spy agencies’ reported conclusion since it contradicts their secular cult’s dogma, namely that President Putin is personally responsible for every bad thing that happens to any non-systemic opposition member. It’s a matter of faith for them to believe this since failing to do so could lead to the unraveling of their entire movement. They therefore delusionally insist that they know him better than the entire American Intelligence Community does.

As two cases in point, the Wall Street Journal cited Russian-designated foreign agent Leonid Volkov (a member of the non-systemic opposition) and Polish think tank expert Slawomir Debski, who both claimed that Navalny was killed at President Putin’s orders or at least with his tacit approval in advance. By divorcing themselves more and more from reality, they’re further discrediting the West’s information warfare operations, which works to Russia’s cynical benefit in the soft power sense.

The Bell, 4/5/24

Nationalizations in Russia begin to hit smaller firms

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been a wave of high-profile nationalizations in Russia, mainly affecting big business people and powerful officials. Now, however, there are more and more cases of the state seizing relatively minor assets from low-level tycoons, and even those without any significant personal wealth.

• Significant incidents involving the state seizure of assets from wealthy Russians amid the war in Ukraine include auto trader Rolf (owned by former opposition parliamentary deputy Sergei Petrov) and chemical company Metafrax. In January, Russian prosecutors even ordered 13 plots of land along Moscow region’s prestigious Rublyovskoye Shosse be seized by the state (Rublyovka has long been regarded as Russia’s Millionaire’s Row). 
• In a significant legal dispute over the nationalization of a magnesium factory in the central Russian city of Solikamsk, prosecutors Wednesday stated that they do not believe the apparently legal acquisition by minority shareholders of a stake in the plant on the Moscow Exchange was made in good conscience. This is a major case, which appears to be setting a precedent for further seizures.   
• The most recent target for nationalization is Russia’s biggest pasta company: Makfa. At the end of last month, it emerged that prosecutors had filed a lawsuit for the state to seize Makfa, and dozens of related companies. They estimated the combined value of the companies at about $500 million.
• The lawsuit names businessmen Mikhail Yurevich and Vadim Belousov as Makfa’s beneficiaries. In the 1990s, the two men privatized pasta and flour plants in the Ural mountains Chelyabinsk Region. Like many other such  business people, Makfa’s owners went on to enter politics. Yurevich became mayor of Chelyabinsk, a city of 1.2 million people, then governor of the region. Belousov was a parliamentary deputy from 2011 to 2023. The justification for nationalizing Makfa is that, after the two were elected to government roles, they continued to do business. But this seems a very thin excuse – hundreds of other Russian entrepreneurs followed a similar path.  
• Nationalizations have even begun to affect ordinary homeowners. Russian-installed officials in the occupied Ukrainian region of Zaporizhzhia this week announced their intention to pass a law to nationalize “abandoned” Ukrainian houses. While details are unclear, it seems that anyone who leaves the area could potentially lose their property. The authorities are promising to transfer nationalized housing to doctors, teachers and construction workers. 

Why the world should care

Russia appears to be undergoing its greatest redistribution of wealth in three decades. The idea of 1990s privatization was to create a new capitalist class that would help prevent a return to Communism. Now, asset transfers appear designed to boost loyalty to the Kremlin.

Russia’s ballooning budget deficit

Russia’s budget deficit has almost reached its planned annual limit (1.6 trillion rubles) in the first two months of this year, according to Finance Ministry figures. At the end of February the deficit stood at 1.5 trillion rubles. At the same time, spending in January and February hit 6.5 trillion rubles – up 17.2% on the same period a year ago.

• How significant is this? Last year’s deficit came to 3 trillion rubles ($32 billion), and economists expect Russia to surpass that this year. However, Russia’s budget deficit isn’t big by global standards. In 2023, the deficit amounted to 1.9% of GDP, in 2022 it was 2.1%. That’s lower than the European maximum, established in 1992 with the creation of the European Union. Russia also has low levels of debt. 
• Amid the war in Ukraine, the main source of funds to plug the deficit has been Russia’s rainy day fund, the National Welfare Fund (NWF). The cost of supporting Russia’s economy has almost halved the fund’s liquid assets from 8.9 trillion rubles before the invasion of Ukraine to 5 trillion rubles at the beginning of this month.
• Such a drop, however, is not critical, according to economist Dmitry Polevoy. The remaining liquid part of the NWF amounts to about 3.3% of GDP, which is better than the 2019 minimum of 2.1 trillion rubles (1.5% of GDP).
• The NWF is usually topped up with windfall oil revenues. But this year its liquid assets are likely to dwindle further. 
• Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said late in 2023 that liquid NWF funds could be exhausted this year if oil prices plunge. The average price for Russian oil would have to fall to $48 a barrel for this to happen (if spending remained as planned), an economist at one of Russia’s leading investment banks calculated for The Bell.

Why the world should care

The extent of Russia’s budget deficit does not tell you very much about the country’s financial stability – it’s more important to look at where the money is coming from to pay for it. The fact is that, as long as oil prices remain relatively high, Russia will have plenty of cash to continue running deficits of this size.

By Riley Waggaman, Substack, 4/26/24

The arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, who is accused of accepting a large bribe, has sparked a great deal of speculation on the Russian Internet. And with good reason.

Ivanov is Shoigu’s man. He served as deputy governor during Shoigu’s brief stint as head of Moscow Oblast before following his patron to the Defense Ministry. (If you’re looking for more background info on Ivanov, Rurik has a fun writeup.)

Also, everyone knew that Timur had been embezzling gazillions of rubles and pocketing gargantuan bribes for a long time. So why cuff him now, just a few weeks before Putin will pick a new cabinet?

It is these two things—the fact that Ivanov is part of Team Shoigu, and the timing of his arrest—which suggest that Ivanov might not be the only high-ranking official to get the boot. This is what patriotic, pro-SMO Russian media outlets are saying, at least.

Here’s a comment from a political scientist published by Nakanune:

It is clear that the official wording of the charge—a bribe of a million rubles—is only the beginning of the process, other charges will be added. Ivanov’s case had been in the works for a long time, the dossier was plump, the president personally issued the order for the arrest warrant and, probably, it is no coincidence that this happened right now, because after May 7, after the inauguration of the president, nominations for the main positions will be made—and this, of course, a signal that our Department of Defense may be about to change.

We need to look at the appointments that will be made; the whole logic of the process suggests that our Minister of Defense may also change.

Read full post here.

Here is further reporting from Reuters.

Arrest of Russian defence minister’s deputy may be strike by rival ‘clan’

By Andrew Osborn, Reuters, 4/26/24

LONDON, April 26 (Reuters) – Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister, has tried to send a “business as usual” message since his deputy was arrested on a bribery charge. But the widening scandal looks bad for him too, and is seen as a push by a rival clan to dilute his power.

On the surface, the timing of the detention on Tuesday of Timur Ivanov, one of Shoigu’s 12 deputy ministers, was unexpected, coming when Russia is waging war in Ukraine and the authorities have made discrediting the army a jailable offence.

Allegations of graft funding a lifestyle way beyond his means made against 48-year-old Ivanov by the late opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation had been in the public domain for more than a year with no apparent fallout.

Yet this week state TV suddenly showed Russians a perplexed-looking Ivanov – who denies wrongdoing – dressed in full military uniform, standing in a clear plastic courtroom cage of the type that so many Kremlin foes have occupied before him.

His arrest, say Russian political analysts including some former insiders, shows how the war is shaping infighting between the “clans” that jostle for wealth and influence in Russia’s sharp-elbowed political system.

The clans – alliances of like-minded officials or business people – centre around the military, the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the military-industrial complex and also include a group of people from President Vladimir Putin’s native St Petersburg who have known him personally for many years.

“Someone in the elite didn’t like the fact that Shoigu had grown stronger,” Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told Reuters.

“This doesn’t comes from Putin, but from people who are close to Putin who think that Shoigu has overplayed his hand. It’s simply a battle against someone and a ministry that has got too powerful and an attempt to balance the situation.”

Abbas Gallyamov, a former Kremlin speechwriter who is now designated as a “foreign agent” by the authorities, said he too saw the arrest as an attack on Shoigu that would weaken him.

“Ivanov is one of the closest people to Shoigu. His arrest on the eve of the appointment of a new government suggests that the current minister’s chances of staying in his chair are sharply declining,” he said.

Ivanov was arrested as a result of an investigation by the counterintelligence arm of the FSB security service, according to Russian state media.

LUCRATIVE MILITARY CONTRACTS

Ivanov’s is the highest-profile corruption case since Putin sent troops into Ukraine in 2022. State media have reported that Shoigu has removed Ivanov from his post.

The scandal comes just two weeks before Putin is inaugurated for a fifth presidential term and before a government reshuffle expected next month at which Shoigu’s job will, in theory, be up for grabs.

Ivanov was in charge of lucrative army construction and procurement contracts and is accused of taking huge bribes in the form of services worth, according to Russian media reports, at least 1 billion roubles ($10.8 million) in return for handing out defence ministry contracts to certain companies.

While few are willing to bet Shoigu will lose his job because of the scandal, given his loyalty to Putin, Ivanov’s arrest is seen as a reversal for his boss, who’s influence and access to the Kremlin chief has been elevated by his key role in the Ukraine war.

The Moscow Times cited a senior government official as calling the arrest a serious blow to Shoigu’s camp and cited a source close to the defence ministry as saying that the arrest was more about politics and “Sergei Shoigu’s weakening position” than about Ivanov.

Shoigu and the top army brass have at times been the focus of vicious criticism from Russian war bloggers and nationalists who have accused him, particularly after a string of retreats in 2022, of incompetence.

Shoigu survived an abortive coup led by Wagner mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, since killed in a plane crash, who in June last year orchestrated a march on Moscow to try to topple him, but his authority was damaged. Putin said the events could have plunged Russia into civil war.

‘FEASTING IN A TIME OF PLAGUE’

Shoigu had since managed to win back Putin’s trust, but the arrest of his deputy is a renewed setback.

“It indirectly damages Shoigu. Questions arise. How is it that a person who was close to him and who he brought on managed to steal so much under Shoigu’s own nose?” said Carnegie’s Stanovaya.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, has forecast that Shoigu, in post since 2012, will keep his job regardless.

“Everyone is wondering – could this be a signal to Shoigu that he will not be in the next government after 7 May?” Markov wrote on his official blog.

“Calm down. He will be. Shoigu has created a new army since the disastrous year of 2022 which repelled the offensive of the Ukrainian army in 2023. And in 2024, the army is already advancing.”

There is much about the background to Ivanov’s arrest that remains unknown. Multiple theories are circulating in Moscow about whether the bribery accusation is the whole story, with unconfirmed media reports that he may also be accused of state treason, something his lawyer has denied.

Some have suggested that it was perhaps his love of a Western lifestyle at a time when Putin says Russia is engaged in an existential struggle with the West that may have been his downfall.

Others believe his family’s fondness for luxury European holidays, yacht rentals, Rolls-Royce cars and opulent parties was fine before the war but was now seen as “feasting at a time of plague”, a Russian literary reference.

Shoigu has remained silent on the scandal, inspecting a space launch facility this week as if nothing had happened.

The Kremlin has told journalists to rely solely on official sources and has said that the often vast construction projects which Ivanov oversaw – such as the reconstruction of the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol – will not be affected. ($1 = 92.2705 roubles)